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Abstract 
In the early 1970s, microfinance came to public attention as a promising tool to reduce 
poverty. However, some people began to claim that microcredit is unsuitable for sustainable 
development. Nevertheless, the lack of scientific support for both viewpoints has created a 
need for empirical studies to disentangle whether microfinance interventions should be 
implemented, and if so, how. The objective of this thesis is to provide evidence on the role of 
microfinance in Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Mexico. The main innovation of 
this study is the focus on four topics that have thus far received relatively little attention. 
Firstly, the relationship between efficiency and the ownership structure of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in Latin America is investigated. Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and Cooperative/Credit Unions are found to be less technically efficient and have an 
inferior technology relative to Banks and Non-Banks Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs). 
Secondly, this study assesses five different microfinance programs on household welfare in 
Mexico. The findings reveal that savings-oriented microfinance programs outperform 
programs that primarily offer microcredit, in reducing poverty. Thirdly, the impact of 
microfinance on vulnerability to poverty is analyzed. The results of this analysis show that 
membership in a savings and credit society in Mexico improves the well-being of households 
and reduces their vulnerability. Finally, the impact of the loan officer’s characteristics on 
determining repayment rates in microfinance is examined. The main outcome suggests that 
the gender of the loan officer and his/her professional experience are important determinants 
of repayment rates. Further conclusions are that loan officers who work longer in Pro Mujer 
have higher default probabilities and that peer monitoring of group members is not a 
significant determinant of loan default. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Scope 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs)
1
 have emerged since the 1970s as an important tool to 
reduce poverty, particularly for women, by giving access to small loans. In 1976, the Grameen 
Bank was established in Bangladesh and the model has been extensively replicated in other 
developing economies. Banco Sol in Bolivia and Bank Rakyat in Indonesia are two examples 
of this. Daley-Harris (2006) reports that, between December 1997 and December 2005, the 
number of microcredit institutions increased from 618 to 3,133. Similarly, the number of 
recipients (84% of whom are women) rose from 13.5 million to 113.3 million during the same 
period (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). 
This massive growth in the number of MFIs and recipients gave birth to the microfinance 
revolution. Microcredit has become extremely popular and has been met with much 
enthusiasm among supporters from around the world. The positive viewpoint on microfinance 
was that it had the potential to serve as an important tool to enable poor people, especially 
entrepreneurial women, to accumulate assets and to reduce their vulnerability to poverty. In 
recognition of this potential, the United Nations declared 2005 as the International Year for 
Microcredit. According to this organization, microcredit can contribute significantly to 
achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015. In October 
2006, attention on microfinance was intensified when Mohammad Yunus, the founder of the 
                                                 
1
 Microfinance institutions (MFIs) cover different institutional forms: non-governmental organizations, credit 
unions, non-bank financial intermediaries, cooperatives, and state-owned and commercial banks. They provide 
small loans to poor people to enable them to establish or expand income-generating projects aimed at reducing 
poverty. Some of these MFIs are subsidized credit institutions, whereas others have become sustainable 
commercial financial institutions. 
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Grameen Bank, received the Nobel Peace Prize. As a result, donors, governments, and 
investors have been channeling huge amounts of resources into microfinance.  
However, many MFIs worldwide have been replicating the original Grameen Bank model 
instead of adapting and innovating it to the specific complexities in which the institutions are 
operating (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). According to Zeller and Meyer (2002), such adaptations 
are the first step towards realizing the intended goals of these organizations. Furthermore, 
recently an increased focus on the commercialization of microfinance has emerged; this may 
imply a deviation from the original objectives of poverty alleviation focused on women as the 
target group, towards a vast for-profit orientation (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011), potentially 
at the expense of poor borrowers. MFIs such as Compartamos Bank in Mexico have been 
condemned for charging exorbitant interest rates and targeting non-poor borrowers to advance 
their financial performance. In addition, due to the recent economic crisis in the southern 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, some people claim that microcredit has even induced suicides. 
As a result, enthusiasm for microfinance appears to be dissipating very quickly. Bateman 
(2010) even argues that microfinance may prove to be an obstacle to sustainable development 
and poverty reduction. However, both the existing negative viewpoint and the extremely 
positive view of microfinance lack serious scientific support.  
The current thrust to ascertain the central role of microfinance in development policies 
requires a broadening of the research agenda to allow for investigation of a number of 
unresolved issues. Since MFIs developed in the 1970s, several major branches of literature 
have focused on explaining how and why microfinance works from a theoretical perspective 
and how microfinance programs are sustainable (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). However, most 
of the empirical evidence is anecdotal and only a few reliable analyses have been conducted 
that evaluate the real contribution of microfinance to reduction of poverty and vulnerability. 
Another poorly researched issue is governance: how does the ownership structure of MFIs 
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affect their functioning; and what is the role of loan managers, the intermediates between 
MFIs and their clients? Thus there are a large number of unresolved issues inadequately 
addressed up to now, and it is clear that further studies of microfinance are essential. This 
study aims to shed some light on these unexplained issues.  
 
Accordingly, the innovative value of this thesis with respect to existing microfinance literature 
is threefold. First, the novel type of research questions that this study focuses on are very 
important for microfinance policy; however, they have scarcely been examined in 
microfinance literature. Second, we use a plethora of methodological approaches and data 
sets, and the most appropriate techniques have been applied to tackle the research questions 
under study. Longitudinal data have primarily been used to overcome methodological 
drawbacks that are known to hinder the real impact of microfinance on poverty reduction and 
the economic performance of MFIs. Third, the focus of the research is on a single region, 
namely Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Mexico. The rationale of focusing only 
on Latin America/Mexico is that this is a homogeneous region; thus, the research outcomes 
can be attributed to the characteristics of the programs and institutions under study rather than 
to regional disparities and/or heterogeneity in market conditions. 
1.2 Research Objectives  
The main objective of this study is to evaluate empirically the economic performance and the 
poverty impact of different types of MFIs. We tackle this core objective by using five 
different units of analysis (i.e. loans, borrowers, loan officers, households, and institutions), 
three representative data sets, and four different approaches. These strategies allow  to deal 
with four specific research objectives, as follows: 
Chapter 1 
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i) to examine the relationship between efficiency and ownership structure of MFIs by 
measuring the intra-type and inter-type efficiency  (Lansink et al., 2001) of four different 
types of MFI (non-governmental organizations [NGOs], cooperative/credit unions, non-
bank financial intermediaries [NBFIs], and banks) operating across 18 countries in Latin 
America from 2003 to 2009.   
ii) to evaluate the relative importance of different types of microfinance services on poverty 
reduction (savings, microcredit, and cash transfers) by considering the impact of different 
microfinance programs on poverty reduction: savings and credit societies (SACPs); the 
Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program (PATMIR); the traditional MFIs; the 
National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI); and the COOPERA cash 
transfers program. Some of these programs focus more on savings, while others offer 
mainly microcredit. We test which of the five microfinance programs has been most 
effective in improving the well-being of microfinance recipients relative to a comparable 
group of non-participants.  
iii) to assess whether being a member of an SACP in Mexico reduces vulnerability to poverty. 
For this purpose, we analyze the impact of being banked on the mean and the variance of 
three different household indicators: per capita income, per capita education expenses, and 
per capita expenditure. 
iv) to investigate whether the loan officer’s personal characteristics determine repayment rates 
in joint-liability group-lending microfinance in Pro Mujer Mexico. In doing so, we link 
loans to borrowers and borrowers to loan officers in a three-level hierarchical structure and 
allow for correlation of observations between hierarchical levels. 
1.3 Methodological Approaches  
In this study, we have used a variety of methodological approaches to provide answers to the 
specific research questions that we have formulated in each empirical chapter. We have 
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chosen the best methods at our disposal to overcome methodological drawbacks such as 
endogeneity or selection bias problems that frequently undermine impact studies of social 
programs. In particular, we have used the following methods: 
1) Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which is a parametric method used to evaluate the 
technical efficiency of different ownership types of MFIs in Latin America. This method 
allows for the observed production of a particular MFI to deviate from the efficient 
frontier, due to either random events or possible inefficiencies (Gregoire and Tuya, 
2006); further, it incorporates an error term that captures irregularities in the data, a 
suitable property when analyzing information from developing countries (Paxton, 2007). 
This method allows for the testing of some hypotheses in Chapter 2. 
2) The Hausman‒Taylor (1981) estimator. This is an instrumental variable approach that 
uses the variation between and within strictly exogenous variables in other periods as 
instruments (Baltagi, 2001). It serves as a suitable method for controlling for 
endogeneity problems in impact studies where the researcher lacks good instruments. 
We use this method in Chapter 3 to assess the impact of different microfinance 
programs on poverty reduction. 
3) Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test. This test permits the quantification of 
performance variability, both across-household and within-household. We use this 
method in Chapter 4 to estimate the impact of membership in an SACP saving 
institution in Mexico on the reduction of household vulnerability to poverty.  
4) Multilevel analysis. This is a novel method that controls for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity at different levels: loan, borrower, and loan officer. It also allows for 
correlation of observations at different levels: loans to borrowers and borrowers to 
loan officers. We use this approach in Chapter 5 in order to investigate the role of a 
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loan officer’s personal characteristics and of peer monitoring on determining 
repayment rates in joint-liability group-lending microfinance. 
1.4 Description of the Data  
The empirical results presented in this thesis are based on both secondary and primary data, 
which are longitudinal. This means that we have repeated observations over the same unit of 
analysis: loan, borrower, loan officer, household, or institutions per year or per credit cycle. In 
the subsequent section, the particular data sets are described. 
The MIX Market Data Set. This panel set was constructed with data from the well-known 
microfinance information exchange network − MIX market. This platform is among the most 
renowned and extensive databases in worldwide microfinance and includes high-quality self-
reported information provided by more than 800 MFIs operating in four geographical regions 
(see www.mixmarket.org). From this source, we extracted information for a single region, 
Latin America. Our data set consists of financial and outreach indicators of 315 MFIs 
operating across 18 Latin American countries from 2003 to 2009. Ultimately, we built a panel 
set of 1,681 observations to tackle the core objective of Chapter 2, i.e. to estimate the 
technical efficiency of four different types of MFIs: NGOs, credit unions, NBFIs, and banks. 
The BANSEFI Household Panel Survey. This is a comprehensive panel survey pertaining to 
savings, credit, and rural microfinance, conducted annually in Mexico from 2004 to 2007 by 
the BANSEFI bank in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural 
Development, Fisheries, and Food (SAGARPA). This survey contains data that capture 
differences in access to financial services for a sample of banked and non-banked households. 
The panel set includes information about urban and rural households living in one of the three 
geographical regions: central, south, and north. In total, surveyors visited 27 of the 32 
Mexican states to obtain information about households that did or did not participate in 
Introduction 
7 
 
financial institutions such as savinsg and credit societies, credit unions, cooperative societies, 
cajas solidarias, NGOs, the BANSEFI bank, and newly-established PATMIR branches. 
The survey was conducted at the household level using probability proportional to size 
sampling techniques. First, households in which family members were clients of any financial 
institution included in the sampling frame during the five years prior to the survey (i.e., since 
1999) were included as the treatment group. Second, comparable households in the same or 
nearby communities to the treatment group were asked filter questions in order to identify 
households that did not have any family member who was a client of a financial institution at 
the time of the survey and five years prior to it. Consequently, households that passed the 
filter questions were identified as non-banked and formed part of the control group (Berumen 
and Associates, 2006). The original sample in 2004 included 5,768 households: 2,975 
treatment households and 2,793 control households. However, attrition was somewhat higher 
for households without an account in 2004 (37.1%) than for those with an account (31.5%). 
Furthermore, new households were added in 2006 and 2007, leading to a sample size in the 
final survey of 3,722. In total, the survey offers detailed information about 6,976 households 
over the four-year period.  
To address the main objective of Chapter 3, we use 18,933 observations from households that 
bank with one of the five different microfinance programs: (1) the SACPs; (2) PATMIR; (3) 
the BANSEFI bank; (4) the traditional MFIs; and the COOPERA cash transfers program and 
a comparable group of non-banked households living in the same or in a nearby community. 
However, in Chapter 4, we reduced the sample size to only 14,245 observations, which 
correspond to households associated with savings and credit institutions linked to two of the 
above-mentioned programs: SACP and PATMIR. The rationale of this last step is to evaluate 
to what extent microfinance institutions focusing primarily on savings contribute to a 
reduction of household vulnerability to poverty. In both Chapters, 3 and 4, we extract detailed 
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information on the banking status of households as well as on a wide range of household 
welfare indicators (such as income and expenditures, economic activities, formal and informal 
assets and liabilities, transaction costs, self-employment [farm and off-farm activities], risk 
and insurance, remittances, and public cash transfers) and on regional characteristics in order 
to test the specific hypotheses that we formulate for these empirical investigations.  
The Pro Mujer Data Set. This set consists of hand-collected primary data from a survey 
conducted in collaboration with Pro Mujer Mexico, an NGO working with the village banking 
methodology. We conducted interviews between December 2010 and March 2011 in 18 
branches of Pro Mujer Mexico in four states: Mexico, Puebla, Distrito Federal, and Tlaxcala. 
These four states correspond to two adjacent regions: (1) the Mexico‒Distrito Federal region, 
which includes 12 branches, and (2) the Puebla‒Tlaxcala region, which features six branches. 
In total, we collected information from 57 loan officers and 407 borrowers. These data were 
gathered from interviews with the support of 25 trained enumerators and cross-checked with 
inspections of the archives of Pro Mujer, which contain reports of group meetings including 
the number of defaults incurred. Borrowers were randomly selected from the client portfolios 
of the loan officers. We interviewed about 5 per cent of the clients for each loan officer. For 
all loans overseen by a single loan officer, we collected information on the associated officer 
whenever possible, either through interviews with the current loan officers or by tracking and 
interviewing former loan officers. Most of these officers were working as branch managers 
for Pro Mujer at the time of the surveys, although some had left the institution and could not 
be traced. We discarded loans administered by two or more loan officers, as it is simply 
impossible to link these loans to a consistent set of loan officer characteristics. We ultimately 
included in our estimation a total sample of 57 loan officers and a panel of 650 loans to 407 
borrowers. In Table 1.1 below, we summarize the specific characteristics of each particular 
data set used in the four empirical studies that this thesis encompasses. 
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1.5 Background  Information on  Microfinance Programs in Mexico 
Microfinance programs in Mexico only started to develop at the beginning of the 1990s.  At 
that time, local and international organizations such as Financiera Compartamos, Pro Mujer, 
the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), Asesoría Dinámica a 
Microempresas (ADMIC), and Fondo 5 de Mayo began operations. These institutions offered 
financial services to thousands of microfinance recipients through Solidarity Groups or 
Village Banking methods. By 2008, almost all these MFIs became members of Pro 
Desarrollo, A.C. (www.prodesarrollo.org), a national microfinance network that makes 
financial and outreach data from those affiliated MFIs available to the public.  
At the same time, the Mexican government has also encouraged the development of micro-
credit programs in Mexico to give households access to financial services. For instance, in 
2001 the PRONAFIM (National Program for Financing Microenterprises), the FOMMUR 
(Microfinance Fund for Rural Women) and the PATMIR (Program of Technical Assistance 
Table 1.1  Description of the Panel Data Sets used in the Empirical Studies   
 
Dataset Region Period Unit of analysis  
Number 
of units
1
 
Number of 
observations
1
 
MIX market data set  Latin America 2003‒2009 
Microfinance 
institution (MFI) 
315 1,681 
BANSEFI panel survey 
Mexico: 27 states, 
3 regions 
2004‒2007 Household 6,976 18,933 
Pro Mujer data set 
Mexico: 4 states, 
2 regions 
2010‒2011 
Borrower 
Loan officer 
407 
57 
650
2 
1
 These figures correspond to the maximum number of units of observations for each study 
2
 Loan observations 
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for Rural Microfinance) were launched as strategies to support financial institutions working 
with low-income recipients, especially those living in rural areas where financial services are 
limited. In addition, Rural Development Banks (e.g. FIRA and Financiera Rural); the socially-
oriented BANSEFI bank; and commercial banks such as BANORTE and  BANAMEX have 
initiated joint ventures with MFIs to maximize the number of people in Mexico who can 
benefit from micro-finance services. 
Besides the aforementioned traditional MFIs, the BANSEFI census conducted in 2002 
enumerated more than 800 credit and savings institutions including Cooperatives, Credit 
Unions, Societies of Savings and Public Credit, and Civil Associations, among others. The 
majority of these institutions are still undergoing a process of regulation; however they are 
known to play a key role in facilitating access to credit, deposits and other types of assistance 
to low-income groups including ethnic people living in rural areas where no financial 
institutions exist. Below, a brief description of five different microfinance programs is 
presented. These programs encompass all the types of financial institutions which are the 
subject of this study. 
 
1.5.1 The Public Savings and Credit Societies Program (SACP) 
This program includes small, community-based organizations created by local people using 
their own savings and public cash transfers from the government. Even though SACP 
institutions play an important role in financial inclusion in rural areas, there is still only 
minimal information available concerning their operation and type of clients. Most institutions 
are operating in communities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and lack technological 
innovation (e.g. internet, computers, efficient accounting systems), which leads to high 
transaction costs and cost inefficiencies (Paxton, 2006). 
Introduction 
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The major share of capital in the total portfolio of SACP institutions are savings coming from 
recipients participating in village banks. Thus, these institutions have not been highly reliant 
on external aid from donors or public subsidies, unlike the traditional microfinance 
institutions. In Table 1.2 we show a summary of indicators from financial institutions 
operating in this category. 
Table 1.2 Key Indicators of  SACP Financial Institutions by Legal Status 
Type of Institution 
Average 
number of 
members 
% 
Female 
clients 
% Rural 
clients 
    
Saving and Credit Cooperative (CAP) 5,337 54 51 
    
Saving and Credit  Society (SAP) 105,987 53 14 
    
Credit Union (UC) 2,163 37 66 
    
Caja Solidaria (CS) 1,154 29 92 
    
Civil Association (AC) 6,746 58 58 
    
Other 5,951 53 65 
Source: Author’s compilation. Database property of the BANSEFI bank; SACP Census 
2002. 
 
Until now, the heterogeneity of SACP institutions represents a challenge for the Mexican 
financial authorities. On the one hand, institutions of 100,000 to 1 million clients operate with 
efficient accounting systems, are regulated, and aim for financial-sustainability. Meanwhile 
other institutions are very small, with 1,000 to 10,000 clients; they still rely on rudimentary 
accounting systems and have very low levels of technology. These smaller institutions 
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struggle to achieve cost-efficiency (Paxton, 2006). In 2002, the Mexican government 
launched a public policy to regulate and support all SACP institutions in filling the gaps in the 
provision of financial services, particularly in rural communities, by means of supporting 
them with technological innovations, resulting in the PATMIR program. 
 
1.5.2 The Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program (PATMIR) 
The Mexican government launched this initiative with two purposes: 1) to assist SACP 
institutions to comply with the regulation imposed by the financial authorities which started in  
2001; and 2) to provide specialized technical assistance and capital to new or existing SACP 
institutions confronting technological constraints and high inefficiencies (Zapata, 2007). The 
adaptability of this program to rural-ethnic communities was critical as 72% of the rural 
indigenous population lives in those communities within PATMIR’s operational area. Table 
1.3 presents some basic indicators of affiliated PATMIR institutions. 
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Table 1.3 Basic  Indicators of PATMIR Institutions   
Name of the Institution 
Total  
clients 
% 
Ethnic 
clients 
% 
Female 
clients 
Average 
Savings 
(MXN 
pesos) 
Average 
Credit 
(MXN 
pesos) 
Caja Solidaria Zongolica 11,853 80 51 1811.7 1868.61 
      
Caja Solidaria  Santa Catarina Ticua 690 71 53 10821.7 8549.26 
      
Sociedad Cooperativa San Andrés Coyutla 4,208 55 63 3751.13 2224.33 
      
Caja Solidaria  Kondoy 494 100 62 1591.16 4467.2 
      
Caja Solidaria  Xamanká 729 99 41 216.25 139.32 
      
Fondo Cooperativo Zihualtme Kimpantiyá 
Tekitice 971 95 55 69.92 1693.85 
      
Caja Solidaria El Porvenir 28 93 46 555.13 3073.17 
      
Caja Solidaria Mulmeyah 3,173 82 79 165.08 4277.57 
      
Caja Solidaria San Dionisio Ocotepec 967 75 61 4070.97 10694.44 
      
Caja Solidaria Cosoltepec 91 58 34 959.47 3804.51 
      
Caja Solidaria Bahía de la Buena Pelea 2,715 51 42 2813.65 758.97 
      
Cajin 1,704 97 66 2414.06 2538.17 
      
Caja Cristo Rey 10,349 96 61 1772.57 2667.2 
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Caja La Sagrada Familia 4,298 75 68 2848.14 2301.37 
      
Caja Natividad  2,208 63 69 1469.31 2045.39 
      
Chindé Etnyo 2,220 56 58 2291.19 2323.22 
      
Caja Solidaria Tosepantomin 7,802 87 67 5358.67 2403.86 
SERFINSO 4,143 60 41 1193.1 294.04 
Source: Unidad Técnica Operativa, PATMIR; García De la Cruz, M. (2011).  
Assessment of the Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program (PATMIR).  
 
Initially, the PATMIR program was expected to integrate more than 80,000 clients from 
Mexico’s poorest, most marginalized groups. To achieve this goal, consultant organizations 
and participating institutions worked extensively within three regions of the country in 13 
States (Taber, 2004). Although this program has been transferred between State Secretaries 
over the last decade, it is still operating and is fulfilling the initial goals of supporting financial 
institutions with recipients located in rural communities where poverty levels are high and the 
supply of financial services is very limited. In the following section we describe some features 
of traditional microfinance institutions which differ from the SACP institutions described in 
this paragraph and in the previous section. 
 
1.5.3 The Traditional Microfinance Institutions (MFI)   
This program comprises institutions that do not share the same organizational structure and 
socio-economic objectives as the mainstream unregulated SACP or PATMIR institutions. 
Most traditional MFIs typically target urban women, although some exceptions are 
Introduction 
 
15 
Compartamos Bank, Finca, and Solucion Asea, who manage a portfolio of more than 90% of 
rural women. Table 1.4 shows some basic indicators from the most representative MFIs in 
this program. 
Table 1.4  Key Indicators of  Traditional  MFIs in Mexico   
Institution 
Age 
(# years) 
Active 
Clients 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio  
(US Dollars)* 
Average Loan 
Size  
(US Dollars)* 
% 
Rural 
% 
Female 
Methodology 
Compartamos Bank 20 1,961,995 790,202,429 402.75 90 98 Village Banking 
F. Independencia 17 1,399,978 467,453,303 1,294.90 0 - 
Individual  
Lending 
Provident México 8 597,696 139,937,799 263.32 8 70 
Individual 
Lending 
CAME 17 232,856 54,392,725 405.91 0 80 
Village 
Banking; 
Individual L. 
FinComún 16 145,218 55,204,049 895.63 0 53 
Individual 
Lending 
FINCA 19 122,614 37,679,671 491.09 95 96 Village Banking 
Apoyo Económico 6 111,786 65,199,540 3,697.33 0 52 
Individual 
Lending 
CrediEquipos 17 77,239 21,260,892 360.24 10 92 
Solidarity 
Group 
Solución Asea 8 64,152 15,524,934 392.96 90 91 Village Banking 
FinAmigo 7 59,695 8,801,665 629.31 99 73 
Solidarity 
Group 
ProMujer 10 27,284 8,897,623 326.07 - 97 Village Banking 
Source: Author's compilation from Prodesarrollo (www.prodesarrollo.com.mx) and Mix Market (www.mixmarket.org). December 2010); 
* Based on an average exchange rate of  12.35 MXN  pesos per 1 US dollar from December 2010 with data from the Mexican Bank 
(http://www.banxico.org.mx). 
 
An imminent process of commercialization in Mexico is motivating traditional MFIs to aim at 
becoming financially sustainable in the near future. However, this trend may be at the expense 
of poverty outreach. As a result, more research is required to evaluate the impact of this type 
of institutions to see if they are  able to  balance  the two goals and  if  this brings  benefits for 
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recipients. Our study aims to shed some light on this issue by analysing the impact of this 
program relative to other types of microfinance interventions. In the following paragraph, we 
describe some features of the socially-oriented BANSEFI branches. 
 
1.5.4 The BANSEFI  Program 
The National Bank of Financial Services, BANSEFI, has been in charge of ensuring the 
financial regulation of small community-based SACP institutions since the beginning of 2001. 
This social bank is operating through an extensive network of branches to provide access for 
its recipients to accounts that link different savings and investment products. Three types of 
savings accounts being offered by the BANSEFI to its recipients are: 1) the basic short-term 
savings account; 2) the “Oportunidades” account for receiving public cash transfers, and 
where possible, to save; and 3) the long-term deposit account, which is designed for the 
poorest clients (BANSEFI, 2007). In Table 1.5, we present some characteristics of the 
BANSEFI branches included in the panel survey. 
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Table 1.5 General Description of the BANSEFI Branches in the Sample 
Name of the branch Region State # Clients Size 
     
JAUMAVE North Tamaulipas 1,314  Small 
     
SPM. LAZARO CARDENAS Central Michoacán 1,580 Small 
     
SPM. STA. LUCIA DEL CAMINO South Oaxaca 1,005 Small 
     
SAN JOAQUIN Central Queretaro 810 Very Small 
     
VILLA NICOLAS ROMERO Central México 3,588 Small 
     
TOLUCA Central México 9,777 Medium 
     
SPM. RAYON North S.L.P. 579 Very Small 
     
SPM. GUAYMAS URBANA 1 North Sonora 2,345 Small 
     
HERMOSILLO North Sonora 5,106 Medium 
     
VILLA BENITO JUAREZ South Tabasco 930 Very Small 
     
LA VENTA South Tabasco 1,262 Small 
     
TEHUACAN (SUC. 705) South Puebla 17,712 Medium 
Source: Author’s compilation. Database property of the BANSEFI bank; SACP Census 2002. 
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The network of  BANSEFI branches are conduits for facilitating the provision of financial 
services to low-income clients who are otherwise excluded from formal commercial banks 
(BANSEFI, 2007). Next, we present a brief description of a cash transfer program which is 
different from conventional cash transfer programs such as Oportunidades or Procampo.   
 
 
1.5.5 The COOPERA Program 
 
This program consists of branch institutions by which it is possible to make public cash 
transfers to the poorest of Mexican families from the “Oportunidades” and “PROCAMPO” 
social welfare programs implemented by the Federal Government to improve their education, 
health and productivity. The program has been launched as a new way to transfer government 
subsidies via affiliated branches to “L@ Red de la Gente” (“The People’s Network”) a system 
of institutions operating with the BANSEFI branches. The main objective of this initiative is 
to integrate the poorest Mexican families into using financial services. As these poor families 
earn interest on their savings accounts, they learn how savings can open up access to other 
types of financial services such as financial literacy. In the following section, we present a 
summary of the five microfinance programs. 
 
1.5.6 Summary of MFI Programs and Services   
 
In two of the empirical studies in this thesis (Chapter 3 and 4), we analyzed the impact of 
microfinance on household welfare and poverty level. However, the contribution of 
microfinance will depend on the institutional design of the sample of institutions that each 
particular microfinance program features as well as on the type of financial services it offers 
to its recipients. To have an idea of the potential of each of the microfinance programs under 
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study, descriptions are given in Table 1.6 according to the type of services and ownership 
structure. 
Table 1.6  Summary of Microfinance Programs by Type of  Services 
Program Type of services 
Interest 
rate on 
credit 
Interest 
rate on 
savings Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
SACP  
Credit Savings 
Training on 
health, education, 
and technical 
assistance 
Input supplies Low Low 
Privately owned 
by its members 
PATMIR  
Credit Savings Mobile banking Input supplies Low Low 
Privately owned 
by its members 
BANSEFI  
 Savings 
Public and private  
cash transfers   
Financial 
literacy 
 Low
3
 
Development 
Bank –State 
owned 
Traditional 
Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) Credit Savings
1
   
Training on 
health, 
education and 
business 
development  
Very high
2
 Low 
Shareholders or 
privately-owned   
COOPERA   
  
Public cash 
transfers 
Financial 
literacy 
  
Privately owned 
by its members  
1 Only a few regulated MFIs such as Compartamos Bank offer savings facilities to their clients. 
2  Very high interest rates on credit of more than 50% per annum. 
3 Low interest rates on savings of 1-2% per month. 
  
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is made up of four empirical chapters, each addressing a different research 
question. Chapter 2 evaluates to what extent the ownership of MFIs have an impact on 
technical efficiency. To answer this research question, we rely on the parametric SFA. We 
analyze a sample of 1,681 observations of 315 MFIs operating across 18 countries in Latin 
America. In Chapter 3, we examine the  extent to which  microfinance programs  focusing  on 
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different financial services (e.g. savings, credit, cash transfers) contribute to poverty 
reduction. To address this issue, we use 18,933 observations from a representative panel 
survey conducted in Mexico annually from 2004 to 2007 that was administrated by the 
BANSEFI bank and the SAGARPA. This set differentiates between treatment and control 
households. With this information, we estimate several models of household welfare level by 
means of an instrumental variable approach, the Hausman‒Taylor (1981) estimator. In 
Chapter 4, we also use data from the BANSEFI panel survey but on a limited sample of 
14,245 observations of households associated with microfinance programs offering primarily 
savings. We use Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test to evaluate whether being a member 
of an SACP helps households to reduce their vulnerability to poverty.  Finally, in Chapter 5 
we investigate the extent to which the loan officer’s personal characteristics have an impact 
on loan default probabilities. In order to address this question, we use multilevel analysis, 
which is a novel method that considers observed and unobserved heterogeneity at three 
different levels: loan, borrower, and loan officer. We base the analysis of this chapter on 
primary data that were collected in two regions in central Mexico by means of interviews with 
borrowers and loan officers. This work was done in collaboration with a non-profit 
microfinance organization, Pro Mujer Mexico, which works with the village banking 
methodology. As a result, this thesis contributes to existing microfinance literature by 
providing evidence on different unresolved issues; at the same time, it can be informative for 
microfinance managers and policymakers in ways that will allow them to improve their 
microfinance policies.   
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Ownership and Technical Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions: 
Empirical Evidence from Latin America

 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
By using stochastic frontier analysis, this article examines the technical efficiency of different 
types of microfinance institutions in Latin America. In particular, it tests whether differences 
in technical efficiency, both intra- and interfirm, can be explained by differences in 
ownership. With a focus on non-governmental organizations, cooperatives and credit unions, 
non-bank financial intermediaries, and banks, the data set contains 1,681 observations from a 
panel of 315 institutions operating in 18 Latin American countries. The results show that non-
governmental organizations and cooperatives have much lower interfirm and intrafirm 
technical efficiencies than non-bank financial intermediaries and banks, which indicates the 
importance of ownership type for technical efficiency.  
 
Keywords: Microfinance, Efficiency, Technology, Stochastic frontier, Ownership type, Latin 
America. 
 
 
 Paper by Roselia Servin, Robert Lensink and Marrit van den Berg, published in Journal of 
Banking & Finance 36 (2012) 2136-2144.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to poor people who have no 
access to commercial funding. Until recently, many people adopted extremely positive views 
about the potential role of microfinance. Greater access to microfinance seemed to provide an 
important instrument for reducing poverty in developing countries. Some observers even 
called the development of microfinance—which provides financial services including loans, 
deposits, insurance, and organizational help to poor households—one of the main innovations 
in the past 25 years.  
 
Recent developments challenge this extremely positive view and question whether 
microcredit contributes to a true reduction in worldwide poverty in the short or long terms. 
Stories about loan shark–style MFIs driving borrowers to suicide in the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh took some of the shine off the rosy view of microfinance. These negative 
developments may result from governance failures, partly related to the recent trend of 
commercializing microfinance, and the expansion of services offered by MFIs. Whereas once 
they focused only on microcredit and small loans to the poor, today MFIs have shifted to 
microfinance, including savings and insurance. The funding situation also is changing: 
Whereas once MFIs relied mainly on private and public donors and aid organizations, an 
increasing number turn to the capital market for funding. The drive toward commercialization 
also has induced, and partly required, a change in ownership, such that some MFIs are moving 
away from their ownership structure as non-governmental organizations (NGO) to become 
shareholding companies.  
 
To explain why some MFIs are successful but others fail, and to preclude Andhra Pradesh–
like events, we need a better understanding of governance issues. Unfortunately, literature on 
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microfinance governance tends to be mainly anecdotal (Labie and Mersland, 2011). Some 
research studies the relevance of certain governance characteristics (e.g. Hartarska, 2005); 
other studies focus specifically on the role of the type of ownership of MFIs (e.g. Mersland 
and Strøm, 2009). Noting the importance of ownership structure for MFI governance, several 
authors argue that nonprofit MFIs should transform into shareholder-held firms (SHFs), 
because SHFs can be regulated by banking authorities and benefit from superior corporate 
governance. Yet Mersland and Strøm (2009) reject this argument and suggest instead that 
SHFs and NGOs perform similarly in terms of both social and financial aims.  
 
In line with Mersland and Strøm (2009), we examine the relevance of various ownership 
structures for MFI performance. However, we also adopt Lansink et al.’s (2001) focus on 
intra- and inter-type technical efficiency. We derive and compare the technical efficiency of 
four groups of MFIs in Latin America: NGOs, cooperatives and credit unions, non-bank 
financial intermediaries (NBFI), and banks. These ownership types differ considerably from 
those of traditional commercial banks. In general, MFIs are smaller in size, limit their service 
provision to only poor households, and often provide small, collateral-free group loans. In 
addition, most MFIs have dual objectives, financial and social, and their source of income 
includes not only deposits but also donations (Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2009). Furthermore, a 
limited number of MFIs are regulated and may mobilize savings. 
 
Our study estimates the technical efficiency of the four groups of MFIs. Other MFI efficiency 
studies focus solely on cost efficiency (Gregoire and Tuya, 2006; Hartarska et al., 2006; 
Hassan and Tufte, 2001; Hermes et al., 2011), whereas this investigation is the first to analyze 
the impact of the type of ownership on the technical efficiency of MFIs. We focus on 
technical efficiency for several reasons. First, for most MFIs, good price information is 
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lacking, which makes profit and cost functions difficult if not impossible to estimate. Second, 
there are theoretical and methodological objections to a focus on profit and/or cost efficiency, 
in that these concepts assume that MFIs maximize profits and are price takers in input markets 
and, in the case of profit efficiency, output markets. Yet MFIs have multiple objectives, 
including both helping the poor and financial sustainability, and therefore do not necessarily 
maximize profits, which means they should not aim to become profit efficient. Moreover, 
most MFIs have at least some sovereignty in setting interest rates and can affect the costs of 
their capital, including the share and nature of subsidies, through lobbying. Technical 
efficiency instead requires that they achieve the maximum output, given inputs, and thus 
seems a more relevant concept for MFIs. To estimate the production frontier we use stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). Contrary to alternative methods like the thick frontier approach 
(TFA), the distribution-free approach (DFA), and data envelope analysis (DEA), SFA 
incorporates an error term that captures irregularities in the data and allows observed 
production to deviate from the efficient frontier due to either random events or possible 
inefficiencies. 
  
Another main difference between this work and existing MFI efficiency studies is that 
previous studies have estimated a single frontier for all MFI types (NGO, cooperative/credit 
union, NBFI, and bank). The technology likely differs by ownership type, so a common 
frontier assumption may lead to biased efficiency estimates. We explicitly allow for 
differences in technology and test the appropriateness of this assumption with a likelihood 
ratio test. 
 
Finally, our study focuses on Latin America, a region with a rich variety of MFIs in terms of 
ownership type. There are many small, nonprofit MFIs in Latin America, financially 
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supported by international funders (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007). Miller (2003) also locates 
some of the most experienced, developed, and profitable MFIs in Latin America. On average, 
MFIs from Latin America have more assets, are more leveraged, and make use of a growing 
share of commercial funds compared with institutions in other regions.  
 
Latin America is also interesting to study because many of its MFIs are under pressure to 
transform their organizational structure from an unregulated, nonprofit institution to a 
regulated, shareholder form (Mersland and Strøm, 2009). Competition in Latin American 
microfinance markets has triggered MFIs to make this transformation, for which they must 
cover their lending costs with income generated from the outstanding loan portfolio and 
reduce costs as much as possible. We focus on a single region to achieve a somewhat 
homogeneous sample of MFIs and attribute any performance differences specifically to 
differences in ownership types, not regional disparities. 
  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we survey literature on 
MFI ownership and derive hypotheses regarding the link between ownership type and 
technical efficiency. Section 2.3 contains the methodology, followed by a description of the 
empirical model in Section 2.4 and the data in Section 2.5. The estimation results appear in 
Section 2.6, and we conclude in Section 2.7.  
 
2.2 Ownership Structure and MFI Technological Efficiency 
The main function of microfinance governance is to control self-interested managers and 
resolve agency problems.
2
 However, corporate governance is one of the weakest features of 
MFIs (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). The early philanthropic status of many 
                                                 
2
 This section draws from Galema, Lensink and Mersland (2009, 2012).  
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MFIs reduced demands for their accountability, such that they were able to attract funding at 
an increasing rate and keep growing without adjusting their governance system. Without 
sufficient oversight though, managers likely enrich themselves or pursue other self-interests, 
at the MFI’s expense. In addition, corporate governance gets more complicated in MFIs due 
to their dual mission, namely, to be financially sustainable while reaching out to the poor. 
This dual mission, together with the lack of external control, provides managers with some 
managerial discretion, which affects both outcomes and efficiency. However, managerial 
discretion is not likely to be the same for all types of MFIs.  
 
Ownership type is a key feature of the governance system within the MFI and ultimately 
determines MFI performance. Within the microfinance industry, various ownership structures 
exist, including banks, NBFIs, credit unions and cooperatives, and NGOs. Banks and NBFIs 
are shareholder firms that distribute excess profits to their shareholders, though unlike banks, 
NBFIs are legally limited in the range of services they can offer (e.g., some cannot provide 
savings accounts). Credit unions and cooperatives are nonprofit organizations, owned and 
controlled by members. Unlike NGOs, they may distribute profits to their members. Finally, 
NGOs are nonprofit organizations, characterized by a non-distribution constraint.  
 
Although MFIs of all ownership types have social and financial motives, their relative weights 
differ by MFI type. As shareholder firms, NBFIs and banks have clearly defined financial 
objectives, whereas NGOs and cooperatives put much more weight on social objectives. 
These varying main objectives likely prompt differential technology use in each 
organizational structure, because the technology determines the optimal relationship between 
inputs and outputs. Organizations serving poorer clients, such as NGOs and cooperatives, 
have higher average costs than NBFIs and banks, because small loans are costlier to provide 
(Cull et al., 2009). Moreover, MFIs with a clear social orientation often combine loan 
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provision with training, a labor-intensive activity that does not contribute directly to output in 
terms of loans provided. Finally, a poverty orientation may require targeting people in more 
remote areas and visiting them. These differences in orientation make it highly likely that the 
technology differs for the various types of MFIs: An appropriate technology for a NBFI or 
bank type may not be the best technology for a NGO or cooperative or credit union. This 
argument leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: MFIs characterized by different ownership types use different technologies  
 
The difference in technology use may be a deliberate choice based on objectives, such that an 
MFI focusing primarily on social objectives may decide not to adopt a technology focused on 
increasing output (e.g., number of loans) given the available inputs. Rather, this type of MFI 
may opt for a technology that provides better opportunities to offer training, which then gets 
reflected in the type and skill levels of hired loan managers. A loan manager who can find 
new clients and/or improve repayment levels may not be the best loan manager to offer 
training. In addition, the difference in inter-MFI technology may result from constraints on 
innovation adoptions or improvements to input qualities due to managerial capability, 
experience, or education (Lansink et al., 2001). When MFIs must deal with poorer 
technologies due to constraints that force them to adapt less efficient technologies, they likely 
switch to better technologies after the constraints relax.  
 
Regarding our classification of MFI types, NGOs and credit unions or cooperatives should be 
more monetarily constrained, because they do not raise funds through capital markets and, 
with their focus on social goals, have fewer opportunities to attract funds from private 
investors. The combination of a stronger focus on social goals and a more severe constraint in 
terms of funding possibilities leads us to our second hypothesis.  
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H2: NGOs and cooperatives or credit unions achieve a lower maximum output given 
inputs than NBFIs and banks 
 
The production possibilities frontier of shareholder firms also is higher than that of non-
shareholder NGOs and cooperative or credit unions, because the former pursue an optimal 
combination of inputs and outputs in the production process, which allows them to achieve 
higher interfirm efficiency over time. Differences in interfirm efficiency across ownership 
types thus stem from efficiency differences, as well as from differences in technology. For 
example, NGOs generally provide credit through group lending, whereas banks and NBFIs 
focus more on individual lending. These different technologies have varying skill 
requirements for personnel and different capital requirements, so they also produce different 
operating costs per loan or per borrower. The characteristics of shareholder MFIs put them 
closer to the best production possibility frontier, whereas nonprofit MFIs rely on a dissimilar 
technology that is more suitable to meet their social needs. 
 
Managerial discretion also differs across organizational types (see Table 2.1). Managers in an 
MFI may try to pursue policies in their own interest and gain private benefits, possibly at the 
expense of overall MFI performance. Or they may deliberately decide not to use the existing 
technology in the most optimal way to increase their own private benefits. Their opportunities 
to do so depend on their managerial discretion, which in turn depends on several factors that 
can help explain why different ownership types offer different possibilities for private 
benefits, which lead to intrafirm technological inefficiencies. First, because NGOs and 
cooperatives are nonprofit organizations, their governance is not tied to ownership. Board 
members of nonprofit organizations, unlike those of NBFIs and banks, rarely have a financial 
stake in the organization and often lack financial knowledge or experience with risk 
management, which probably reduces the active control of the managers. Second, NGOs, 
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unlike cooperatives, NBFIs, and banks, cannot distribute profits to any stakeholders. The 
excess profits instead get returned to the organization, and this non-distribution constraint 
creates organizational slack, giving NGO executives more managerial discretion (Glaeser, 
2003). Third, regulation often limits the discretionary power of managers, but because NGOs 
and cooperatives usually do not offer savings products, they are not regulated by central 
banking authorities. Banks and NBFI, in contrast, are heavily regulated by monetary 
authorities, which reduce their discretionary power. Fourth, NBFIs and banks have more 
clearly defined financial objectives, whereas the objectives of NGOs and cooperatives are 
rather less clear. If objectives are unclear and/or have a dual character, it becomes more 
difficult to develop an appropriate governance system and incentive system that will induce 
managers to behave appropriately to optimize MFI performance. Accordingly, we posit: 
 
H3: Own-frontier efficiency is lowest for NGOs and highest for banks. The own-frontier 
efficiency of cooperatives/credit unions is similar to that of NGOs, and the own-frontier 
efficiency of NBFIs is similar to those of banks 
 
Table 2.1  Managerial Discretion Typology of MFIs 
 
NGOs Cooperatives and 
Credit Unions 
NBFIs  Banks  
Not regulated Not regulated Partly regulated Regulated 
Non-distribution 
constraint 
Distribute profits to 
members 
Distribute profits to 
owners 
Distribute profits to 
owners 
Governance not tied 
to ownership 
Governance tied to 
members 
Governance tied to 
ownership 
Governance tied to 
ownership 
Dual objectives Dual objectives Financial objectives Financial objectives 
 
Most    Managerial Discretion    Least 
 
Source: Galema et al., (2012). 
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The rationale for H3 also stems from the dual objectives of non-shareholder firms (NSHF), in 
that they lack an appropriated incentive scheme and suffer from a suboptimal utilization of 
resources (e.g., labor, capital, fixed assets). In addition, staff members of NSHFs target more 
poor clients than do most shareholder firms (SHF), which implies high transaction costs and 
greater inefficiencies. The high transaction costs for NSHF also arise because they provide 
more non-financial services (e.g., training, health and education). This manifestation of the 
social orientation of NSHF increases costs, as well as loan recovery risk. For example, 
unregulated NGOs and credit unions usually lack a legal department to enforce contracts in 
the case of loan default, because they rely more on social collateral, so their staff spend more 
time in loan recovery, with less time left to devote to the production process of loans. This 
duality in objectives causes socially oriented firms to misallocate resources and deviate more 
from their own optimal production frontier (intrafirm), compared with banks and NBFIs, 
which approach their optimal production possibilities.  
 
In the context of Latin America, managerial discretion can be viewed as a factor explaining 
the differences in technical efficiency between Share-holder and Non Share-holder MFIs.  In 
fact, in our sample, we have a total of 194 not-for-profit MFIs (62%) and 121 (38%) for-profit 
MFIs. Thus, according to managerial discretion theory and some empirical studies (Galema et 
al., 2009) we expect that the higher proportion of not-for-profit MFIs, particularly the 145 
NGOs (46%)  have a dual mission, a powerful CEO, and a large degree of managerial 
discretion which cannot be limited. These features can lead these institutions towards a 
suboptimal utilization of resources which contributes to a higher intra- and inter- type 
technical inefficiency and to a higher performance variability relative to for-profit MFIs. 
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2.3 Methodology 
The production frontiers of financial intermediaries can be estimated with both parametric and 
non-parametric techniques. Four approaches are common: (1) stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA), (2) thick frontier approach (TFA), (3) distribution-free approach (DFA), and (4) data 
envelope analysis (DEA). 
 
This study uses SFA, first developed  by Aigner et al., (1977) and  Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977), which previous authors have applied both theoretically and empirically to the 
banking sector to evaluate production, cost, and profit efficiency  (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; 
Lensink and Meesters, 2007; Lensink et al., 2008; Mester, 1993; Weill, 2004), though rarely 
to measure the technical efficiency of MFIs in developing countries. Perhaps it seems too 
difficult to impose distributional assumptions on data from firms that offer little information 
with respect their production process and the institutional environment in which they operate. 
In this case, researchers might assume that deviations from the optimal production 
possibilities frontier are due to merely inefficiencies, rather than outcomes of the combination 
of environmental factors resulting from idiosyncratic or covariate shocks and inefficiencies 
that may shift the production frontier up or down. Yet more recently, some authors have 
applied SFA to measure MFI efficiency (Gregoire and Tuya, 2006; Hermes et al., 2011; 
Paxton, 2007) and consider it a suitable approach that (1) permits an analysis of efficiency 
using unbalanced panels; (2) allows the observed production of a particular institution to 
deviate from the efficient frontier, due to either random events or possible inefficiencies 
(Gregoire and Tuya, 2006); and (3) incorporates an error term that captures irregularities in 
the data, a convenient property when analyzing information from developing countries 
(Paxton, 2007). These latter properties do not hold for the other three approaches to efficiency 
measurement (TFA, DFA, and DEA). 
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The SFA approach decomposes error terms into a random component (vi) and an inefficiency 
term (ui), each of which has a particular statistical distribution (usually the normal distribution 
for the error and half normal for inefficiency). Both “error terms” are assumed to be 
orthogonal to the production function’s exogenous variables (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977). 
 
We apply  SFA to estimate technical efficiency (Lansink et al., 2001) specifically, we 
investigate firm type–specific production frontiers and differentiate between inter- and intra-
type technological inefficiencies. Intra-type efficiency refers to the efficiency of the MFI 
relative to its own production frontier; intertype efficiency is the efficiency of the MFI relative 
to a best practice frontier. The technique also provides an estimate of the catch-up component 
(CU), or the differences in technologies between firms and hence the potential to improve 
performance if the firm were to adopt another firm type’s technology. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the three type-specific efficiency measurements for MFIs, assuming one output (Y) and one 
input (X).  
 
Figure 2. 1  Relationship Between Input and Output of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
by Ownership Type 
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The measure of intra-type efficiency (IA) computes a particular firm’s efficiency over time 
relative to the best practice frontier of that firm’s type, according to firms with the same type 
of ownership, as follows: 
10;
'
 IA
Y
Y
IA .                    (1) 
To measure catch-up, we use the ratio between the output obtained if the firm operates at the 
frontier of its own-type (Y’) and the output obtained if the firm were to produce in line with 
the best practice frontier (Y’’). A positive CU value may reflect differences in technology 
across MFI types, as a result of differences in the rate at which MFIs adopt technological 
innovations, or it could be due to input quality differences (e.g., labor, fixed capital). Thus a 
positive CU value indicates there is potential to improve performance by adopting another 
firm’s technology type. That is, if CU = 1 for MFIA, then its technology is better than that of 
MFIB, with CU < 1. The calculation uses:  
.10
''
'
 CU
Y
Y
CU           (2) 
Finally, intertype efficiency (IE) reflects the performance of a firm over time relative to the 
best available technology. By definition, IE equals: 
.10;
''
 IE
Y
Y
IE
        (3) 
The relationship among the three efficiency measurements then is: 
.
''''
'*
'
*
Y
YIE
Y
Y
Y
YIECUIAIE 
       (4) 
2.4 Empirical Model 
We use the transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function proposed by Aigner et 
al. (1977), with a general model specified as: 
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where Yit is the output of MFI i at time t,    
 
 refers to input j of MFI i at time t, D is a set of 
country dummies, t is a time trend, C is a dummy for the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and , , 
, , , and  are the parameters to be estimated. Furthermore, εit = vit-ui is the error 
component in the production function; vit is a normally distributed random noise component 
with variance σv
2
, including uncontrollable factors that affect total production (e.g., weather, 
luck, labor strikes, machine performance); and ui is a nonnegative technical inefficiency 
component covering firm-specific production deviations or errors due to factors that are under 
the control of the firm management (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). The inefficiency 
term ui comes from a non-negative half-normal distribution with variance σu
2
.  
 
We then can define the technical efficiency for MFI i as: 
TEi= exp(-ui)            (6) 
This measure ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a fully efficient MFI. 
 
We estimate the frontier functions using maximum likelihood methods. The parameter λ = 
σu/σv reflects the relative importance of inefficiency and noise. A value of 0 for λ implies the 
absence of inefficiency and indicates that ordinary least squares estimation is appropriate (see 
Coelli et al., 1998 ). 
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2.5 Data  
We use data from the Microfinance Information Exchange Network,
3
 a global web-based 
microfinance platform that provides data on individual MFIs. The platform is among the most 
renowned and extensive databases in worldwide microfinance and provides high-quality 
information about more than 800 MFIs operating in four geographical regions, including Latin 
America. We extract data for 315 MFIs operating across 18 Latin American countries during 
the period 2003–2009. We construct a panel set of financial and outreach indicators. Our 
sample contains 1,681 observations for 2003–2009 and is representative of the variety of 
MFIs in Latin America. Table 2.2 reports the number of observations per ownership type and 
country. 
Table 2.2   Observations by Country and Ownership Type of  MFI (2003–2009) 
 
 Country NGO NBFI 
Cooperative or 
Credit Union 
Bank Total 
1 Peru 100 191 42 7 340 
2 Ecuador 98 7 119 21 245 
3 Nicaragua 113 9 12 13 147 
4 Mexico 35 85 10 7 137 
5 Bolivia 80 33 10 14 137 
6 Colombia 76 11 13 21 121 
7 Guatemala 97 0 0 0 97 
8 Honduras 30 53 0 9 92 
9 Brazil 62 9 9 6 86 
10 El Salvador 34 38 6 6 84 
11 Argentina 24 24 0 3 51 
12 Paraguay 10 14 0 13 37 
13 Haiti 14 19 0 0 33 
14 
Dominican 
Republic 
10 0 0 14 24 
15 Chile 7 7 0 7 21 
16 Panama 0 14 6 0 20 
17 Venezuela 0 0 0 7 7 
18 Uruguay 0 2 0 0 2 
  Total 790 516 227 148 1681 
Source: Authors’ compilation, using data from www.mixmarket.org. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See www.mixmarket.org  
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As the results in Table 2.2 reveal, most observations refer to NGOs and NBFIs, especially for 
the largest microfinance markets in the region: Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Bolivia, 
and Colombia. Observations of cooperatives appear in 9 countries, and banks are in 14 of the 
18 countries. This irregular distribution of ownership types across countries indicates that the 
microfinance sector in this region still largely relies on nonprofit organizations, despite the 
trend toward more commercial ownership types.  
Furthermore, NGOs appear in almost all countries, with the exceptions of Panama, Venezuela, 
and Uruguay. Guatemala provides observations only for NGOs, not for other MFI types, 
which indicates a lack of diversity in ownership types in that country. Overall, 10 of the 18 
countries lack observations for at least one or two ownership types. The distribution of 
observations by ownership type across Latin American countries thus is not homogeneous, 
which may have implications with respect to the technical efficiency of the different 
ownership structures, if they depend on country-specific factors such as regulation and 
competition. Table  2.3 offers some descriptive statistics of the different MFIs, classified by 
ownership type. 
Banks are the largest MFI type in terms of assets, gross loan portfolio, and number of 
employees. Cooperatives and credit unions and banks have a lower percentage of female 
borrowers in their portfolios than NGOs and NBFIs. Although NGOs have the lowest cost per 
loan, their small loan sizes give them the highest cost per U.S. dollar lent. Banks outperform 
all other ownership types in the amount of their portfolios at risk for more than 30 days.  
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Table 2.3  Descriptive Statistics of MFIs by Ownership Type (mean values, 2003–2009) 
 
Indicator Obs. NGO Obs. 
Cooperative 
or Credit 
Union 
Obs. NBFI Obs. Bank 
Total assets
1
 783 10,500 226 66,100 515 48,300 147 268,000 
Gross loan portfolio
1
 783 8,430 227 49,400 514 39,100 148 209,000 
Operating expense
1
 735 1,497 194 5,325 460 6,857 138 29,600 
Write-offs
1
 708 146 190 471 443 1,495 121 5,030 
Number of active 
borrowers 
780 13,884 227 29,815 507 39,936 148 140,423 
Average loan balance 
per borrower (US$) 
774 618 227 1,867 506 1,448 148 1,634 
Cost per loan (US$) 504 136 141 188 335 209 113 224 
Percentage of women 
borrowers 
727 71 178 48 392 60 119 58 
Return on assets (%) 660 1 176 1 434 1 132 4 
Portfolio at risk > 30 
days (%) 
710 7 191 6 445 6 122 4 
Personnel (no. 
employees) 
767 88 218 78 470 203 104 491 
No. of offices 650 10 187 21 427 21 135 64 
1 
Thousands of US$. 
 
 
The definition of inputs and outputs of financial institutions such as banks and MFIs is not 
straightforward. A controversy emerges about how to classify deposits, as an input or output. 
In financial literature, two approaches categorize bank inputs and outputs (Bikker and Bos, 
2008). First, the production approach (PA) regards financial institutions as producers of loans 
and providers of services for account holders. Second, the intermediation approach (IA) views 
financial institutions as mediators of funds between savers and investors. In the former, 
deposits are outputs, but in the latter, they represent input. To overcome this confusion, 
Berger and Humphrey (1991) propose a modified production approach (MPA), which 
includes both input and output characteristics of deposits in cost functions.  
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For this study, the selection of inputs and outputs follows the PA. Labor and physical capital 
are the main inputs; number of processes, documents, and transactions (e.g., loans) are main 
outputs. This approach appears suitable for bank branches with low autonomy in loan policy 
(Bikker and Bos, 2008); many MFIs do not take deposits at all, so we cannot use the 
intermediation approach. In line with empirical efficiency studies (Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 
2009; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), our model distinguishes one output (number of 
loans outstanding) and three different inputs (assets, operating expenses and personnel), as we 
detail in Table 2.4.  
 
We also provide a summary of descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs used in the 
estimation of production functions in Table 2.5. All monetary values are in 2003 U.S. constant 
dollars (base year), because we deflated the monetary values by their price indexes, as 
provided by the International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org).  
Table 2.4  Definition of Output and Inputs of MFIs for Efficiency Measurement 
 
Name Description 
Number of loans 
outstanding 
Number of loan accounts that have any outstanding loan balance with the 
MFI and any portion of the loan portfolio.  
Assets 
Total of all asset accounts, including trade and other payables, provisions 
for employee benefits, other provisions, deferred revenue, financial 
liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, deposits, borrowings, other 
short-term financial liabilities, subordinated debt. 
Operating expenses 
Expenses related to operations, including all personnel expenses, 
depreciation and amortization, and administrative expenses. 
Personnel 
Total staff members or employees at end of period who were actively 
employed by the MFI. This number includes contract employees or 
advisors who dedicate the majority of their time to the MFI, even if they 
are not on the MFI’s roster of employees.  
Note: Definitions based on MIX-Market Taxonomy (http://www.mixmarket.org/mix-market-development-
roadmap/inline-glossary; http://www.mixmarket.org/en/glossary). 
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Table 2.5  Descriptive Statistics of Inputs and Output  to Estimate Type-Specific Technical 
Efficiency 
 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output Number of loans outstanding
1
         
 NGO 660 15.9 29.3 0 306 
 NBFI 435 47.0 116.3 0 1,236 
 Cooperative/credit union 192 34.7 131.2 0.14 1,030 
 Bank 141 170.5 271.0 1.25 1,699 
Input 1 Total assets
2
      
 NGO 783 10.5 34.8 0 555 
 NBFI 515 48.3 88.1 0 698 
 Cooperative/credit union 226 66.1 226.0 0.34 1,670 
 Bank 147 268.0 528.0 1.93 3,480 
Input 2 Operating expense
3
      
 NGO 735 1.5 3.0 0.01 37 
 NBFI 460 6.9 15.5 0.01 153 
 Cooperative/credit union 194 5.3 19.9 0 166 
 Bank 138 29.6 50.4 0.5 289 
Input 3 Personnel      
 NGO 767 87.8 120.8 0 876 
 NBFI 470 203.0 190.6 0 989 
 Cooperative/credit union 218 77.6 105.7 2 644 
  Bank 104 490.8 257.8 55 995 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on data from www.mixmarket.org microfinance platform. 
1 
Thousands. 
2 
Thousands of US$. 
3 
Millions of US$. 
 
      
 
The minimum values of zero in Table 2.5 correspond to a negligible number of 
observations/institutions (1 to 3). For instance, ICC MAU-CE, Fácil SCM and Progresar from 
Brazil and Argentina reported zero values for loans, assets and personnel in 2003 and 2007 to 
the Mix-Market platform. However, we expect that these values do not have any impact on 
the overall outcomes. 
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2.6 Empirical  Results 
We begin by estimating a production frontier for a pooled sample of all MFIs. Then we 
estimate separate production functions for each of the four ownership types. A likelihood ratio 
test of the pooled model versus the type-specific models strongly rejects the existence of a 
single production frontier (2(74) = 449.61, Prob > 2 = 0.0000), in support of our first 
hypothesis. We continue the analyses using the ownership-type specific frontiers. 
 
Table 2.6 Production Frontier Estimates of MFIs by Ownership Structure 
 
Variable  
Pooled 
Frontier 
Separate Production Frontiers 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Description All MFIs NGOs Coop./CUs NBFIs Banks 
      
Constant 4.181 -13.18** 23.71** 24.17** 110.6*** 
 [0.279] [0.041] [0.035] [0.024] [0.000]    
ln(Assets) 0.615 1.140* -2.608 -1.663* -8.335*   
 [0.138] [0.083] [0.146] [0.074] [0.081]    
ln(Operating Expense) -0.739 2.341* -1.691 -2.865 -1.664 
 [0.362] [0.060] [0.194] [0.195] [0.786]    
ln(Personnel) 1.459* -2.316* 5.827** 6.634*** -5.364 
 [0.080] [0.060] [0.022] [0.001] [0.553]    
ln(Assets)2 -0.104** -0.0944 -0.0607 -0.275*** -2.342**  
 [0.014] [0.130] [0.732] [0.002] [0.018]    
ln(Operating Expense)2 
-0.0171 -0.297** -0.479*** -0.153 -5.225*** 
 [0.875] [0.044] [0.008] [0.597] [0.001]    
ln(Personnel)2 0.0361 -0.334** 0.658** 0.568*** 2.275 
 [0.722] [0.012] [0.050] [0.002] [0.160]    
ln(Assets)*ln(Operating Expense) 0.0767 0.024 0.490*** 0.468*** 3.993*** 
 [0.145] [0.730] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]    
ln(Assets)*ln(Personnel) 0.0339 0.0376 -0.514** -0.117 -1.970**  
 [0.506] [0.595] [0.013] [0.236] [0.043]    
ln(Operating Expense)*ln(Personnel) 
-0.0849 0.303** -0.00312 -0.479** 1.861 
 [0.391] [0.022] [0.985] [0.018] [0.168]    
ln(Assets)*Trend 
-0.0187 0.00187 -0.119*** -0.013 -0.129 
 [0.153] [0.915] [0.008] [0.646] [0.376]    
ln(Operating Expense)*Trend 
0.0329 0.0249 0.0820* 0.0165 0.228 
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 [0.191] [0.421] [0.086] [0.763] [0.201]    
ln(Personnel)*Trend 
-0.0132 -0.0321 0.0547 0.0284 -0.381**  
 [0.541] [0.239] [0.356] [0.506] [0.040]    
Trend -0.0517 -0.209 0.489 -0.101 1.051 
 [0.776] [0.403] [0.301] [0.789] [0.330]    
(Trend)2 
-0.0205* -0.00963 0.00751 -0.0262 -0.0124 
 [0.053] [0.503] [0.707] [0.146] [0.719]    
Crisis dummy 0.0723 0.14 1.347 0.621 0.675 
 [0.902] [0.861] [0.224] [0.603] [0.830]    
ln(Assets)* Crisis dummy 0.0294 0.0859 -0.149 -0.0354 0.117 
 [0.485] [0.123] [0.181] [0.643] [0.736]    
ln(Operating Expense)*Crisis dummy -0.0403 -0.117 0.0556 -0.0171 0.082 
 [0.607] [0.208] [0.690] [0.913] [0.867]    
ln(Personnel)*Crisis dummy 0.00956 0.0361 0.0934 0.049 -0.653 
  [0.893] [0.679] [0.510] [0.709] [0.144]    
lnσv
2 -2.006*** -2.562*** -3.105*** -1.564*** -1.973*** 
Std. Err. 0.118 0.260 0.450 0.071 0.143 
lnσu
2 -1.179*** -1.089*** -2.411*** -9.909085 -10.51597 
Std. Err. 0.158 0.206 0.672 81.629 160.5336 
σv 0.367 0.278 0.212 0.457 0.373 
Std. Err. 0.022 0.361 0.048 0.016 0.027 
σu 0.555 0.580 0.300 0.007 0.005 
Std. Err. 0.044 0.060 0.101 0.288 0.418 
σ2 0.442 0.414 0.135 0.209 0.139 
Std. Err. 0.037 0.528 0.043 0.015 0.020 
 1.512 2.088 1.415 0.015 0.014 
 Std. Err. 0.063 0.093 0.146 0.290 0.421 
Significance  Level of the Likelihood  
ratio or F-Statistic 
0 0 0.166 1 1 
Likelihood-ratio test of σu=0: 
2 (1)  26.09 13.68 0.94 0 0 
Log Likelihood -929.13 -378.8 -23.31 -254.80 -42.38 
Wald 2(27) 9153.03 4693.80 3234.85 2893.81 492.10 
Number of observations 1310 638 174 400 98 
*Although we included some country dummies in the estimation, we omitted them here for brevity and present only 
the most relevant coefficients 
p-values in brackets. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The best explanation for deviations from the optimal production possibilities frontier for 
NGOs and cooperatives and credit unions relies on the technical inefficiency component 
(ui)—that is, factors under the control of the MFI’s management. In contrast, the inefficiencies 
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of banks and NBFIs arise mostly from the random noise component, which represents random 
uncontrollable factors or external shocks beyond the firms’ control that affect total production. 
This finding is in line with our second hypothesis. 
From the estimations of the separate production functions (see columns 2–5 in Table 2.6), we 
calculate the average efficiency scores for each of the three efficiency measurements: 
intrafirm (IA), interfirm (IE), and catch-up component (CU). Table 2.7 summarizes the 
results. The t-tests indicate that the averages of the three efficiency levels differ significantly 
at the 0.05 level for all four ownership types. 
Table 2.7  Technical Efficiency Scores and t-test on Mean Differences between MFIs 
Ownership Types 
 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
t-test 
with 
NGO 
t-test 
with 
C./CU 
t-test 
with 
NBFI 
1. Intra-firm Technical Efficiency (IA)                  
NGO 638 0.665 0.155 0.180 0.930    
Coop./Credit Union 174 0.799 0.088 0.525 0.923 -14.85   
NBFI 400 0.994 0.000 0.994 0.995 -53.63 29.27  
Bank 98 0.996 0.000 0.996 0.996 -53.87 -29.49 -440.00 
All MFIs types 1310 0.808 0.190 0.180 0.996    
2. Catch-Up Component (CU)                  
NGO 725 0.641 0.234 0.117 1    
Coop./Credit Union 188 0.568 0.226 0.167 1 3.92   
NBFI 436 0.795 0.192 0.015 0.990 -12.15 12.01  
Bank 99 0.932 0.039 0.791 1 -30.52 -21.50 -13.75 
All MFIs types 1448 0.698 0.235 0.015 1    
3. Inter-firm Technical Efficiency (IE)               
NGO 638 0.428 0.188 0.037 0.899    
Coop./Credit Union 174 0.448 0.188 0.136 0.839 -1.25   
NBFI 400 0.798 0.184 0.015 0.985 -31.25 20.64  
Bank 98 0.928 0.039 0.788 0.996 -59.31 -32.48 -12.96 
All MFIs types 1310 0.581 0.264 0.015 0.996       
Source: Author’s compilation with data from www.mixmarket.org.        
 
 
The average IE of banks is 0.928; on average, banks produce just less than the overall optimal 
production technology. The extremely high IA of 0.996 reconfirms this finding; it results from 
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the insignificance of the inefficiency component in the error term of the banks’ production 
function, as well as a CU of 0.932. The bank production function virtually never falls below 
that of  any other production function. 
 
Similarly, NBFI have on average negligible IA, but their production function averages 
somewhat lower than that of banks; the CU of their overall efficiency is 0.795. With an 
overall IE of 0.798, NBFIs on average produce 80% of the maximum possible output, given 
their inputs, mainly because they use non–output-maximizing technology. 
 
The NGOs and cooperatives and credit unions reveal similar average IE scores: 0.428 and 
0.448, respectively. Unlike banks and NBFIs, they indicate considerable intra-firm 
inefficiency; they could increase output using their own technology. Moreover, these 
technologies tend to be below both the bank and NBFI technology levels. On average, NGOs 
have a higher output technology than cooperatives, with CU of 0.641 compared with 0.568. In 
contrast, cooperatives produce closer to their own production frontier, with an IA of 0.799 
compared with 0.665 for NGOs. 
 
Kernel density plots of the different efficiency measures confirm the conclusions derived from 
the average results per ownership type (see Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). Moreover, they indicate 
that whereas  IA is more than 0.99 for all banks and NBFIs, there are large differences in IA 
among cooperatives and NGOs, such that some institutes have efficiency of more than 0.9, but 
others’ efficiency is as low as 0.2 (NGOs) or 0.6 (cooperatives). The CU distribution also is 
very flat for NGOs and cooperatives, but it shows a negatively skewed distribution for NBFI 
and is highly concentrated around 0.9 for banks.  
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Figure 2.2  Intra-Firm Efficiency of NGO and Cooperative/Credit Union 
 
Figure 2.3  Intra-Firm Efficiency of NBFI and Bank MFIs 
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Figure 2.4 Catch-up Component of MFIs by Ownership Type 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This article uses non-traditional measurements of efficiency with stochastic econometric 
frontier techniques to investigate the efficiency of MFIs with different ownership types. We 
use data from the microfinance platform www.mixmarket.org during the period 2003–2009 to 
build a sample of 315 MFIs operating in Latin America. Our methodology allows both the 
production frontier and the error structures to differ across four types of ownership: NGO, 
cooperatives and credit unions, NBFI, and banks. Robustness tests indicate that the data 
support this unrestricted model, in favor of the use of a single production technology. 
 
Furthermore, the analyses suggest that MFIs with different ownership types use different 
technologies and have different efficiencies. Specifically, NGOs and cooperatives have a 
CU_COOP
CU_NBFI
CU_BANK
CU_NGO
k
d
e
n
s
it
y
0
5
1
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1efficiency score
Chapter 2 
46 
 
lower technology level than banks and NBFIs, because of their stronger focus on social goals 
and their more severe funding constraints. Unclear objectives and the associated difficulty of 
developing appropriate incentive structures also causes non-shareholder MFIs to suffer from 
lesser efficiency with respect to their own frontier. The economic implication of these 
outcomes is that NGOs and cooperatives are wasting resources in the production process and 
incur higher inefficiencies than their peers, NBFIs and banks. 
 
There are at least three ways to extend this research. First, researchers could enrich our 
approach by including multiple outputs—such as savings, training, insurance, and other 
financial services that an increasing number of MFIs provide—and estimating translog 
distance functions using corrected ordinary least squares (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). 
Second, productivity indicators, such as technological change, total factor productivity, and 
input elasticity, derived from the current type-specific production functions might help 
disentangle the main factors that account for differences in technologies across MFIs types. 
Third, by determining ownership-specific key factors that explain efficiency, further research 
would provide insights into how to implement better practices to increase the efficiency of 
struggling MFIs (NGOs and cooperatives). Battese and Coelli (1995) suggest an SFA model 
that simultaneously estimates the frontier and the coefficients of the efficiency variables; it 
also could be applied to type-specific production frontiers.   
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Does Microfinance Improve Household Welfare?  Empirical Evidence from 
Five Mexican Microfinance Programs
♠
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique data set from the National Bank of Financial Services, this study examines the 
impact of five Mexican microfinance institutions (MFIs) on household welfare levels. The 
data set, including a random sample of 18,933 observations, differentiates between treatment 
groups and reliable control groups to identify the effects of being a member of a particular 
MFI. To control for possible selection biases, the authors use the Hausman-Taylor panel 
estimator. The results reveal that membership in MFIs that primarily focus on savings 
improves household welfare, as measured by per capita expenditures.  
 
Keywords: Microfinance, BANSEFI, Panel survey, Household, Welfare level, Hausman-
Taylor approach, Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
♠ Paper by Roselia Servin, Robert Lensink  and Marrit van den Berg. Submitted for 
publication. 
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3.1  Introduction 
Until very recently, microfinance was extremely popular, and the industry grew rapidly. Such 
massive growth in microfinance programs followed the almost universal idea that microcredit 
could and would be an important instrument to lift poor people, especially women, out of 
poverty. This positive perception received support from a plethora of anecdotes and simple 
empirical analyses. Policy makers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became even 
more excited about the possible role of microfinance when Mohammad Yunus received the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.  
 
Even as studies argued that microcredit could help reduce poverty though, most empirical 
studies of microfinance were weak, which in retrospect suggested that the positive view of 
microfinance was driven by wishful thinking and based on anecdotal evidence, rather than 
rigorous research (see Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Hermes et 
al., 2011). The studies suffered from some severe methodological issues; virtually none of the 
empirical studies addressed problems related to self-selection bias and/or program placement 
bias. Yet there were some exceptions, such as Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) consideration of the 
impact of microcredit in Bangladesh, where they found large marginal impacts of microcredit, 
especially lending to women. However, when Roodman and Morduch (2009) tried to replicate 
these findings, they found instead rather negligible impacts of microcredit.  
 
Several new empirical analyses have attempted to use superior methodologies to assess the 
impact of microcredit and address problems due to selection biases, such as through 
randomized controlled trials (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2010; Crépon et al., 2011; de Mel et al.,  
2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2010). These studies achieve mixed results, though few have been 
able to detect any substantial impact of microcredit (Roodman and Morduch, 2009). Although 
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Lensink and Pham (2012) identify a positive effect of microcredit on household self-
employment profits in Vietnam, Roodman (2012) maintains that its impact has been 
considerably overstated.  
 
Going even further, Bateman (2010) argues that microfinance constitutes an obstacle to 
sustainable development. The microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh led some observers to accuse microcredit of inducing suicides. Thus the nearly 
universal support for microfinance seems to have faded very quickly. Yet just as the 
extremely positive view did, this overwhelmingly negative view of microfinance also lacks 
any serious scientific support. Microfinance institutions (MFIs), which traditionally focused 
on providing microcredit to the poor in the informal sector, have started to recognize that 
diversification represents an essential step in their development and begun experimenting with 
financial products other than credit, such as savings and insurance products. Some recent 
studies suggest that, unlike microcredit, these microfinance products may be able to improve 
the welfare of the poor (e.g. Roodman, 2012). Karlan and Appel (2011) designate micro 
savings one of the ideas that actually supports development and probably the best financial 
service available to reduce poverty. To avoid the errors of the past though, we require 
additional studies that address the impact of microfinance. 
 
This article aims to contribute to this ongoing discussion by investigating the impact of 
becoming a member of a microfinance program in Mexico on per capita consumption. We 
focus on five programs—SACP, PATMIR, MFI, BANSEFI, and COOPERA—that are similar 
in the sense that they all deal with microfinance but also differ considerably. For example, 
SACP and PATMIR offer a wide range of financial services, including credit and savings 
products; BANSEFI focuses on savings; the MFI program primarily offers micro credit; and 
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COOPERA specializes in channeling public cash transfers. By investigating this wide range 
of services, our study provides new evidence about the importance of microfinance in general, 
as well as a preliminary analysis of the relative importance of different financial services that 
MFIs can offer to improve the well-being of low-income people. 
 
Furthermore, despite the importance of microfinance in Mexico, few studies address the 
impact of Mexican microfinance programs in particular. Cotler and Woodruff  (2008), in a 
cross-sectional study of the impact of short-term credit, provide some evidence that access to 
microcredit increases the profits of the smallest firms. Niño-Zarazúa (2007) suggests that 
group-based lending methods in Mexico are effective in reducing the poverty of microfinance 
recipients. Yet both studies are limited in their coverage and deal with microfinance only in 
urban settings in Mexico.  
 
Our study is unique in several ways. First, we base our analysis on a unique, rich, longitudinal 
panel survey from the National Bank of Financial Services (BANSEFI), which includes 
information about the controls and treatments adopted by each of the five microfinance 
programs we investigate. This data set provides broad coverage of the microfinance sector in 
Mexico, including both traditional MFIs and modern, commercialized microfinance programs. 
Therefore, we can study not only the “average” impact on household welfare derived from 
membership in a Mexican microfinance program but also whether these impacts differ 
according to the type of microfinance program. Furthermore, the contributions from our data 
set advance the discussion on the relative importance, in terms of poverty reduction, of 
different financial services (e.g., micro savings, microcredit, cash transfers, micro-insurance).  
Second, we use the Hausman-Taylor (HT) panel estimator to determine the impact of being a 
member of a Mexican microfinance program. Existing estimates of microfinance impacts 
Does microfinance improve household welfare? 
51 
 
suffer from (1) selection bias, because the household’s decision to participate in a 
microfinance program is endogenous, and (2) placement bias, due to the possibly non-random 
locations of microfinance programs. In principle, the best way to avoid both selection and 
placement biases is to use a randomized, controlled trial. However, these expensive trials are 
not currently available in relation to the impact of microfinance in Mexico, and they are too 
difficult to organize on a broad scale in the near future. Thus observational studies remain 
important and may reveal insights into issues that cannot be covered by randomized, 
controlled trials. In this case, the HT estimator provides a good estimation technique, because 
reliable external instruments are not available. The HT estimator can identify variables that do 
not change over time (e.g., membership in a MFI), even if they correlate with fixed effects. By 
using the HT estimator, we disentangle the impact of membership in a microfinance program 
from observed attributes that affect household welfare. Moreover, this estimator controls for 
relevant, unobserved household and community characteristics that do not change over time. 
 
To present this approach, we begin by describing the five microfinance programs we study, 
followed by a detailed description of the data set. We then specify both our estimation 
procedure and the empirical model. Finally, we present our results and some conclusions 
derived from them.  
3.2 Overview of Mexican Microfinance Programs 
The microfinance sector in Mexico comprises a range of models, though they mostly reflect 
two types: public and private. Private microfinance programs usually offer a full range of 
financial services, such as savings, microcredit, and health and nutrition assistance (e.g., 
SACP, PATMIR), though a few focus primarily on microcredit (MFI). Public microfinance 
programs instead center on savings (BANSEFI) or facilitate monetary transfers from the 
government (COOPERA), but they do not offer microcredit.  
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3.2.1 Public Savings and Credit Societies Program (SACP ) 
The SACP includes mostly semi-formal institutes and a predominantly rural clientele (Paxton, 
2006). The cajas solidarias, savings and credit cooperatives or societies, credit unions, civilian 
associations and societies, and social solidarity societies all fall within this category. Although 
some SACP institutes—especially the savings and credit societies—are quite large, most of 
them are small, community-based organizations that operate with funds obtained from 
deposits by clients, sometimes complemented with funding from the federal government for 
institutional innovation and limited international donations.  
 
A BANSEFI inventory of non-regulated financial institutions in 2002 identified more than 
800 unregulated credit and savings organizations, targeting more than 2 million active clients, 
predominantly the rural poor who were not being served by commercial banks. In the past 
decade, all SACP institutions have undergone a process of regulation, initiated by the National 
Commission of Banking and Values. The Mexican government now requires all SACP 
institutions to be supervised by upper-tier organizational bodies, called federations. However, 
most institutions still rely on rudimentary accounting systems and have minimal technology 
access, which creates costly inefficiencies (Paxton, 2006). 
 
3.2.2 Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program (PATMIR) 
In 2002, the Mexican government launched a public policy to support the SACP institutions 
and stimulate the expansion of financial services to underserved rural communities. This 
policy resulted in the PATMIR program, which received technical support from the World 
Council of Credit Unions in the United States, the Deutscher Genossenschafts un 
Raiffeisenverbad Cooperative Confederation from Germany, and the Développement 
International Desjardins of Canada (Towsend and Woodruff, 2006). The program assists 
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affiliated SACP institutions with specialized technical assistance and basic start-up capital to 
advance their technology, which in turn enables them to reduce transaction costs when 
operating in disadvantaged rural communities (Zapata, 2007). 
 
The program also stimulates the creation of new branches through technological innovations, 
which then serve as examples of cost-efficient institutions to serve the rural poor. Originally, 
the PATMIR program focused on small, impoverished communities in hard-to-reach areas, 
and many new clients were rural women. Subsequently, it shifted to focusing on new branches 
in communities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Most of these branches did not make a 
profit when their operations began, but within three years, nearly half had become financially 
sustainable.  
 
Near the end of 2006, the PATMIR project was operating across 13 states with 34 different 
institutions in 163 branches, and 77% of them were newly established branches. In total, these 
institutions managed 202,000 savings accounts, 57.9% of which belonged to clients who had 
not been banked before. Deposits amounted to more than USD$23.73 million (SAGARPA, 
2007). 
 
3.2.3 Traditional Microfinance Institutions (MFI)  
This category includes mostly small to medium-sized institutions, but also some of the largest 
MFIs in Mexico, and even in Latin America, such as Compartamos Bank and Financiera 
Independencia, which together serve close to 3 million clients and manage a gross loan 
portfolio of nearly USD$1.5 billion. The size of the institutions represents the main objective 
of the institution (profit or nonprofit), largely determined by market conditions. However, 
many MFIs in this category have been accused of charging exorbitant interest rates above 
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50% per annum, which, in addition to the seemingly nonrandom placement of the program 
outposts in wealthier zones, implies a divergence from the claimed social mission. 
 
Unlike the SACP institutes, traditional MFIs focus primarily on microcredit, at least partly 
due to their regulatory status. Some NGOs, such as Pro Mujer, initially collected savings from 
their clients but later shifted to microcredit services, because Mexican regulatory authorities 
denied them permission to mobilize savings. The MFIs in this category typically target urban 
women and grant small loans, ranging from USD$263.32 to USD$895.63. However, the 
Compartamos Bank, Finca, and Solucion Asea also manage loan portfolios that consist 
predominantly (more than 90%) of rural women.  
 
3.2.4 BANSEFI Program 
The National Bank of Financial Services (BANSEFI) is a socially oriented savings bank that 
serves approximately 3.75 million clients through a network of more than 2000 branches 
across the country. Its main objective is to integrate the poorest Mexican families into the 
financial services industry. The size of the branches range from less than 600 clients to more 
than 15,000 clients. The BANSEFI branches offer both basic, short-term savings accounts and 
long-term deposit accounts (BANSEFI, 2007). Account holders also receive financial literacy 
training. Emigrants living outside Mexico can use BANSEFI accounts to make cost-effective 
cash transfers to recipients in some of Mexico’s poorest and most remote areas.  
 
3.2.4 COOPERA Program 
This program consists of institutions that make cash transfers from the federal 
“Oportunidades” and “PROCAMPO” public programs, which were implemented to improve 
the health, education, and agricultural production of the poorest Mexican families. The federal 
government uses the financial infrastructure of the BANSEFI branches and more than 50 
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affiliated institutions in “La Red de la Gente” as conduits for these transfers. In December 
2003, 78% of the 633,974 people who received transfers from the public Oportunidades 
program maintained savings accounts with positive balances in La Red de la Gente network.  
3.3 Data Description  
We use a national panel survey pertaining to savings, credit, and rural microfinance, 
conducted annually in Mexico from 2004–2007, to support our analysis. The survey is part of 
the “Programme for Strengthening Savings, Social Credit and Rural Microfinance” project, 
which also has prompted an agreement between BANSEFI and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food. The panel data include detailed 
information about urban and rural households in three geographical regions: central, south, 
and north. In total, surveyors visited 27 of the 32 total Mexican states to obtain information 
about households that either participated or not in one of the five microfinance programs. 
 
The survey also covers household welfare, with items related to income and expenditures, 
economic activities, formal and informal assets and liabilities, transaction costs, self-
employment (farm and off-farm activities), risk and insurance, remittances, and public cash 
transfers. This information refers to the household level, and the goal is to determine the 
impact of access to financial services on household welfare, as well as on the economic, 
social, and institutional environment in which these financial institutions operate.  
 
A two-step process identified the sample of participating households, which represents the 
treatment group. First, the survey administrators identified branches of institutions with a 
probability proportional to their size (i.e., number of accounts) from the baseline BANSEFI 
Census of SACP institutions conducted in 2002. For each selected branch, they randomly 
selected 20–35 client records. Second, a similar number of households from the same or a 
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nearby community was screened through a survey. Households in which no family members 
were clients of any financial institution during the five years prior to the survey (i.e., since 
1999) were included as the control group. The survey does not provide enough evidence to 
conclude that treatment/control households were members of two different 
institutions/programs at the time that the survey was conducted (2004-2007).  
 
The original sample included 5,768 households: 2,975 treatment and 2,793 control 
households. This sample diminished substantially over the four survey years, due to attrition 
or the intentional exclusion of households when budget constraints demanded it. Thus 3,437 
households were surveyed in all four rounds. Attrition was somewhat higher for households 
without an account in 2004 (37.1%) than for those with some account (31.5%). Furthermore, 
new households were added, leading to a sample size in the final survey of 3,722. In total, the 
survey offers detailed information about 6,976 households. These data suggest that during the 
period of analysis, some control households became clients of financial institutions, and some 
clients dropped out of programs in which they had been participating. However, we retained 
the original assignment to treatment and control groups for all years, because omitting 
dropouts from the treatment group would bias the impact estimates upward, if they dropped 
out because they had been negatively affected by their participation in the program (Tedeschi, 
2008). 
  
From the data, we calculated a t-test of mean differences between participating and non-
participating households in the five microfinance programs under study (see Table 3.1 for a 
list of key household characteristics). From the t-values, we can see that there are significant 
differences between groups for all observable attributes. Thus, we took these characteristics 
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into account for the estimation of the different empirical models of household welfare 
thereafter in Section 3.5. 
Table 3.1. Mean Differences between Microfinance Clients and  Non-clients 
Household indicator 
Non-
Clients 
Clients t-test 
Per capita Expenditure  
(constant MXN pesos 2004) 
15,088.63 22,107.59 -11.57 
Head  gender  (1 if male) 0.78 0.82 -6.79 
Head age (years) 47.99 49.22 -5.42 
Head  years of  formal  schooling 4.87 6.59 -26.79 
Head civil status (1 if married) 0.76 0.81 -9.50 
Head has a formal  job 0.80 0.82 -3.94 
Household size 4.36 4.47 -3.46 
Dependency ratio
1 
 0.35 0.32 9.32 
Household  mean age (years) 32.27 32.99 -2.93 
Household  formal years of schooling 5.17 6.77 -35.71 
Household  has  a business 0.23 0.33 -14.90 
Household  shocks 1.31 1.22 3.78 
Household has insurance 0.36 0.55 -26.23 
Urban household 0.51 0.53 -2.29 
1 
Number of dependents/total  family members 
Source: Author’s compilation; data set property of  the BANSEFI bank. 
 
3.4 Methodology  
We focus our analysis on the impact of microfinance on household consumption. We estimate 
the consumption (y) of household i at time t as a function of a vector of participation dummies 
that includes all five microfinance programs (P), a vector of time-variant household 
characteristics (X), a vector of regional dummies (Z), and a vector of t – 1 year dummies (T) 
that accounts for covariate shocks:  
 
,                                            (1) 
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where ci is a time-invariant, household-specific effect. Table 3.2 provides details about the 
control variables, X and Z. 
Table 3.2 Control Variables in Empirical Models of Household Welfare Level 
 
Time-Variant (X) 
Head gender  Gender of the household’s head, 1 = male, 0 = female  
Head age  Number of years the household’s head has been alive  
Head education Number of years of the household head’s formal education  
Head civil status  Household head’s civil status, 1 = married, 0 = otherwise 
Head has a formal job 
Dummy variable, 1 = head of the household had a formal job the previous 
year, 0 = otherwise 
Household size Total number of individual household members  
Dependency ratio 
Ratio of the total family members under 18 years of age to total household 
family members  
Household mean age  Mean age (years) of total family members in the household  
Household mean 
education 
Mean number of years of education of all household’s family members  
Household business Dummy variable, 1 = household head owned a business, 0 = otherwise  
Household shocks 
Total number of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks faced by the household 
family members during the previous year 
Household insurance 
Dummy variable, 1 = some family members had health insurance, 0 = 
otherwise 
Time-Invariant (Z) 
Urban community 
Dummy variable, 1 = household is living in an urban community of more than 
10,000 inhabitants, 0 = otherwise 
Southern region Dummy variable, 1 = household was in the southern region, 0 = otherwise 
Central region Dummy variable, 1 = household was in the central region, 0 = otherwise 
  
 
 
A major advantage of our data set is that it differentiates treatments and controls for each 
microfinance program. Including reliable, predetermined controls in the data set improves our 
ability to identify the impact of the different microfinance programs. Nevertheless, we still 
need to control for possible remaining self-selection biases and program placement biases. To 
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attain unbiased estimates of the causal impact of membership in a microfinance program on 
household welfare, we must account for all time-varying and time-invariant observable and 
unobservable control variables that affect household welfare and correlate with membership in 
the microfinance program. We thus control for observable time-varying variables by including 
relevant determinants of household welfare, and we try to control for program placement bias 
by including regional dummies and a dummy for urban areas (see Appendix 3-1 and 3-2). The 
main problem we face thus are the unobserved variables that cannot be included directly in the 
model. For example, it may be the case that some household characteristics, such as 
innovation skills, affect both the likelihood of becoming a member of a microfinance program 
and the possibility of escaping poverty.  
 
We start by conducting a Hausman test to determine if there is any correlation between the 
unobserved time-invariant variables c and the other regressors in the model. If the test 
indicates no correlation, we can estimate a random effects model. That is, if all unobserved 
factors that affect household welfare are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units and 
the unobserved time-invariant individual effects are uncorrelated with all other regressors in 
the model, a random effects model is preferable, because it would be more efficient than 
ordinary least squares or a fixed effects panel estimator. However, if the Hausman test 
indicates correlation between the unobserved time-invariant variables and other regressors, the 
random effects model yields inconsistent and likely biased estimators. Therefore, we would 
need to rely on another estimator in this case. A fixed-effects model assumes that all observed 
and unobserved differences across the cross-sectional units can be captured by differences in 
the constant term (fixed effects). It also allows the unobserved effects to correlate with the 
included variables, because the estimator eliminates fixed effects from the model. However, it 
eliminates anything that is time invariant and cannot identify such variables. Our main 
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independent variable, “being a member of a microfinance program” is time invariant for most 
of the program, so we rule out the fixed effects estimator.  
 
Instead, we use the Hausman-Taylor (HT) (1981) estimator, which assumes that the set of 
explanatory variables contains both time-varying and time-invariant variables. A subset of 
both types is assumed to be exogenous and uncorrelated with the unobserved time-invariant 
individual effects, though some of both types of variables may correlate with the time-
invariant individual effects. The HT estimator can identify time-invariant determinants; it also 
is more efficient than the fixed effects approach, which essentially assumes that all regressors 
are correlated with the unobserved fixed effects and thus that all time-varying observed 
variables are instrumented by their deviation from individual means. If only some regressors 
correlate with the unobserved individual effects, not all variables need to be instrumented. By 
differentiating between exogenous and endogenous regressors, the HT estimator accounts for 
this possibility. Furthermore, the HT model uses the variation between and within strictly 
exogenous variables in other periods as instruments. The individual means of the strictly 
exogenous covariates serve as instruments for the time-invariant covariates, correlated with 
the individual effects (Baltagi, 2001). 
 
We further note that the HT model, similar to ordinary least squares, the random-effects 
model, and the fixed-effects estimator, assumes that none of the regressors is correlated with 
the individual time-varying disturbance terms. If they do, using an instrumental variable 
technique can solve the problem. As is common, our data set does not include reliable outside 
instruments, so we rely on random effects or HT estimates. However, we carefully test the 
reliability of the assumption that none of the regressors correlates with the individual time-
varying disturbance terms by applying an overidentification test of the instruments, using the 
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Hansen J statistic. In this test of the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, a high p-value would provide some support for the prediction 
that none of the regressors is correlated with the individual time-varying disturbance terms. In 
addition, we test the power of the (internal) instruments in the HT estimator by using the 
Craig-Donald Wald F statistic, which tests the null hypothesis of weak instruments. We use 
the critical values applied by Stock-Yogo. Finally, we present robust standard errors based on 
bootstraps with 250 replications. This procedure is suitable when the asymptotic sampling 
distribution is difficult to derive for an instrumental variable estimation, such as the HT 
method.  
3.5  Estimation Results  
In total, we estimated seven specifications of our empirical models of household welfare. We 
start by estimating the two models that use the entire sample and provide the results in Table 
3.3.  Model 1 does not distinguish between different microfinance programs and thus provides 
an estimate of the average impact of being a member of a microfinance program in Mexico. 
Model 2 assumes that the impact of the different programs may differ, so it features separate 
dummies for each one. Because the Hausman test indicates that the unobserved time-invariant 
variables correlates with the other regressors, we present these results using the HT estimator.  
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Table 3.3  Estimates of the Impact of Microfinance Program 
Participation on Annual Household Per Capita Expenditures 
(MXN$), 2004–2007 
 
  Hausman-Taylor Estimator 
Model 1 2 
Variable 
Pooled 
Sample 
Five Independent 
Programs 
Panel A. Time-Invariant Endogenous     
Treatment Group 8700.8**   
  [0.013]   
SACP Program   13787.6** 
    [0.019] 
PATMIR Program   24964.9 
    [0.103] 
MFI Program   -19033.3 
    [0.226] 
BANSEFI Program   10357.3 
    [0.471] 
COOPERA Programme   -38983.0* 
    [0.060] 
Panel B. Time-Variant Exogenous      
Head gender (1 = male) 2429.5 2788.1 
  [0.157] [0.116]  
Head age (# years) -46.49* -63.47**  
  [0.083] [0.047]  
Head education (number of years) 475.0*** 267 
  [0.004] [0.119]  
Civil status of the head (1 = married) -3196.6* -3220.2 
  [0.093] [0.109]  
Head has a formal job 226.1 -770 
  [0.833] [0.552]  
Household size (# individuals) -2069.4*** -2131.6*** 
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Household dependency ratio -3965 -5299.8*  
  [0.149] [0.092]  
Household mean age (# years) 139.1** 105.2*  
  [0.010] [0.066]  
Household mean education (# years) 1038.7*** 563.7**  
  [0.000] [0.013]  
Household owns a business 5832.7*** 4503.8*** 
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Household number of shocks 883.2*** 966.4*** 
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Household insurance 911.7 1762.5*** 
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  [0.111] [0.003]  
Year dummy 2004 3771.2*** 3190.5*** 
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Year dummy 2006 -643.4** -430.6 
  [0.048] [0.172]  
Year dummy 2007 2166.5** 2813.9*** 
  [0.022] [0.002]  
Panel C. Time-Invariant Exogenous      
Urban community 1297.9** 3755.1*** 
  [0.032] [0.008]  
Southern region -906.1 2043.1 
  [0.200] [0.487]  
Central region 2753.5*** 6397.3**  
  [0.000] [0.020]  
Constant 7930.4* 11050.1**  
  [0.050] [0.018]  
Number of observations  18933 18933 
Number of  households  6976 6976 
Number of explanatory variables 19 23 
p-value, Hausman test (FE vs. RE) 0.0010 0.0024 
p-value, Hansen J statistic  0.0023 0.0522 
Craig-Donald Wald F statistic 47.279 4.65 
Stock-Yogo weak identifier test of critical 
values 
  
5% maximal IV relative bias 21.41 21.41 
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.51 11.51 
20% maximal IV relative bias 6.42 6.56 
30% maximal IV relative bias 4.63 4.80 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 250 replications served to estimate both 
equations. The p-values obtained from these estimations appear in brackets below 
the corresponding parameters. FE = fixed effect, RE = random effect, IV = 
independent variable. 
***Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
* Significant at 10%.  
 
 
The results for Model 1 suggest that on average, membership in a Mexican microfinance 
program reduces poverty: The “Treatment Group” dummy is highly significant with a positive 
sign. However, Model 2 reveals that the impact differs considerably, depending on the 
program joined. Whereas the SACP program appears to improve household welfare, 
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membership in the PATMIR, MFI, and BANSEFI programs does not contribute to poverty 
reduction. Being a member of COOPERA even seems to have a negative impact. 
 
The results in Table 3.3 offer an initial assessment of the impact of different microfinance 
programs in Mexico. However, the p-value of the Hansen J statistic in both estimates also 
rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, 
which may imply that the estimation results are biased. Moreover, the Craig-Donald F statistic 
of Model 2 is low, such that the (internal) instruments appear weak. Therefore, we offer this 
first set of estimates with some caution. 
 
The tests for the reliability of the instruments also suggest problems with the HT estimates, so 
we undertake estimates for different samples in each microfinance program, namely, the 
treatment and control households for each program. By using different samples, we allow the 
coefficients of the control variables to differ for each program. However, the smaller samples 
reduce the degrees of freedom per estimate, though the number of observations for each 
program estimate remains quite high. The number of observations is lowest for the MFI 
program sample, but even it exceeds 900 observations.  
 
We provide these estimates for the separate samples in Table 3.4, using different models for 
each program. The Hausman test suggests no correlation between the unobserved time-
invariant variables and the other regressors for the BANSEFI and COOPERA programs, so 
we use the random effects estimator for these samples. For the other programs, the estimates 
are based on the HT estimator.  
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Table 3.4 Estimates of the Impact of Five Mexican Microfinance Programs on Annual 
Household Per Capita Expenditures (MXN$), 2004–2007 
 
  A. Hausman-Taylor Estimator (HT) B. Random Effect Estimator 
(RE) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Program SACP  PATMIR  MFI  BANSEFI  COOPERA  
Panel A. Time-Invariant Endogenous           
SACP Program 15231.9***        
  [0.005]        
PATMIR Program   15535.4***      
    [0.004]      
MFI Program     -9958.2*     
      [0.082]     
BANSEFI Program      3830.4***   
       [0.007]   
COOPERA Program        -1625.1 
         [0.783]  
Panel B. Time-Variant Exogenous           
Head gender (1 = male) 2812.3 -1790.8 809.3 -869.7 9625.8 
  [0.356] [0.434] [0.777] [0.709] [0.217]  
Head age (# years) -31.03 -105.3** 50.09 96.75 -523.2**  
  [0.414] [0.033] [0.349] [0.494] [0.022]  
Head education (number of years) 563.9* 214.3 336.2 297 77.51 
  [0.062] [0.126] [0.122] [0.242] [0.900]  
Civil status of the head (1 = married) -4347.1 625.4 -2744.6 1750.3 -13878.5 
  [0.232] [0.718] [0.376] [0.439] [0.119]  
Head has a formal job -587.5 -924.5 1458.9 1609.6 802 
  [0.613] [0.572] [0.389] [0.687] [0.722]  
Household size (# individuals) -2336.1*** -1513.7*** -1699.9*** -1575.2*** -1728.8**  
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.047]  
Household dependency ratio -1739.9 4000.2 5031 -9969.4* -32869.2*  
  [0.627] [0.242] [0.376] [0.094] [0.092]  
Household mean age (# years) 74.15 343.7*** 93.47 74.64 -197.3 
  [0.257] [0.009] [0.389] [0.486] [0.540]  
Household mean education (# years) 1003.5** 776.1*** 1234.6*** 1020.1*** -1835 
  [0.027] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.226]  
Household owns a business 6255.0*** 4063.7*** 4059.8*** 6383.8*** 3551.8 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.149]  
Household number of shocks 959.4*** 919.1** 485.2* -2.426 1165.2*  
  [0.000] [0.027] [0.091] [0.997] [0.084]  
Household insurance 641.2 -45.84 1477.4 2605.1** 2942.7*  
  [0.389] [0.963] [0.111] [0.041] [0.099]  
Year 2004 4437.5*** 2369.9*** -1583 1547.1 5618 
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  [0.000] [0.000] [0.227] [0.122] [0.237]  
Year 2006 -600.6 193.6 -1499.6 -829.9 -3083.6**  
  [0.185] [0.780] [0.187] [0.322] [0.021]  
Year 2007 2028.2* 4303.6** -1503.4 3716.1 -2151.3 
  [0.064] [0.034] [0.196] [0.264] [0.102]  
Constant 8788.6** -2331.9 12596.1 4386.5 85076.3**  
  [0.029] [0.535] [0.177] [0.715] [0.022]  
Panel C. Time-Invariant Exogenous           
Urban community 2290.9** 4139.9*** 1126.8 -4652.8 4636.7 
  [0.046] [0.008] [0.357] [0.123] [0.352]  
Southern region -1390.7 695.5 -2260.8 8178.9 -18306.2**  
  [0.197] [0.549] [0.227] [0.108] [0.017]  
Central region 448.9 -1192.3 599 5360.4***   
  [0.705] [0.628] [0.752] [0.000]   
Number of observations  9523 4324 936 2560 1590 
Number of households  3486 1497 476 1014 503 
Number of explanatory variables 19 19 19 19 18 
p-value, Hausman test (FE vs. RE) 0.0057 0.0010 0.018 0.5222 0.8713 
p-value, Hansen J statistic  0.5742 0.1295 0.5709     
Craig-Donald Wald F statistic 49.118 17.743 2.072     
Stock-Yogo weak identifier test critical 
values 
     
       5% maximal IV relative bias 21.41 21.41 21.41   
       10% maximal IV relative bias 11.51 11.51 11.51   
       20% maximal IV relative bias 6.42 6.42 6.42   
       30% maximal IV relative bias 4.63 4.63 4.63   
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 250 replications served to estimate both equations. The p-values obtained from these 
estimations appear in brackets below the corresponding parameters. FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects, IV = 
independent variable. 
***Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
* Significant at 10%. 
 
 
The results in Table 3.4 confirm the significant positive effect of being a member of the SACP 
program on household  consumption. Moreover, being a member of PATMIR and BANSEFI 
seems to contribute to poverty reduction. In contrast with the test results in Table 3.3, the 
Hansen J statistic and Craig-Donald Wald F statistic now indicate support for the underlying 
assumption of the HT model that the regressors are not correlated with the individual time-
varying disturbance terms.  
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We do not observe a significant impact of membership in the COOPERA program on 
household welfare; we find a negative impact of being a member of the MFI program. The 
latter result demands some caution though, because the value of the Craig-Donald Wald F 
statistic is very low, which indicates that the instruments are weak. 
 
How can we interpret these results? It may be useful to compare our estimation results with 
the main focus of each microfinance program. The SACP and PATMIR programs offer a wide 
range of financial products, though they focus on savings products. In addition, BANSEFI 
focuses on savings products and does not even supply microcredit. The MFI program instead 
primarily uses microcredit, though some regulated institutions such as Compartamos Bank 
also offer savings. The focus of COOPERA is public cash transfers. Thus in the microfinance 
programs for which savings products are very important, membership seems to increase per 
capita expenditures, implying poverty reduction for the household. The largest effects emerge 
from SACP and PATMIR, the programs with most diversified services. Participation in them 
is associated with additional per capita expenditures of more than USD$1,374. In contrast, 
membership in the MFI program, which mostly offers credit, does not seem to help reduce 
poverty. Although more research is needed to study what drives theses outcomes, the results 
are in line with several recent randomized, controlled trials that indicate only a marginal role 
of microcredit but a much greater welfare-enhancing role for other microfinance products, 
such as savings which if provided by MFIs with a suitable institutional design to cover the 
specific needs of the targeted clientele, can lead to a larger impact on poverty reduction. 
 
It is noteworthy that our regressions indicate negative welfare effects of the MFI program. 
This finding may reflect the program’s strong focus on credit or arise because several MFIs 
within this program are highly commercialized and demand very high interest rates on loans. 
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The quick commercialization of microfinance has been widely criticized; the shift even 
induced some microfinance institutions to go public and act like normal, commercial banks. 
The most well-known example of this shift is Compartamos Bank, which is part of the MFI 
program in our sample. In contrast with the argument that the commercialization of 
microfinance is a positive development that improves both MFI performance and the 
availability of funds for the poor, we note that it implies that MFIs have moved away from 
their original mission. Commercialization also likely encourages MFIs to put shareholders’ 
interests above those of the poor they serve. Our results thus provide some support for the 
argument against the commercialization of microfinance.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This study analyzes the impact of five microfinance programs on welfare using data from a 
longitudinal panel survey of 6,976 households conducted in Mexico during 2004–2007. Our 
study adds to extant research because we study not just the average impact of microfinance 
but also compare the effects of five different programs, each with its own goals and activities. 
Therefore, this investigation advances understanding of how various financial services 
provided through microfinancing contribute to poverty reduction. We also use an HT 
estimator to limit the problems associated with self-selection bias and program placement 
bias. 
 
This study in turn reveals that only savings-oriented microfinance programs (i.e., SACP, 
PATMIR, and BANSEFI) exerted a positive, significant impact in terms of increasing 
household per capita expenditures. We do not find such effects for MFIs focused mainly on 
credit or for COOPERA, the program that facilitates cash transfers from the government. 
These findings are in line with studies by Roodman (2012) and Karlan and Appel (2011) that 
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suggest that savings products have a much greater impact on the welfare of the poor than does 
microcredit.  
 
Most savings and credit cooperatives under SACP and PATMIR currently are undergoing 
regulation processes, which might affect the benefits that members reap from these programs. 
More research is needed to disentangle the thus far overlooked consequences of regulation 
policies on the financial sustainability and poverty outreach benefits of these financial 
intermediaries.  
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Appendix 3-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Real annual per capita expenditures (MXN$) 19089 18895.02 42977.74 0 2395459 
Household part of the treatment group 19090 .54 .50 0 1 
Client of a SACP institution 19090 .27 .44 0 1 
Client of a PATMIR institution 19090 .12 .32 0 1 
Client of BANSEFI  19090 .07 .26 0 1 
Client of a MFI institution 19090 .03 .18 0 1 
Client of COOPERA institution  19090 .05 .22 0 1 
SACP Program 9599 .53 .50 0 1 
PATMIR Program 4364 .51 .50 0 1 
BANSEFI Program 2584 .54 .50 0 1 
MFI Program 942 .69 .46 0 1 
COOPERA Program 1601 .60 .49 0 1 
Gender of the head (1 = male) 19089 .80 .40 0 1 
Age of the head (number of years)  19089 48.66 15.49 16 99 
Education of the head (number of year) 19029 5.80 4.58 0 23 
Civil status of the head (1 = married) 19083 .79 .41 0 1 
Head has a formal job (1 if has) 19030 .81 .39 0 1 
Household size (number of family members) 19089 4.42 1.99 1 18 
Household dependency ratio (# members < 18 
years/total members) 
19089 .33 .25 0 1 
Household mean age (number of years) 19089 32.66 16.57 7.5 99 
Household mean education (number of years) 19084 6.04 3.23 0 21 
Ownership of a business (1 = own)  19066 .28 .45 0 1 
Total number of shocks (idiosyncratic or 
covariant) 
19090 1.26 1.64 0 7 
Health insurance (1 = family member has 
insurance) 
19081 .47 .50 0 1 
Urban community  19090 .52 .50 0 1 
Southern region  19090 .48 .50 0 1 
Central region  19090 .34 .47 0 1 
Year dummy, 2004 19090 .29 .46 0 1 
Year dummy, 2006 19090 .21 .40 0 1 
Year dummy, 2007 19090 .25 .43 0 1 
Source: Authors’ compilation; data set property of  the BANSEFI bank. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Does Microfinance Reduce the Vulnerability of Households to Poverty? ♣ 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines whether membership of a savings and credit society (SACP) reduces the 
vulnerability of households to poverty. We use a representative survey from the National 
Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) in Mexico, which consists of 14,245 
observations taken over the period 2004−2007. By using Glejser’s heteroskedasticity test, we 
show that membership of SACP institutions leads to (a) an increase in the level of annual 
household per capita income, per capita education expenses, and per capita expenditure and 
(b) a decrease in the variance of annual household per capita income, per capita education 
expenses, and per capita expenditure. These results provide convincing evidence that 
membership of  SACP institutions indeed reduce vulnerability.  
 
Keywords: Microfinance, Risk,  Banking, Welfare, BANSEFI, Savings societies, Mexico.  
 
♣ Paper by Roselia Servin, Robert Lensink and Marrit van den Berg. Submitted for 
publication.  
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4.1 Introduction 
There is a growing body of literature focusing on the impact of microfinance on the ex post 
poverty status of households; however, there is a shortage of papers studying the role of 
microfinance in reducing households’ vulnerability to poverty. This is unfortunate since what 
really matters is the ex ante risk that households that are non-poor now will become poor in 
the future or the ex ante risk that households that are poor now will remain in poverty in the 
future (Chaudhuri et al., 2002). In most developing countries, insurance and credit markets 
function poorly (Besley, 1995). As a result, poor households find it difficult to cope with the 
risk of events that could easily push them into extreme poverty — illness and death, theft of 
assets such as livestock, a bad harvest, job loss, physical insecurity, weather related events 
(droughts, floods, and earthquakes), or economic downturns such as price fluctuations 
(Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005; Suryahadi et al., 2000). In such circumstances, policies 
aimed at assisting households to reduce vulnerability to poverty can be an important poverty 
reducing strategy (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001).  
Household vulnerability and risk are two related concepts, yet there is no clear-cut definition 
of what a vulnerable household is. For instance, within the disaster risk assessment 
framework, vulnerability is defined by its relation to hazards. Thus, an external hazard that 
acts on a vulnerable entity, in our case a household, can lead to an undesirable outcome: a 
disaster. In contrast, in a food security context, vulnerability refers to an undesirable outcome 
(e.g. hunger, food insecurity, or famine) that vulnerable people face (Dilley and Boudreau, 
2001). Policies to reduce a household’s vulnerability aim either to eliminate the risk factors in 
the household’s environment, to mitigate the household’s exposure to those risk factors, or to 
strengthen its capacity to cope with them (Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005). Our study 
focuses only on the latter aspect. More precisely, we proxy household vulnerability by the 
probability that a household with certain characteristics will become (or remain) poor.  
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The main aim of our study is to examine the hypothesis that the vulnerability to poverty of 
banked households is lower than that of non-banked households. Banked households are 
expected to use a wide-range of coping strategies including precautionary savings (e.g. liquid 
and non-liquid) relative to non-banked households. We test our hypothesis by focusing on one 
specific type of microfinance institutions in Mexico. More specifically, we concentrate on  the 
savings and credit societies (SACPs) in Mexico.  
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, our study is one of the few studies that 
examines whether membership of a microfinance institution helps to reduce the vulnerability 
to poverty. The only other recent study we are aware of is Swain and Floro (2012). Second,  
we use a unique dataset that allows one to differentiate between treatment and control 
households, which helps us to address the attribution question. Third, we use Glejser’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity tests to examine whether membership of an SACP increases the mean and 
reduces the variance of three alternative indicators for poverty. By using Glejser’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticity tests, we are able to estimate the impact of membership of SACP on the 
mean and variance of different poverty indicators. Membership of an SACP may both 
increase the level and reduce the variance of a poverty indicator; in this case, we argue that 
the probability of being poor, i.e. the vulnerability, then reduces. We focus on three indicators: 
per capita income, per capita education expenses, and per capita expenditure. We use these 
indicators to measure household vulnerability to poverty for several reasons: (1) they are 
suitable measurements to evaluate the impact of being a member of savings and credit 
societies on household welfare level and its variability; (2) they are linked directly with a 
household’s poverty dynamics and its exposure to risk; (3) they allow changes in the 
household’s welfare status to be tracked over time, both in the short and in the long term. 
The rationale for analysing per capita education expenses, which is a non-conventional 
measure that serves as a proxy for investment in children’s schooling, is that, theoretically, 
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education has been identified as crucial in reducing long-term poverty (Schultz, 1961). It is 
related to GDP growth (Barro, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Garcia De la Cruz, 2008; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Middendorf, 2006) and has an unambiguous positive effect on human 
capital formation. In fact, empirical studies (Behrman et al. 1989; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; 
Schultz et al., 1988) suggest that educational achievement is affected by household size and 
resources. Thus, if the households are financially constrained, their investments in human 
capital can be affected (Garcia De la Cruz, 2008). If that is the case, we expect that investment 
in children’s schooling, facilitated through access to savings and credit facilities from the 
SACP institutions, can help to reduce a household’s vulnerability to poverty. 
An important advantage of conducting Gelsjer’s heteroskedasticity test is that we do not need 
long-term time series to estimate variances, so that we can determine the impact on 
vulnerability even from cross-sectional data. The approach we use is to some extent similar to 
the Chaudhuri et al. (2002) approach. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical framework on 
microfinance and risk. In section 4.3, we develop some hypotheses on the link between being 
banked and three different outcome indicators. Section 4.4 presents descriptive statistics of 
our dataset. In Section 4.5, we explain our empirical methodology. Finally, the main results 
and the conclusions are offered in sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. 
4.2 The Role of Microfinance in Risk Mitigation  
It is common to differentiate between covariate and idiosyncratic risks (Dercon, 2002). 
Idiosyncratic risks can be dealt with or managed within a community because they affect only 
a particular individual or household. In contrast, covariate risks are aggregate, are experienced 
across the economy, and affect everybody in the community. They cannot be shared and can 
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only be dealt with by means of formal or informal transfers (e.g. credit, insurance, public 
transfers) or mechanisms originating from outside the community. 
Households use a variety of risk-management strategies to smooth their income and 
consumption levels. For instance, households in a community may informally agree to insure 
each other or provide state contingent transfers and remittances to friends and neighbors 
(Besley, 1995; Morduch, 1995; Rosenzweig, 1988). Households may also use their savings 
(Paxson, 1992; Paxton and Young, 2011), take loans from the formal financial sector (Udry, 
1994), sell assets such as grain reserves and livestock (Deaton, 1992), or send their children to 
work instead of school in order to supplement their income (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997). 
Additional strategies include income diversification, participation in credit and informal 
insurance arrangements such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), kinship-
based networks, multiple job holding, and engagement in other informal economic activities 
(Kochar, 1999; Morduch, 1995). However, these insurance mechanisms may not be efficient 
for dealing with covariate risks such as natural disasters. In such situations, access to 
resources for investment in mitigation becomes relevant. Financial-sector institutions that 
target households can play an important role here in assisting the poor with suitable insurance 
mechanisms for adjusting to these risks (Vatsa and Krimgold, 2000). 
In low-income countries, the most important sources of credit for poor people to generate their 
livelihoods are informal institutions such as moneylenders, landlords, shopkeepers, friends, 
and family members (Fofana, 2010), particularly for non-banked people. However, people 
with access to deposit and credit facilities can, in addition to the informal sources, use a wide 
range of formal instruments to mitigate risk (e.g. loans, savings, life insurance, and cash 
transfer services). Theoretical and empirical literature (Kumar and Newport, 2005; Palier and 
Prevost, 2007) suggests that microfinance emerges as an efficient solution for risk coping 
through insurance and saving mechanisms and through the creation of microenterprises. It is 
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argued that microfinance helps to reduce the negative effect of idiosyncratic and covariate 
risks and prevents households from adopting costly self-insurance strategies in response to 
unanticipated income shocks. One way of doing so is by means of facilitating financial 
services that enable banked households to diversify their income sources (e.g. different jobs, 
regular employment, etc.), to increase their income-earning and asset-building opportunities. 
After weather disasters, for instance, microfinance has proved to assist farmers to rebuild their 
houses and  re-establish their agricultural production, without having to rely on governmental 
disaster relief (Hoff et al., 2003). Even in extreme events, such as the Bangladesh major 
floods of 1988 or the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka, microfinance played a crucial role in relief 
and rehabilitation alongside government efforts to deal with the adverse impact on the poor. 
In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
encompass more than 3 million clients and more than 750 non-governmental organizations 
operating microcredit schemes. They have delivered extra loans to meet consumption and 
investment expenses with a six-month extension of the repayment schedule and allowed 
clients to withdraw up to 50 per cent of their savings if needed in the event of disaster (Shah, 
1999). 
In Mexico, government efforts are not enough for relief and reconstruction in the event of 
risks such as earthquakes or floods. As a result, funds from public programs are shifted to 
assist the communities affected by these risks, a practice that is known to be disruptive to 
important development efforts of such programs. One of the alternative mechanisms that the 
Mexican government can do in such events is to transfer the risk to other parties, for instance 
to insurance companies and to capital markets (Kreimer et al., 1999). However, market 
imperfections prevent these mechanisms from functioning well because poor people lack 
access to formal insurance and capital markets. Nevertheless, financial institutions such as 
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SACPs, which are the subject of this study, can play an important role in reducing 
vulnerability to poverty.  
4.3 Hypothesis Development   
Participation in a microfinance program may help to reduce vulnerability to poverty since 
microfinance institutions may provide loans and savings possibilities to its credit constrained 
members. The loans and accumulated savings may help households to reduce the level of 
poverty and to deal with shocks, especially in case of idiosyncratic shocks. Empirical 
evidence suggests that microfinance participation has a positive effect on the smoothing of 
income and consumption in the event of risk. This is due to a positive link between the 
financial services being offered by microfinance institutions (MFIs), such as savings, and the 
reduction of uncertainty (Carroll et al., 1992; Paxson, 1992). In line with this, Lee and 
Sawada (2010) found in rural Pakistan that the precautionary savings motive is more 
pronounced when access to credit markets for the poor is limited, as is the case in Mexico. 
Further research (Paxson, 1992; Paxton and Young, 2011; Paxton and Zhuo, 2011) supports 
the role of savings as a buffer stock to cope with income variability due to economic shocks. 
According to the latter studies, households accumulate stock savings prior to a shock and 
make use of these during or in the aftermath of shocks to smooth their income and 
consumption. For instance, Shoji (2009) found that a contingent repayment schedule of 
savings and installments during natural disasters such as the Bangladeshi major floods of 
2004 functioned as a safety net by decreasing the probability that MFI recipients skip meals 
by 5.1 per cent; this was particularly so for the landless and females.  
Consequently, we expect that SACP members in Mexico are better able to cope with risk in 
comparison to non-banked households. Our first hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
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H1 Household participation in savings and credit societies improves the mean of annual 
per capita income and per capita expenditure and reduces the variance of annual per 
capita income and per capita expenditure    
Some theoretical and empirical work (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Garcia-De la Cruz, 
2011; Garcia De la Cruz, 2008; Paxton and Young, 2011; Paxton and Zhuo, 2011) suggests 
that access to formal deposit facilities has a positive impact on human capital formation, 
particularly on schooling choices and/or in financing major school expenses. Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) and Ersado (2005) found that membership of microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh improved children’s schooling and reduced child labor. However, another stream 
of literature (Jacoby, 1994; Maldonado and González-Vega, 2008; Wydick, 1999) suggests 
that access to credit and income-earning opportunities in the family enterprise may increase 
the marginal product of child labor, leading to an increase in the opportunity cost of 
schooling. In addition, Jacoby (1994) pointed out that, if hired labor and child labor are not 
easily substitutable, the demand for child labor can lead to a negative impact on investment in 
children’s schooling.  
Furthermore, Paxton and Young (2011) pointed out that higher levels of education have been 
associated with higher levels of total savings. An evaluation study of the PATMIR Program 
(Garcia-De la Cruz, 2011, pp. 9-12), which includes some of the sampled SACP institutions in 
this study, reports that clients used 14-28% of their loans and 12-29% of their savings for 
education expenses. Similarly, 20% of non-clients declared to be willing to save and 20-40% 
claimed to have access to credit for the purpose of covering education expenses. In a related 
study, Garcia-De la Cruz (2008) found that access to both deposit and loans, in comparison 
with no access, reduced the schooling gap by 1.2 years. After adding an interaction term of 
both probabilities (access to deposits and loans), the author found that access to credit 
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increases rather than reduces the gap. As a result, the latter study pointed out that financial 
institutions offering deposit facilities, rather than simply loans, may bring additional benefits 
on human capital formation. Our study aims to shed some light on this issue by testing 
whether SACP clients do better in terms of per capita education expenditure, and whether they 
have a lower variability in per capita education expenditure as compared to a control group of 
non-banked households. We hypothesize: 
H2 Being a client of a savings and credit society improves investment in children’s 
schooling and reduces its variance 
4.4  Data  
This study uses data from a representative household panel survey from 2004 until 2007, 
commissioned by the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) in Mexico 
through a collaborative project with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and 
Rural Development (SAGARPA) and supported by a World Bank project on rural financial 
markets. The main objective of the survey was to learn about the differences in access to 
financial services for a sample of banked and non-banked households. 
Based on differences in access to formal financial institutions, it is possible to collect 
information on two groups of households: (1) banked households, defined as those with at 
least one family member identified as being a client of a microfinance  institution (in our case 
a savings and credit society) at the time of the survey and five years prior to it; (2) non-banked 
households, defined as those that did not have any family member who was a client of a 
microfinance institution at the time of the survey and five years prior to it. The latter 
households’ classification has been proposed in empirical studies (Paxton and Young, 2011) 
that analyzed the liquidity profiles of Mexican households. We use this grouping because it 
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seems suitable to test hypotheses on the impact of being a member of an SACP institution on 
reducing household vulnerability to poverty.  
To ensure comparability between both groups of households, enumerators guaranteed that 
banked and non-banked households shared similar socio-economic characteristics and are 
living in a similar environment, either in the same or in a nearby community. Information is 
gathered at the household level using probability proportional to size sampling techniques that 
are carried out in several steps. First, all Mexican states are classified according to one of the 
three geographic regions: northern, central, and southern. Next, the survey team identifies four 
strata according to the total number of clients that each financial institution had at the time of 
the survey: very small, small, medium, and large. In the first stage of the sampling, the 
number of institutions that are randomly selected from each stratum is proportional to the size 
of the stratum (number of clients). In the second stage, the banked households (treatment 
group) are selected randomly from the previously selected sample of institutions in the first 
stage. The sampling framework is based on the client directory of each financial institution 
(Berumen and Associates, 2006). 
Once the communities where the banked households (treatment group) were living had been 
established, an additional sample of non-banked households (control group) that were living 
in the same or in nearby communities as the banked households were randomly selected. 
Some filter questions were asked to households in such communities to identify households 
that did not have any family member who was a client of any financial institution at the time 
of the survey and five years prior to it. Consequently, a comparable group of households that 
passed the filter questions were identified as non-banked and formed part of the control group 
(Berumen and Associates, 2006). 
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The four waves of the survey (2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007) correspond to about 5,700 
households. The survey contains detailed information on household income, expenditures, 
credit and savings, risk, employment, remittances, cash transfers, assets, liabilities, household 
demographic characteristics, and regional variables (Zapata, 2007). The overall survey, 
including banked and non-banked households, encompasses 19,090 observations, which 
correspond to households linked with one of the four different programs: (1) the Savings and 
Credit Societies (SACPs); (2) the BANSEFI bank; (3) the traditional MFIs; and (4) the 
COOPERA cash transfers program. However, for the purpose of this study, we use 
information from one program only, SACPs. This program is by far the largest; it  
corresponds to a random sample of 14,245 observations. SACPs in Mexico include 
cooperatives, credit unions, cajas de ahorro, cajas solidarias, and savings and loan associations 
that are owned and managed by its members. They focus primarily on savings, although 
sometimes offer credit and other assistance (e.g. financial literacy, technical assistance, 
education, health, etc.) to its members. We exclude the other programs in order to have a more 
homogeneous sample of microfinance institutions that offer similar microfinance services. In 
Table 4.1, we present a summary of observations per annum and by household category.  
Table 4.1 Number of  Observations of  Panel  Survey 
 
Year Banked Non-banked Total % 
2004 2,297 2,069 4,366 30.65 
2005 1,886 1,739 3,625 25.45 
2006 1,542 1,319 2,861 20.08 
2007 1,789 1,604 3,393 23.82 
Total 7,514 6,731 14,245 100.00 
Source: Author’s compilation. Dataset property of the BANSEFI bank. 
 
From this information, it is possible to make an account of the most relevant coping strategies 
used by households according to their frequency (see Table 4.2). In doing so, we identify that 
both banked and non-banked households mitigate risk differently. The data in Table 4.2 
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suggest that there is no unique alternative used by households to mitigate risk. They use a 
combination of formal and informal coping strategies to cope with shocks that relates to the 
household’s specific characteristics and context. Among the coping strategies, we can see that 
households used savings and acquired loans, cut consumption, searched for jobs, and turned to 
relatives and friends for assistance when needed in order to mitigate risk. All these 
alternatives were used by households to improve their welfare level on different dimensions 
(e.g. income, consumption, education, health, or production process) and to reduce their 
vulnerability and poverty level. Based on this, we expect that all strategies, including their 
membership in SACP savings institutions, could have played an important role in reducing 
poverty and vulnerability at least in the short term. 
Table 4.2  Risk Coping Strategies used by Banked and Non-Banked Households in 
Mexico (2004-2007) 
 
Coping Mechanism Banked % Non-Banked % Total % 
Cut consumption 702 9.76 700 9.74 1402 19.50 
Sell assets 44 0.61 30 0.42 74 1.03 
Pawn personal items 9 0.13 10 0.14 19 0.26 
Use of savings 445 6.19 305 4.24 750 10.43 
Loans
1
 387 5.38 300 4.17 687 9.56 
Stop paying debts 36 0.50 21 0.29 57 0.79 
Job search 310 4.31 385 5.36 695 9.67 
Temporary  job 190 2.64 230 3.20 420 5.84 
Work extra hours 48 0.67 63 0.88 111 1.54 
Aid from family 150 2.09 172 2.39 322 4.48 
Aid from friends 90 1.25 145 2.02 235 3.27 
ROSCA
2
 4 0.06 2 0.03 6 0.08 
Social insurance 58 0.81 42 0.58 100 1.39 
Government aid 19 0.26 47 0.65 66 0.92 
Reduce prices of  products 47 0.65 24 0.33 71 0.99 
Product promotion 57 0.79 22 0.31 79 1.10 
Other  162 2.25 146 2.03 308 4.28 
Nothing 957 13.31 830 11.55 1787 24.86 
 Total 3715 51.68 3474 48.32 7189 100.00 
1
 Loans  with and without interest 
2 
ROSCA: rotating savings and credit association 
Source: The present authors’ compilation with data property of the BANSEFI bank. 
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In addition to the information provided in this section, we present a detailed description of the 
data in the Appendix 4. In Appendix 4-2 we present a definition of the core variables used to 
estimate the empirical models underlined in section 4.6 below. In Appendix 4-3, we present 
some descriptive statistics and t-tests of mean differences between banked and non-banked 
groups with unequal variance of key variables used in all empirical models; finally, in 
Appendix 4-4, we show a correlation matrix for the most relevant variables. From the results 
of the t-tests given in Appendix 4-3, we can observe some differences in household 
characteristics between both banked and non-banked households. These findings led to the 
conclusion that banked and non-banked households differ in some demographic 
characteristics such as their education level and on their use of financial services, particularly 
savings. We decided to account for these differences in our empirical models of household 
welfare level and its variability. In the following section, we describe the methodology used to 
answer the research question that we formulated for this empirical research. 
4.5 Empirical Method  
In this study we analyzed, by means of Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticty test, the impact that 
banking with savings and credit societies has on risk mitigation. This method is described 
below.  
4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity test 
This approach has previously been applied in the financial literature by Adams et al.(2005); 
Cheng (2008); Pathan (2009) and Galema et al. (2012), and others. This test permits the 
quantification of performance variability both across-household and within-household. One of 
the main advantages of the test is that vulnerability to poverty can be assessed by using cross-
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sectional data, and hence that long-term  time series data, which are often lacking,  are not 
needed.  The test is structured in two steps. 
4.5.1.1 First step 
The first step consists of estimating an empirical model that captures the effect of membership 
in a savings and credit society on the level of a particular outcome indicator. In doing so, we 
estimated a welfare equation (e.g. per capita income, per capita education expenses, or per 
capita expenditure) on a binary indicator capturing the membership status of the household, 
plus a set of control variables by means of an ordinary least square (OLS) method. The results 
of this estimation offer parameters of the mean value of the outcome variable conditional on a 
set of explanatory variables. The empirical specification for this step can be written as 
follows: 
,),,( ,,2,10, titititi XBankedHYY          (1)
 
where Yi,t is a continuous variable referring to one of three outcome indicators under study: 
per capita income, per capita education expenses, or per capita expenditure of household i at 
time t. H is the vector of independent variables. Bankedi,t  is a binary indicator that takes 1 if 
household i was a client of a saving and credit society at time t and zero if not. The Xi,t 
indicator is a vector of  livelihood capital variables such as human, social, financial, natural, 
physical, and location capital as well as context-specific variables such as regional dummies 
referring to household i at time period t. The error term, 
ti ,
 , represents the unexplained part 
of Yi,t. α0 is a constant term, and α1 and α2  are parameters to be estimated.  
4.5.1.2 Second step 
Similar to the procedure in the first step, we again evaluated the impact of being a client of a 
savings and credit institution but this time on the variance of the outcome indicator. To 
Does microfinance reduce the vulnerability of households to poverty? 
87 
 
achieve this, we estimate the variance of
 ti ,
 , and hence the variance of Yi,t, on the same set of 
independent variables, including the binary indicator of membership in an SACP institution. 
This implies that we assume that the variance is not equal for all households but may depend 
on household characteristics, context-specific variables, and the membership of an SACP. The 
explicit modeling of the variance of the disturbance terms is similar to a heteroskedasticity 
correction, hence the term ‘heteroskedasticity test’. The variance of the unexplained part of Yi,t 
is given by
 
 
.,,2,10
2
titiXtiBankedHit
 
      (2)
 
In equation (2), the dependent variable is expressed as a variability measure εit
2
, which 
includes both across-household and within-household variability. To test whether household 
welfare variability is affected by membership in a savings and credit society, we used a t-test 
for the null that β1 =0. A negative  β1 and a high t-statistic indicate that being banked decreases 
the variance of a particular outcome indicator. We hypothesize that β1<0 and hence that being 
banked reduces the variability of per capita income, per capita education expenses, and per 
capita expenditure of household i at time t. 
By making some assumptions about the distribution of Y, we would, in principle, be able to 
estimate the vulnerability (v) to poverty, i.e. the probability that a household is poor, or in 
other words the probability that Y is below some appropriate poverty level: v =Pr(Y≤z). 
Assuming normality, this would be given by  
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where  Φ denotes the cumulative density of the standard normal.
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However, we are not interested in the vulnerability level as such, which also would depend on 
the value of the threshold variables z. Rather we are interested in the question whether being a 
member of an SACP reduces vulnerability to poverty. The expression above shows that this 
will always be the case if membership of an SACP increases the mean of Y and at the same 
time reduces the variance of Y; this will be the case if α1 is significantly positive and β1 is 
significantly negative. In the remainder of the analysis we will focus, therefore, on the impact 
of being Banked on the mean and variance of the three household welfare indicators we look 
at.  
4.6  Estimation Results   
In this section we present the results of three empirical models discussed in section 4.5. The 
difference between the three models is that they are different channels by which it is possible 
to identify the contribution of microfinance in improving household welfare and in reducing 
vulnerability to poverty. By using a unique indicator, it is difficult to unravel different 
mechanisms by which microfinance participation, in SACP savings institutions, can 
contribute to poverty reduction. While per-capita income and per-capita expenditure are two 
straightforward measurements used in impact assessment of microfinance, per-capita 
education expenses is an innovative household welfare measurement that can help to 
disentangle why microfinance recipients save and borrow from savings and credit societies in 
Mexico in a continuous basis. It may be the case that households with membership in SACPs 
institutions aim to cover school fees and other education expenses of their children. If that is 
the case, financial products from these institutions can contributing to improvements in human 
capital and to poverty reduction. 
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In Table 4.3 we present the outcomes from the first step of Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticty 
test corresponding to the level of the different dependent variables as described earlier. We 
have estimated the three models by means of the ordinary least square (OLS) method with 
robust standard errors. 
Table 4.3  Estimation Results on the Impact of Membership in an SACP 
Institution on Household Welfare Level − First Step of  the Glejser’s (1969) 
Heteroskedasticty Test (OLS) 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Variable                                       Welfare  
                                                        Indicator 
 
Per capita 
Income 
(log) 
Per capita 
Education 
Expenses (log) 
Per capita 
Expenditur
e (log) 
        
Banked (yes=1) 0.221*** 0.149*** 0.208*** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Panel A. Human Capital        
        
Head gender (1 if female) -0.170*** 0.0214 0.0496* 
  [0.001]    [0.398] [0.055] 
Head age (years) 0.00974*** 0.00625*** 0.00101** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.032] 
Head marital status (1 if married) -0.144***   0.0615*** 
  [0.004]      [0.010] 
Head formal education                   0.0165*** 
                    [0.000] 
Head has completed  primary school (yes=1) -0.0343 0.0505*** -0.0247* 
  [0.202]    [0.009] [0.053] 
Head has completed secondary  school (yes=1)                   -0.0518*** 
                    [0.001] 
Head speaks an ethnic language (yes=1) 0.0166 -0.102*** -0.192*** 
  [0.566]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Family size (log) -0.547*** -0.631*** -0.580*** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Dependency ratio                  0.172*** -0.268*** 
                  [0.004] [0.000] 
Percentage of female adults 0.095   -0.209*** 
  [0.252]      [0.000] 
Household nutritious status (1 if good) 0.190***     
  [0.000]        
Household is illiterate (yes=1) 0.158*     -0.0545 
  [0.074]      [0.157] 
Household mean years of schooling 0.0495*** 0.100*** 0.0566*** 
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  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Household completed primary education (yes=1)  
-0.0292 -0.0212 -0.0186 
  [0.436]    [0.456] [0.258] 
Household completed secondary  education 
(yes=1)                   -0.0737*** 
                    [0.008] 
Family labour (no. of  employees) 0.0234   0.115*** 
  [0.289]      [0.000] 
Non-family labour (no. of  employees) 0.155***   0.165*** 
  [0.000]      [0.000] 
Panel B. Social Capital        
        
ROSCAS ( 1if participated)  0.0729**  0.0724***   
  [0.017]    [0.001]   
Family and friends aid (gifts in cash: yes=1) 
0.0672*   -0.0925***   
  [0.065]    [0.003]   
Trader relationship (yes=1) -0.0515   -0.0138 
  [0.225]      [0.527] 
Moneylender  relationship (yes=1) -0.0645   0.0887* 
  [0.441]      [0.055] 
Shop relationship (yes=1)                   0.150*** 
                    [0.000] 
Panel C. Financial Capital        
        
Number of  goats 0.000887 0.00897*   
  [0.940]    [0.065]   
Number of cows                   0.00963*** 
                    [0.000] 
Number of  pigs  0.00592*       
  [0.050]        
Amount of credit (log) 0.0323*** 0.0118*** 0.0251*** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Amount of savings (log) -0.0184*** -0.000824 0.00497*** 
  [0.000]    [0.779] [0.003] 
Income from diversification (log) 0.101***   -0.0000203 
  [0.000]      [0.987] 
Income from business (log) 0.0815*** 0.00808***   
  [0.000]    [0.000]   
Public cash transfers programme (yes=1)                   -0.224*** 
                    [0.000] 
Amount of  remittances (log) 0.0585***     
  [0.000]        
Value of assets (log) 0.168***     
  [0.000]        
Panel D.  Natural Capital        
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Land proprietorship (yes=1)                 0.037 0.128*** 
                  [0.121] [0.000] 
Panel E.  Physical Capital        
        
Clean water (1 if available)                 0.0970***   
                  [0.003]   
Electricity (1 if available)                 0.197***   
                  [0.008]   
Drainage (1 if available) -0.0168 0.143***   
  [0.536]    [0.000]   
Phone (1 if available)                 0.151***   
                  [0.000]   
Panel F.  Location Capital        
        
Urban community (>10,000 inhabitants) -0.0516**  0.174***   
  [0.043]    [0.000]   
Southern region (yes=1) -0.110*** -0.0426* -0.103*** 
  [0.001]    [0.081] [0.000] 
Central region (yes=1) -0.155*** -0.0948*** 0.0459*** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.003] 
Panel G.  Additional Controls         
        
Year 2004 0.405*** -0.153***   
  [0.000]    [0.000]   
Year 2006 0.481*** 0.0279 -0.0269** 
  [0.000]    [0.285] [0.029] 
Year 2007                 0.0217   
                  [0.432]   
Constant 6.036*** 4.889*** 9.784*** 
  [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] 
Statistics       
Number of observations 12769 8557 14245 
Model degrees of freedom 32 26 29 
Model sum of square 8599.6 2193.4 3820.7 
Root mean square error 1.297 0.809 0.622 
R-square  0.286 0.282 0.41 
Adjusted R-square 0.285 0.28 0.409 
F statistic 171.3 116.6 312.8 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 42909.8 20693.1 26940.6 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 43155.8 20883.6 27167.5 
OLS: ordinary least square 
ROSCA: rotating savings and credit associations 
SACP: savings and credit society    
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As we can see from Table 4.3, the individual regressions of the three different models suggest 
that being banked has a positive and significant effect on the mean values of log of per capita 
income by 0.221, log of per capita education expenses by 0.149, and log of per capita 
expenditure by 0.208.  
In order to examine the impact of being a member of an SACP institution on a household’s 
vulnerability to poverty, we also need to consider the impact on the variance of the three 
outcome indicators; this will be done by conducting the second step of Glejser’s (1969) 
heteroskedasticty test.   
In Table 4.4 we present the estimation results of three different empirical models based on 
equation (2), which were estimated with an OLS method with robust standard errors. For 
these estimations, we used the same set of explanatory variables as we did in equation (1) but 
now with the quadratic value of the residuals  εi,t
2
 from the first step as the dependent variable, 
which corresponds to the variability measure and includes both across-household and within-
household variability.   
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Table 4.4 Estimation Results on the Impact of Membership in an SACP 
Institution on the Variability of Different Outcome Indicators−Squared Value of 
Residuals: Second Step of the Glejser’s (1969) Heteroskedasticty Test (OLS) 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Variable                                                 Welfare  
Indicator 
Per capita 
Income (log) 
Per capita 
Education 
Expenses (log) 
Per capita 
Expenditure 
(log) 
        
Banked (yes=1) -0.258** -0.0663** -0.0372*   
  [0.010] [0.036] [0.054]    
Panel A. Human Capital        
        
Head gender (1 if female) -0.182 -0.00536 0.000457 
  [0.255] [0.873] [0.992]    
Head age (years) -0.00515* 0.00235** 0.000345 
  [0.092] [0.049] [0.564]    
Head marital status (1 if married) 0.115   -0.0402 
  [0.502]   [0.320]    
Head formal education (years)     -0.00105 
      [0.655]    
Head has completed  primary school (yes=1) 0.102 -0.0421* -0.0061 
  [0.219] [0.100] [0.703]    
Head has completed secondary  school (yes=1)     -0.0259 
      [0.125]    
Head speaks an ethnic language (yes=1) -0.106 0.0828** 0.0819*** 
  [0.245] [0.016] [0.000]    
Family size (log) -0.385*** 0.0258 -0.038 
  [0.000] [0.499] [0.146]    
Dependency ratio    -0.184** -0.00991 
    [0.027] [0.839]    
Percentage of female adults 0.033   -0.0501 
  [0.905]   [0.533]    
Household nutritious status (1 if good) 0.176                   
  [0.224]                   
Household is illiterate (yes=1) -0.23   0.135*   
  [0.540]   [0.085]    
Household mean years of schooling -0.000487 0.0339*** -0.000438 
  [0.975] [0.000] [0.900]    
Household completed primary education 
(yes=1)  -0.0304 -0.0296 -0.0236 
  [0.792] [0.503] [0.239]    
Household completed secondary  education 
(yes=1)     -0.000964 
      [0.976]    
Family labour (no. of  employees) 0.0853*   0.0144 
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  [0.065]   [0.244]    
Non-family labour (no. of  employees) 0.0478   0.151*** 
  [0.117]   [0.000]    
Panel B. Social Capital        
        
ROSCAs ( 1if participated)  0.155 -0.00497                 
  [0.124] [0.878]                 
Family and friends aid (gifts in cash: yes=1) -0.353*** 0.0447                 
  [0.001] [0.305]                 
Trader relationship (yes=1) -0.134   -0.0712*** 
  [0.258]   [0.001]    
Moneylender  relationship (yes=1) -0.0209   0.038 
  [0.949]   [0.632]    
Shop relationship (yes=1)     -0.0309 
      [0.244]    
Panel C. Financial Capital        
        
Number of  goats 0.00884 -0.00152                 
  [0.734] [0.874]                 
Number of cows     0.00459*** 
      [0.003]    
Number of  pigs  -0.00339                   
  [0.436]                   
Amount of credit (log) -0.0459*** -0.0033 0.00294*   
  [0.000] [0.346] [0.087]    
Amount of savings (log) 0.0508*** 0.00561 0.00231 
  [0.000] [0.148] [0.327]    
Income from diversification (log) -0.143***   -0.00471*** 
  [0.000]   [0.003]    
Income from business (log) -0.137*** -0.000256                 
  [0.000] [0.922]                 
Public cash transfers programme (yes=1)     -0.0308*   
      [0.063]    
Amount of  remittances (log) -0.0800***                   
  [0.000]                   
Value of assets (log) 0.0446                   
  [0.121]                   
Panel D.  Natural Capital        
        
Land proprietorship (yes=1)   -0.0149 0.0759*** 
    [0.659] [0.000]    
Panel E.  Physical Capital        
        
Clean water (1 if available)   -0.0202                 
    [0.676]                 
Electricity (1 if available)   -0.231**                 
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    [0.046]                 
Drainage (1 if available) 0.0279 -0.0579*                 
  [0.743] [0.065]                 
Phone (1 if available)   0.0168                 
    [0.565]                 
Panel F.  Location Capital        
        
Urban community (>10,000 inhabitants) 0.444*** -0.0474                 
  [0.000] [0.118]                 
Southern region (yes=1) 0.0969 0.0698** -0.00754 
  [0.360] [0.028] [0.747]    
Central region (yes=1) 0.358*** 0.168*** -0.00953 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.661]    
Panel G.  Additional Controls         
        
Year 2004 -0.644*** 0.0151                 
  [0.000] [0.690]                 
Year 2006 -0.907*** -0.0202 -0.0704*** 
  [0.000] [0.570] [0.000]    
Year 2007   0.00198                 
    [0.958]                 
Constant 3.762*** 0.588*** 0.514*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Statistics       
Number of observations 12769 8557 14245 
Model degrees of freedom 32 26 29 
Model sum of square 12266.3 147.8 229.1 
Root mean square error 4.139 1.131 0.851 
R-square  0.0532 0.0134 0.0218 
Adjusted R-square 0.0508 0.0103 0.0198 
F statistic 21.94 3.413 6.013 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 72547.3 26423.2 35860.8 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 72793.3 26613.6 36087.7 
OLS: ordinary least square 
ROSCA: rotating savings and credit associations 
SACP: savings and credit society 
 
The results from this second step suggest that being banked in a savings and credit society in 
Mexico leads to a decrease in the variability of log of per capita income by  0.258, of log of 
per capita education expenses by 0.0663, and of log of per capita expenditure by 0.0372. All 
coefficients for the binary indicators of the banking status of a household were statistically 
significant at 5% in models 1 and 2 and at 10% in model 3, respectively. It is noteworthy that 
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our analysis provides new evidence that membership in microcredit programs not only 
improves investment in children’s schooling (Ersado, 2005; Garcia De la Cruz, 2008; Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998), but also reduces the variability of this relevant welfare indicator. This 
improvement in children’s investment in education and reduction of its variability is expected 
to bring additional benefits for households through human capital formation in the long term.  
Overall, our results clearly indicate that being a cooperative member of a savings and credit 
society in Mexico helps to smooth per capita income, per capita education expenditure, and 
per capita expenditure. Since being a member of an SACP also increases the mean of these 
indicators, as shown in Table 4.3, the analysis strongly suggests that membership of an SACP 
savings institution reduces the probability to become poor, or in other words the vulnerability 
to poverty.  
4.7 Conclusion   
In this study, we focus on the potential positive effect of being a member of a savings and 
credit society on a household’s vulnerability to poverty. The potential impact of being banked 
on the probability of  becoming poor – our proxy for vulnerability – is a very important topic 
that has almost completely been ignored in the microfinance literature. Most importantly, in 
contrast to other studies that focus on the impact of microfinance on the level of some key 
welfare indicators, we examine its impact on both the level as well as the variance of a set of 
welfare indicators. We apply our analysis to SACP institutions in Mexico. We argue that, only 
if SACP membership is both positively related to the mean and negatively related to the 
variance, there is convincing evidence that SACP membership reduces the vulnerability to 
poverty. We use three outcome indicators: per capita income, per capita education expenses, 
and per capita expenditure.  
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We analyze a random sample of 14,245 observations over the period 2004‒2007 with data 
gathered from a representative panel survey, property of the National Savings and Financial 
Services Bank in Mexico. We estimated three different empirical models and find convincing 
evidence that being a cooperative member of an SACP institution positively affects the mean 
of log of per capita income, log of per capita education expenses, and log of per capita 
expenditure; at the same time, such membership reduces the variance of these three outcome  
indicators. These results strongly suggest that being a member of an SACP institution reduces 
a household’s vulnerability to poverty, which provides new evidence on the importance of 
microfinance for improving the welfare of a household.  
Finally we would like to point at a possible  area of further research. Although we tried to deal 
with selection problems as good as possible, e.g. by using a sample which includes treatment 
households and comparable control households, and by adding a long list of  control variables 
which may correct for selection based on observables, our results may still be  biased due to 
selection on unobservable. In order to test to what extent our results are driven by selection 
bias it would be recommendable to organise a randomised controlled trial on the impact of 
microfinance on the vulnerability to poverty, and compare these results with ours. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Appendix 4-1 Collinearity Diagnostics 
 Variable  VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Per capita Income 1.63 1.28 0.62 0.38 
Per capita Education Expenses 1.56 1.25 0.64 0.36 
Per-capita Expenditure 2.48 1.57 0.4 0.6 
Head gender (female=1) 3.42 1.85 0.29 0.71 
Head age (years) 1.67 1.29 0.6 0.4 
Head marital status (married=1) 3.09 1.76 0.32 0.68 
Head formal education (years) 2.57 1.6 0.39 0.61 
Head completed primary education (yes=1) 1.17 1.08 0.86 0.14 
Head completed secondary education (yes=1) 1.27 1.13 0.79 0.21 
Head speaks an ethnic language (yes=1) 1.31 1.14 0.77 0.23 
Family size (log) 1.63 1.28 0.61 0.39 
Dependency ratio 2.61 1.62 0.38 0.62 
Percentage of female adults 2.33 1.53 0.43 0.57 
Household’s nutritious status (good=1) 3.08 1.76 0.32 0.68 
Household is illiterate (yes=1) 1.01 1 0.99 0.01 
Household’s  mean years of formal schooling  2.75 1.66 0.36 0.64 
Household completed primary education (yes=1) 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.03 
Household completed secondary education (yes=1) 1.04 1.02 0.96 0.04 
Family labour (no. employees) 1.14 1.07 0.87 0.13 
Non-family labour (no. employees) 1.09 1.05 0.92 0.08 
ROSCAs (1 if participate) 1.09 1.05 0.91 0.09 
Family aid  (yes=1) 1.05 1.02 0.95 0.05 
Trader relationship (yes=1) 1.1 1.05 0.91 0.09 
Moneylender relationship (yes=1) 1.04 1.02 0.97 0.03 
Shop relationship (yes=1) 1.12 1.06 0.89 0.11 
Number of goats 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.01 
Number of cows 1.06 1.03 0.94 0.06 
Number of pigs 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.02 
Amount of credit  (log) 1.39 1.18 0.72 0.28 
Amount of savings (log) 1.23 1.11 0.81 0.19 
Amount of income from diversification (log) 1.45 1.2 0.69 0.31 
Amount of income from family business (log) 1.55 1.25 0.64 0.36 
Public cash transfer programme (yes=1) 1.49 1.22 0.67 0.33 
Amount of remittances (log) 1.12 1.06 0.89 0.11 
Value of assets (log) 1.79 1.34 0.56 0.44 
Land proprietorship (yes=1) 1.42 1.19 0.71 0.29 
Safe water (1 if available) 1.23 1.11 0.81 0.19 
Electricity (1 if available) 1.06 1.03 0.95 0.05 
Drainage (1 if available) 1.35 1.16 0.74 0.26 
Phone (1 if available) 1.58 1.26 0.63 0.37 
Urban community 1.48 1.21 0.68 0.32 
Southern region 2.11 1.45 0.47 0.53 
Central region 2.06 1.44 0.48 0.52 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Loan Officers’ Characteristics and Microfinance Repayment Rates 

  
 
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of loan officer characteristics on repayment rates of 
microfinance borrowers in Mexico. Our results strongly suggest that loan officers play a 
crucial role in improving repayment rates in microfinance. There are, at the least, three 
outcomes that are extremely relevant in terms of reducing loan defaults in microfinance: (1) 
unlike the “traditional” view that microfinance repayment rates are high primarily due to 
“peer monitoring” effects, our paper suggests that  loan officer characteristics are much more 
relevant for reducing loan defaults; (2) contrasting the evidence that female borrowers repay 
their debt better than male borrowers, our study suggests that male loan officers are better 
able to induce borrowers to repay than female loan officers; (3) more experienced loan 
officers are better able to reduce loan default probabilities than relatively inexperienced loan 
officers.  
 
 
Keywords: Microfinance, Loan officers, Repayment rates, Peer-monitoring, Gender, Joint 
liability, Multilevel analysis. 
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5.1 Introduction 
An estimated 2.5 billion adults do not use formal financial services (Chaia et al., 2009). In 
particular, banks lack information and effective enforcement mechanisms to cater to the poor, 
although this does not mean that impoverished people lack any access to credit. They may 
borrow from informal sources, such as relatives and local moneylenders. The resources of 
such lenders are, however, limited, so financial constraints may curb the capacity of the poor 
to invest in profitable ventures or to cope with shocks to their income or heightened 
expenditures. Microfinance represents a successful attempt to address this challenge  
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010); it has reached an estimated 150 million people worldwide 
(Daley-Harris, 2009). Despite this impressive number, statistics about the global poor still 
suggest a significant potential to increase the outreach of microfinance. 
To achieve this potential, microfinance organizations must keep their costs low and achieve 
high repayment rates on their loans. This will allow ensuring sustainability and capacity to 
expand activities. However, in situations in which borrowers may choose among various 
microfinance organizations, high repayment rates are increasingly hard to maintain 
(Vogelgesang, 2003). Recently, many microfinance organizations have been criticized for 
lending practices that have led to overindebted clients. The southern Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh even plunged into a microcredit crisis after the microfinance-induced suicides of 
2010. Due to bad lending practices, several branches of large microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
in Ecuador, India, and Nicaragua have been closed by the authorities.  
Microfinanciers therefore must initiate strategies to improve the quality of their portfolios, 
such as the intensively researched methodology of group lending. In group lending, the 
members of the borrowing group have incentives to monitor one another and exclude risky 
borrowers from their group (Morduch, 1999). Based on field experiments, Cassar et al. (2007) 
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show personal trust between group members and social homogeneity to be important for loan 
repayment. Hermes et al. (2006), however, suggest that only the social ties of the group leader 
and not those of the other members are important for repayment rates. They do not find any 
effect on repayment rates of group characteristics after controlling the characteristics of the 
group leader. The paper thus criticizes the well-known view that microfinance repayment 
rates are high primarily due to peer monitoring. Instead, the paper suggests that “peer 
monitoring” among group members will not take place, or is not effective, if somebody, for 
instance a group leader, acts as a delegated monitor for the microfinance organization. 
Indirectly, that paper therefore draws attention to a potential important role for microfinance 
loan managers, who mediate between the microfinance organizations and the borrower 
groups.  
While the role of borrower groups has been studied extensively, the literature on microfinance 
pays hardly any attention to the role of loan managers. Some exceptions are Beck et al. 
(2010), Dixon et al. (2007), and Agier (2012). Beck et al. (2010) assess the impact of the 
gender of loan officers on default rates in Albania; Dixon et al. (2007) focus on the roles of 
loan officers with regard to loan delinquency in Zambia; and Agier (2012) analyses how loan 
officers influence the performance of microcredit loans in Brazil.  
With this study we aim to contribute to the limited literature on microfinance loan managers. 
A special feature of the study is that we focus on the role of loan managers in improving 
repayment rates of microfinance borrowers who are organized in joint-liability groups. This 
enables the role of loan managers and group characteristics to be compared explicitly in their 
relevance for improving repayment rates. We hypothesize that loan officers in Pro Mujer, the 
microfinance lender we focus on, play a key role in credit decisions such as loan approvals, 
extensions, renegotiation, credit contracts, and repayment. Thus, their role may trade-off peer 
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monitoring and screening of group members. Our study is also innovative because it analyses 
the gender effects of loan managers on loan repayments. This issue has been overlooked in the 
existing banking literature, as only a few empirical studies have investigated whether 
repayment rates are affected by the gender of the loan officer. Finally, we investigate the role 
of loan officers’ professional experience on improving repayment rates.  
Our empirical analysis uses data from Pro Mujer Mexico. However, Pro Mujer is an 
international microfinance organization that uses a similar approach, with a similar role for 
loan managers, in all countries where it is active; thus, our results have a wide external 
validity, beyond the case of Mexico. Pro Mujer was founded in 1990. The international 
headquarters are in New York, USA. Currently, the organization operates in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico. It focuses on group lending to poor women, who are 
engaged in small income-generating activities. Several characteristics of Pro Mujer are similar 
to most other MFIs around the world: more than 90% of the borrowers are female, and the 
institution offers healthcare, education, and training to women groups.  
The remainder of this article is organized into six sections. The next section introduces 
background information about Pro Mujer Mexico. Then we formulate some hypotheses on the 
role of loan officers in repayment in section 5.3. In section 5.4, we briefly describe the study 
region and the data, before outlining the methodology in section 5.5. The main results of the 
study appear in section 5.6, prior to the conclusion.  
5.2  Background Information: Pro Mujer Mexico  
This research was conducted in collaboration with Pro Mujer, a non-profit microfinance 
organization working in Latin America. Pro Mujer Mexico started operations in 2002 in the 
state of Hidalgo. Recently it extended its operations throughout Mexico, in the states of 
Puebla, Tlaxcala, Mexico, Distrito Federal, Veracruz, Queretaro, and Oaxaca. It lends to more 
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than 27,000 borrowers, 90 per cent of whom are women, and it has a loan portfolio of more 
than US$7 million. The organization operates through branches called Centros Focales, or 
neighborhood centers, where financial services are disbursed to customers.  
Pro Mujer’s objective is to support entrepreneurial women of modest means, between the ages 
of 18 and 65 years, who lack sufficient access to credit and physical collateral. The 
organization provides an integrated package of financial services, including credit for 
business, mandatory savings, education (e.g. training on topics such as gender, self-esteem, 
intra-family violence, communication, depression, and women’s rights), and financial literacy 
(business administration, accounting, and access to cash machines).  
The methodology that Pro Mujer uses is village banking, which is based on social collateral. 
This technique encourages the exchange of experiences among group members pertaining to 
relevant human development topics, as well as building social ties and networks. Communal 
associations consist of 8–35 members, of which only two may be men. Each communal 
association has a board in which only women can participate and a credit committee that, 
together with the loan officer and branch manager, is responsible for evaluating and approving 
credit at the start of each new credit cycle. These communal associations often are subdivided 
into smaller solidarity groups (4–8 members) where all group members serve as guarantors for 
one another.  
The amount of credit and the conditions offered by Pro Mujer vary according to the credit 
cycle in which the borrower is involved. For example, the maximum amount of credit 
increases from 500 to 20,000 Mexican pesos between the first and the fifth cycle, with 
maturities of three to four months for the first cycle and four to eight months thereafter. 
Interest rates depend on group size and history. Groups of 5–7, 8–14, and 15–35 members pay 
4, 3.5 and 3 per cent monthly flat interest rates, respectively. Groups of 15–35 members with 
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bad debt in the previous credit cycle pay an additional 0.5 per cent flat interest rate per month. 
Pro Mujer also requests a guarantee of 10–20 per cent of the value of loans in all credit cycles. 
In the first cycle, borrowers pay the total amount equally divided across installments; from the 
second cycle onward, they pay half the amount due at the beginning and the remainder during 
the credit cycle.  
Loan officers serve as intermediaries between Pro Mujer and its communal associations, 
solidarity groups, and clients. The loan officers have multiple tasks. They provide advice to 
clients about how to use the financial services that are most suitable to their needs and train 
them in business growth and personal development. In addition, they must evaluate credit 
applications and recommend appropriate amounts to the credit committee. They also provide 
guidelines for group meetings and for the board. To safeguard Pro Mujer’s continuity, loan 
officers must maintain a healthy portfolio, by monitoring clients jointly with group members 
and identifying causes of dissatisfaction among existing clients. Finally, loan officers are 
supposed to maintain updated, organized files about each communal association under their 
responsibility and obtain information from competitors,
4
 which they transmit directly to 
branch managers, with whom they have shared obligations. 
Loan officers register individual transactions and note weekly installments on outstanding 
loans, savings deposits, and fees, ensure that the totals add up correctly, and sort out 
discrepancies. They also offer advice and make arrangements for customers to obtain new 
loans and let groups know which members are succeeding and who is facing difficulties 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). Moreover, loan officers play an important role in screening 
and monitoring loan applicants, and they decide on loan approvals (Agier and Szafarz, 2010; 
Holtman, 2001; Labie et al., 2010). This variety of tasks and responsibilities means that the 
traits and skills that Pro Mujer requires are diverse, and not all are met by all loan officers. For 
                                                 
4
 In terms of competitive products offered, interest rates, operating areas, and so forth. 
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example, loan officers should display social responsibility and motivation to contribute 
effectively and freely to social improvement. They should assume active roles and balance 
social and financial goals, while also providing professional education in social sciences or 
agronomy, knowledge of marketing services, mastery of techniques for adult education, basic 
knowledge of the microenterprise sector, expertise with computer programs, and familiarity 
with the target region. 
Pro Mujer initially offers two consecutive contracts to loan officers, for three months each. 
After these contracts expire, they have an option to enter an open-ended contract. At the 
beginning of 2011, the base salary of a loan officer was approximately US$360
5
 per month for 
a weekly workload of approximately 40–50 hours. In addition to this base salary, loan officers 
received average bonuses of US$80 per month, based on the performance of their borrowing 
groups. However, bonus requirements recently changed to address individual loan officer 
performance with regard to targets assigned by regional managers (e.g. reduced portfolio risk, 
formation of new groups, inclusion of new borrowers in existing groups). Their total salary is 
high compared with those of unskilled workers but lower than the salaries of professionals in 
other sectors. 
In some branches, several loan officers quit after only a few contracts, which may present a 
threat to loan repayment. Comparisons of the Pro Mujer employee lists for September 2010 
and January 2011 for Mexico State and for November 2010 and February 2011 for Puebla 
show that, in just these short periods, 34 per cent of the loan officers left the organization. The 
main reasons they gave were high work pressure, low pay, and insufficient training and 
support from the organization.  
                                                 
5
 According to an average exchange rate of 12.22 pesos per 1 US dollar during September 2010–March 2011 
(http://www.banxico.org.mx). 
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5.3 Development of Hypotheses 
All loan officers are neither equally efficient in collecting and dealing with information, nor 
are they equally competent when enforcing loan contracts. Therefore, the characteristics of the 
loan officer providing the credit are a determining factor in ensuring loan repayments. Based 
on this assumption, we outline the anticipated relationship between the outcome indicator 
(loan default, measured as the borrower’s failure to pay her/his installment during at least one 
group meeting) and the core variables: loan officer’s gender, professional experience, and 
peer monitoring and peer screening. In addition, we present other influential links between the 
main characteristics of a loan officer and loan repayment (see Table 5.2 for the statistical 
data). Thus, we formulated three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The Likelihood of Loan Repayment Increases when the Loan Officer is a 
Male  
There are a number of reasons why especially female loan managers may reduce loan defaults. 
Empirical evidence suggests that financial and investment decisions made by women are 
influenced by an aversion to take greater risks, and their level of self-confidence is lower in 
comparison to that of their male counterparts (e.g.Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008; Powell and Ansic, 1997). Female loan officers might also be more 
motivated to obtain higher repayment rates, compared with their male colleagues, because 
female loan officers generally have fewer alternative employment opportunities and tend to be 
less mobile. Because they are more dependent on their existing job, they may go to greater 
lengths to reduce loan defaults. Furthermore, female loan officers are likely to be more 
conservative (Beck et al., 2010).  
However, women are also known to be less selfish and less opportunistic because they 
cooperate more on a basis of “moral responsibility” (Gilligan, 1977; Hartmann-Wendels et al., 
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2009). According to this latter theory, female loan officers may fall short when dealing with 
loan repayments, because they tend to show more solidarity by being sympathetic and 
possibly by imposing less stringent credit requirements (e.g. loan approvals, re-negotiations, 
terminations, contractual terms, etc.); these factors, in turn, may weaken their capacity to 
enforce loan contracts. If the latter is the case, male loan managers may perform “better” on 
loan repayments. 
Thus, theories on the role of loan officers’ gender in terms of improving repayment rates are 
conflicting. Empirical studies are needed to provide some conclusive evidence. However, very 
little empirical evidence is available on the role that the gender of the loan officer plays on 
loan repayments. Nevertheless, the literature provides some evidence that the gender of the 
loan officers as decision maker together with their behavior and character are key factors in 
determining the outcome of the bank‒firm relationship (Bellucci et al., 2010; Bellucci et al., 
2011). Among the very few empirical studies available regarding microfinance loan officers is 
Becck et al., (2010), who have analyzed the default probability of loans approved by male and 
female officers at five branches of a commercial bank in Tirana, Albania. The results of this 
study maintain that the loan portfolios of female loan officers exhibit default rates 
significantly lower than those of male loan officers. The differences in performance reflect the 
varying efforts exerted by loan officers to monitor clients, rather than screen them. However, 
Bellucci et al., (2010) suggest that the role of a loan officer’s gender in terms of improving 
repayment rates decreases with the length of the relationship. Female loan officers do not 
seem to behave differently from their male counterparts as the interaction between the bank 
and the entrepreneur extends over time.  
Although both the theoretical and the empirical literature are ambiguous, we hypothesize that 
for Mexico it is likely that male loan officers are better in reducing loan defaults than female 
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loan officers. In the context of Mexico, a patriarchal society, it would seem logical that female 
loan officers have less authority when sanctioning loan contracts and repayments. Moreover, 
first-hand observations of the borrowing groups suggest that female loan officers, in their role 
as counselors, work more closely with their borrowers and tend to demonstrate more 
“solidarity.” Therefore, it is likely that they will apply less stringent loan-approval criteria and 
less pressure for repayment than their male colleagues. In addition, it is very likely that gender 
equality between female borrowers, who are a majority in the Pro Mujer portfolio, and female 
loan officers lead to less intense monitoring of loan contracts on the part of the loan officer as 
the business relationship progresses. Moreover, although some male loan officers have good 
communication skills, it is likely that gender barriers may prevent female borrowers asking 
them if postponement of their payments is possible when financial or personal difficulties 
arise; this could intensify obligations on the part of the female borrowers to repay their loans. 
Another influential factor affecting loan repayments in Mexico is the geographical location of 
Pro Mujer in relation to the borrowers. Loan contracts are difficult to monitor in both urban 
and rural settings because of cultural aspects and delinquency. In these circumstances, male 
loan officers might have more advantages over female loan managers in making regular 
contact with the defaulting borrower, particularly if the defaulters live far away from Pro 
Mujer branches in remote areas. Female loan officers are generally less mobile and face more 
time constraints, particularly if they have children. Hence, we hypothesize that male loan 
officers will perform better in repayment issues in comparison to their female counterparts. In 
our empirical analysis, we will test this hypothesis by including a gender dummy which takes 
a value of 1 if the loan officer is male and zero if she is female.  
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Hypothesis 2: Experienced Loan Officers are Better in Improving Repayment Rates of 
Microfinance Borrowers  
Previous empirical research has evaluated the role of the loan officer’s professional 
experience on loan repayment and on investment decisions (e.g. Agarwal and Wang, 2008; 
Andersson, 2004). Thus, we hypothesize that experienced loan officers are better in improving 
repayment rates of microfinance borrowers than inexperienced loan officers. This is based on 
the following reasoning. Hands-on experience with Pro Mujer loans and shared experiences 
with current borrowers may facilitate communication with group borrowing and thereby 
improve repayment rates. In line with this, Andersson (2004) finds that senior loan officers 
reach more consistent financial decisions than inexperienced loan officers because they have 
improved their screening and monitoring skills over time.  
On the other hand, there are some studies in the literature, such as Agarwal and Wang (2008), 
that suggest that younger and less-experienced loan officers who are concerned about their 
careers may be induced to avoid loan losses in order to maximize their prospects. In addition, 
some others studies such as Beck et al. (2010) find no relation between default probability and 
the loan officers’ experience. In spite of these findings, we hypothesize that, in the context of 
Pro Mujer Mexico, the work experience of loan officers is a crucial determinant of repayment 
rates, particularly if their professional experience refers to a previous job as loan officer. 
We will test this second hypothesis with experience variables such as: the number of months 
the loan officer has worked for Pro Mujer; a dummy for whether the loan officer had a job 
before joining Pro Mujer;  a more specific dummy variable indicating whether each officer 
previously worked for another microfinance lender; and age. Age may affect other aspects of 
the loan officer–client relationship as well, perhaps through the prestige of the loan officer. 
We also used whether the loan officer was former client of Pro Mujer as an experience 
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indicator. Prior knowledge of Pro Mujer’s village banking methodology, of borrower profiles 
and behavior, and of the context can mean that the loan officer takes optimal credit decisions 
and brings efficiency in his/her operation by preventing asymmetries of information and 
moral hazard problems, thereby leading to improved repayment rates.  
Hypothesis 3: Loan Officers are More Effective in Improving Repayment Rates than Peer 
Monitoring and Peer Screening of Group Members  
Stimulated by the widespread adoption of group lending schemes, such as the Grameen Bank 
(see, for example, Morduch 1999 and Ghatak and Guinnane 1999),  and the success of those 
programs, several academic papers analyze the advantages of peer monitoring. Many MFIs 
offer group loans where borrowers are jointly liable for all loans taken up by group members. 
It is argued that joint liability will induce a process of peer monitoring, which may play a 
crucial role in alleviating ex ante moral hazard problems (e.g. Chowdhury, 2005; Conning, 
1999; Laffont and Rey, 2003; Stiglitz, 1990). Joint liability and peer monitoring may also 
ameliorate ex post moral hazard problems (e.g. Besley and Coate,1995). The reason is that, if 
a bank writes a contract in which borrowers are made jointly liable for the repayments of the 
loans, each borrower has an incentive to monitor her/his peer. This may provide incentives to 
the group members to invest in safe projects, and thus may reduce problems of moral hazard. 
This community-based monitoring may be a cost-efficient system of monitoring, because 
people living close to each other have better information about borrowers than banks (Varian, 
1990). There are also some papers that have explored the key mechanisms why peer 
monitoring may help to solve adverse selection problems (e.g. Armendáriz and Gollier, 2000; 
Gangopadhyay et al., 2005; Ghatak, 2000; Laffont, 2003; Laffont and N'Guessan, 2000). 
These papers show that joint liability lending may solve adverse selection problems and 
improve efficiency. The key to this result is that debt contracts containing a joint-liability 
component provide incentives for assortative matching (Becker, 1993) implying that similar 
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types of firms group together (Ghatak, 2000). Consequently, the assortative matching property 
enables banks to price discriminate between pairs or sets of borrowers, because the group of 
risky firms is less willing to accept an increase in the joint-liability component than the group 
of safe firms. 
Based on the theoretical literature on group lending and peer monitoring, several authors 
argued that, due to peer monitoring, group lending systems play a crucial role in reducing loan 
defaults and improving repayment rates. A famous study of Wydick (1999) provides some 
empirical evidence for the role of peer monitoring on repayment rates. He studied the social 
cohesion of 137 borrowing groups with a group lending institution in Guatemala. In doing so, 
the author tested empirically the significance of three different types of social cohesion on 
group-borrowing performance: peer monitoring, social ties, and group borrowing pressure. 
The paper analyzes their effects on the provision of intra-group insurance, the mitigation of 
moral hazards within borrowing groups, and overall group repayment performance. Wydick’s 
(1999) results indicate that peer monitoring affects group borrowing performance significantly 
by stimulating intra-group insurance, which diminishes moral hazard problems.  
However, there are also some papers that question the importance of peer monitoring for 
reducing loan defaults. The standard peer monitoring model assumes that peer monitoring in a 
group lending system is costless. However, the assumption that group members can observe 
each other’s actions without costs and thus can side-contract and monitor each other without 
costs is unrealistic. It seems much more realistic to assume that each borrower in a group 
needs to incur a non-observable monitoring cost. This immediately implies that peer 
monitoring may not take place automatically. It may also be the case that group members try 
to search for a more cost-effective alternative, for instance by delegating the monitoring tasks 
to one of the group members. Some evidence for this is given by Hermes et al. (2006). 
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In a study on the effects of monitoring and social ties among the participants of 102 
microfinance groups in Eritrea, Hermes et al. (2006) show that that social ties with the group 
leader do have a positive effect on repayment performance of groups, whereas this is not the 
case for social ties between other group members. Because the group leader is the 
intermediary between the group and the program staff, and regularly reports to the program’s 
staff on the performance and sustainability of the group, he/she functions as a delegated 
monitor. Thus, the paper by Hermes et al. (2006) implicitly suggests that delegated 
monitoring may be more cost-effective than peer monitoring, and hence be more effective in 
improving repayment rates.   
Loan managers play an important role in most MFIs, even those that lend via group lending 
systems. This also holds for Pro Mujer, the MFI we focus on. If peer monitoring is not 
costless, which will especially be the case if borrowers do not live close to each other, it may 
be argued that group members will decide to rely on the loan manager and give up their “peer 
monitoring” role. If that is the case, the delegated monitor or loan officer is of primary 
importance in undertaking such activities, which leads to an improvement in loan repayment. 
We assume that this is the case in the context of Pro Mujer, where group members do not 
“usually” live close to each other and may not have strong social ties, personal trust, or social 
homogeneity. In such circumstances, it will be costly for borrowers to obtain adequate 
information about each other’s projects, risks, and personal prospects. A loan manager may 
then become very important for the enforcement of loan contracts. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that a loan officer may prove to be more effective than peer monitoring in reducing loan 
default probabilities. 
In our empirical analysis, we use the following variables to proxy for peer monitoring and 
peer screening: the weekly frequency of group meetings; the total number of group members; 
a dummy variable for whether the loan officer provided training to borrowers during group 
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meetings; and a dummy variable for whether the borrower was a group leader during the 
evaluated credit cycle. We compare these peer-monitoring variables with the following list of 
loan officer characteristics: a dummy variable for the marital status being married; a binary 
indicator for the religion being Catholic; a dummy indicator for having children; the total 
number of years of formal schooling; a dummy variable for whether she/he has other job than 
Pro Mujer;  and the time the loan officer spent living in the community. We expect loan 
officers who have lived for a long period of time in the same community to have acquired 
knowledge about the clients’ customs, local lenders, representatives in local governmental 
bodies, and operations of formal and informal institutions in the surrounding context. This 
prior knowledge should help them to make optimal credit decisions with respect to screening, 
monitoring, and enforcing loan contracts, which in turn can lead to better repayment rates as it 
may act as a substitute for collateral. 
The variables used in this study as proxies for peer monitoring and peer screening are in line 
with Hermes et al. (2006) and Wydick (1999). For instance, Hermes et al. (2006) used a 
dummy to account for whether the group leader was regularly visiting other group members. 
Instead, we used the frequency of group meetings to capture the extent to which group 
members acquired information about each other during the credit cycle, which may assist 
them to monitor each other. First, weekly meetings can lead to a better communication and 
enforcement of the credit contract; this is particularly so at the beginning of the business 
relationship where private information is being acquired by both the borrowers and the loan 
officer. Furthermore, both previous studies used a group-level indicator (the number of 
members in a borrowing group) to account for group pressure. We also included this variable. 
On the one hand, the larger the borrowing group, the more likely that group members can 
monitor each other and enforce the contract. Smaller groups, on the other hand, may face the 
risk of having similar risk projects and borrower profiles. This may increase the probability of 
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loan default, particularly if group members are not living close to each other. We also 
included a dummy for training in group meetings. Training can allow trust and commitment to 
be built between group members and with the loan officer; this in turn can lead to an 
improvement in loan repayment. Finally, while a group leader’s dummy does not proxy for 
peer monitoring per se, we added this variable in order to make a comparison with the Hermes 
et al. (2006) results. In fact, borrowers who act as group leaders can enforce the contract and 
motivate group members to fulfill their mutual credit obligations with Pro Mujer.  
Similar to work experience, education should affect the capabilities of loan officers. We 
measure it by the number of years of formal schooling and predict that education improves 
communication skills. Such skills may increase borrowers’ understanding of how best to 
handle their loans. Education also should improve the loan officers’ ability to manage the risk 
in their portfolios.  
Job dependency varies beyond the effects of gender; that is, job security is more important for 
loan officers with no other job that generates income and for people with children, especially 
if they are not married and represent the sole caregiver for their children. Married loan 
officers also may have less time available for their jobs and exert less effort to screen, 
monitor, and enforce contracts with group members. Moreover, we expect that loan officers 
who depend more on their existing jobs make more effort to achieve good loan performance. 
In Table 5.1, we present the descriptive statistics of the key loan officer’s characteristics that 
are referred to in the section and used in the empirical analysis. Additional control variables, 
collinearity diagnostics, and a correlation matrix are given in Appendixes 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4, 
respectively. 
  
Loan officer’s characteristics and microfinance repayments rates 
 
 
121 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Loan Officer’s Characteristics 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Loan officer is male 57 0.19 0.4 0 1 
Marital status (1 if married) 57 0.4 0.49 0 1 
Former loan officer in other MFIs 57 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Former client of Pro Mujer 57 0.37 0.49 0 1 
Religion (1 if Catholic) 57 0.81 0.4 0 1 
Experience with Pro Mujer (months) 57 14.09 12.24 1 54 
Children (1 if have children) 57 0.47 0.5 0 1 
Time living in the community (years) 57 20.89 11.94 1 57 
Training in group meetings (1 if offered) 57 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Number of years of formal education 57 15.34 2.39 10 21 
Age (years)  57 32.07 9.39 19 57 
Previous job (1 if had one) 57 0.81 0.4 0 1 
Other job than Pro Mujer (1 if had one) 57 0.32 0.47 0 1 
MFI: Microfinance institution 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
 
Whether loan officers are Catholic also may influence loan default probabilities. Most 
borrowers in our sample (81%) are Catholic, as are the majority of people in central Mexico. 
People are likely to share similar attitudes with members of the same religion; this then may 
facilitate communication during group meetings and create commitment and incentives for 
clients to repay their loans. Therefore we include a binary indicator of whether the loan officer 
was Catholic or not. 
5.4 Study Region and Data  
Between December 2010 and March 2011, we conducted interviews in 18 branches of Pro 
Mujer Mexico operating in four states: Mexico, Puebla, Distrito Federal, and Tlaxcala. These 
branches are geographically distributed across two regions (Figure 5.1). First, the Mexico-
Distrito Federal region includes 12 branches, most of which register very low default rates of 
Chapter 5 
122 
 
less than 2 per cent monthly; this makes this region one of the most efficient in terms of loan 
repayment. It is a densely populated area, with anywhere from 679 to 5,920 inhabitants/km
2
, 
and has a good availability of public services (e.g. potable water, electricity, drainage, 
telephone, roads) and many microfinance providers (INEGI, 2011). Second, Puebla-Tlaxcala 
features six branches, some of which have high default rates (>5% monthly). With the 
exception of two branches, they target a rural clientele living in municipalities with a high 
degree of marginalization and few basic services available. Competition with other 
microfinance providers is relatively low.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Study area: scattering of  Pro Mujer branches in two geographic  regions 
in Central Mexico.           
We collected data from 57 loan officers and 407 borrowers. Borrowers and loan officers were 
interviewed with the support of 25 trained enumerators. The resulting data was cross-checked 
 
Region 1: Mexico-Distrito Federal Region 2: Puebla-Tlaxcala  
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with information from the archives of Pro Mujer, which contain reports of all group meetings 
including the number of defaults incurred. Borrowers were selected randomly from the client 
portfolios of the loan officers. We interviewed about 5 per cent of the clients for each loan 
officer. Some borrowers had only begun their first credit cycle, especially in the four new 
branches
6
 included in our study. For other borrowers, we gathered information only about the 
latest two cycles, to avoid recall bias. 
Some borrowers switched loan officers within the credit cycles recorded. For all loans 
overseen by a single loan officer, we collected information of the associated officer whenever 
possible, either through the interviews with the current loan officers or through tracking and 
interviewing former loan officers. Most of these officers were working as branch managers 
for Pro Mujer at the time of the surveys, although some had left the institution and could not 
be traced. This could bias the result, because capability and leaving the organization may be 
related. However, we expect this bias to be very small. Only few loans and loan officers are 
concerned (e.g. only 2‒3 loan offices could not be tracked). We also discarded those loans 
administered by two or more loan officers, because it is simply impossible to link these loans 
to a consistent set of loan officer characteristics. We ultimately included in our estimation a 
total sample of 57 loan officers and a panel of 650 loans to 407 borrowers (see Table 5.2).  
Loan officer rotation is very high. In an explorative study (Roscam  Abbing, 2010),  we found 
that, in a period of 2‒5 months at the end of 2010, 14 out of 41 loan officers in the states of 
Mexico and Puebla had left their job; this was presumably due to high work pressure. Put 
differently, few loan officers keep their job for more than one or two years and a substantial 
number leave Pro Mujer every year. The current loan officers intended to stay, on average, 
about one more year in their current job.  
                                                 
6
 Coronango, San Cristobal Ecatepec, Tlahuac, and Xochimilco. 
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Table 5.2 Number of  Observations per Branch 
Branch name 
Number 
of loan 
officers 
a
 
Number of 
borrowers 
Number of 
borrower 
observations 
Coronango 3 11 21 
Cuapiaxtla 2 19 30 
Huamantla 3 14 16 
Huauchinango 3 31 48 
Huehuetoca 2 19 31 
Jardines de Morelos 2 16 24 
Puebla 4 24 37 
San Cristobal Ecatepec 2 6 7 
Tecamac 5 27 47 
Teoloyucan 5 30 50 
Teotihuacan 4 35 62 
Tepotzotlan 2 14 21 
Texcoco 4 26 42 
Tlahuac 2 18 18 
Tonanitla 3 42 67 
Tultepec 5 30 54 
Xochimilco 3 16 20 
Zacatlan 3 29 55 
Total = 18 57 407 650 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
a 
Five loan officers handled cycles in different branches, so we 
interviewed a total of 57 officers. 
 
5.5  Methodology  
With the novel approach of multilevel analysis, suitable for analyzing hierarchically clustered 
data, we analyze the impact of various loan officer characteristics on the probability of loan 
default. As we explained above, we define loan default as failure of the borrower to pay 
her/his installment during at least one group meeting. Because the dependent variable is 
binary, the model is estimated using a logit model. It should be noted, however, that we use a 
three-level random-intercept logit model of the probability of loan default because this 
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enables observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the loan, borrower, and loan officer levels 
to be accounted for, as we explain below.  
The data used for the analysis have a hierarchical structure: each loan officer services a 
number of borrowers, who all get one or more loans. For efficient estimation of the 
determinants of default on loans, the lowest level of the hierarchy, we need to account for 
dependence of the observations for the two higher levels –borrowers and loan officers. 
Default rates for different loans of a single borrower are likely to be correlated and so are 
default rates for loans administered by a single loan officer. These correlations can be 
accounted for using a multilevel hierarchical random-intercept model (Günther and Harttgen, 
2009; see Apendix 5-1). This method is basically an extension of the well-known random-
effects model, which is used when there are two hierarchical levels, for example borrowers 
with clusters of loans. In multilevel models, the clusters themselves are nested in super-
clusters, such that they form hierarchical structures (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Hox, 2010; 
Kreft and De Leeuw, 1998; Rabe-Hesketh and Skronda, 2005). 
In our case, we have loan cycles i for repeated borrowers j who work with loan officers k, as 
in Figure 5.2.  
    Loan Officer 1       Level 3: Loan Officers k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Borrower 1         Borrower 2          Borrower n      Level 2: Borrowers j 
 
 
 
 
    C1     C2              C1     C2              C1       C2      Level 1: Loan cycle i 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Borrower–loan officer hierarchical model 
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Within this nested framework, the binary variable loan default Y can be estimated as follows: 
 
      (1) 
where  is the common intercept; the βs are vectors of coefficients; jk and j are random 
intercepts at the borrower and loan officer level, respectively; and  is the residual random 
intercept. The random effects are assumed to be independent of each other and across clusters. 
The explanatory variables comprise loan officer characteristics L and a set of controls Z, 
which include loan and borrower characteristics, peer monitoring, and region dummies.  
5.6  Estimation Results  
In this section, we present three versions of our borrower default model (Table 5.3). In the 
simple Model 1, loan default depends only on loan officer characteristics. With this model, we 
evaluated the impact  of a loan officer’s characteristics on loan default probabilities. In Model 
2, we added the borrower’s characteristics and some other control variables. Model 3 is a 
comprehensive model that includes loan officer and borrower characteristics, peer-monitoring 
and peer-screening variables, and additional controls. 
From the results in Table 5.3, we can see that eight of twelve loan officer characteristics 
significantly affect default rates in all three model specifications; the only control factor with 
a significant impact is the borrower’s marital status. In addition, peer-monitoring and peer-
screening variables appear not to be statistically significant in any model. Moreover, the loan 
officer characteristics fully explain the impact of the loan officer on the probability of default 
— the random loan officer effect is not significantly different from zero, and unobserved 
borrower characteristics are significant determinants of default— whereas the random 
borrower effect remains significant even after we introduced borrower characteristics. 
ijk
,
21 ijkijkkkjkijk
ZY L  
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Table 5.3 Three-level Random Intercept Logit Model (GLLAMM) of  Probability of 
Loan Deafult in Group Lending Microfinance 
Variable description 
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Loan officer 
characteristics 
Loan officer 
and borrower’s 
characteristics 
Loan officer, 
borrower, and peer 
monitoring 
characteristics 
Panel A. Loan officer characteristics 
   
    
Gender of the loan officer: 
   
Gender (1 if male) -1.283** -1.174**  -1.132**  
 
[0.035] [0.035]  [0.030]  
Loan officer’s professional experience: 
   
Experience with other MFIs  -1.807*** -1.392**  -1.387**  
 
[0.004] [0.019]  [0.018]  
Former client of  Pro Mujer  -1.161** -0.986*  -0.950*  
 
[0.026] [0.054]  [0.050]  
Experience with Pro Mujer (months) 0.0376** 0.0300*  0.0343*  
 
[0.044] [0.090]  [0.057]  
Previous job  0.522 0.675 0.646 
 
[0.352] [0.193]  [0.238]  
Age (years) 0.0254 0.0247 0.0217 
 
[0.159] [0.152]  [0.198]  
    
Other loan officer characteristics: 
   
Marital status (1 if married) 1.507*** 1.234*** 1.202*** 
 
[0.005] [0.007]  [0.007]  
Religion (1 if Catholic) -1.285** -1.322*** -1.329*** 
 
[0.014] [0.003]  [0.003]  
Children -1.148** -0.779**  -0.830**  
 
[0.013] [0.031]  [0.024]  
Time spent living in the community  -0.0399** -0.0319*  -0.0331**  
 
[0.037] [0.056]  [0.046]  
Education (years) -0.084 -0.104 -0.107 
 
[0.435] [0.286]  [0.272]  
Other job than Pro Mujer  -0.282 -0.396 -0.407 
 
[0.451] [0.255]  [0.254]  
    
Panel B. Peer monitoring and screening: 
   
    
Weekly meetings 
  
0.071 
   
[0.885]  
Group size (# members) 
  
-0.0522 
   
[0.131]  
Training in group meetings -0.57 -0.55 -0.604 
 
[0.199] [0.171]  [0.123]  
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Group leader  
 
-0.417 -0.423 
  
[0.246]  [0.245]  
    
Panel C. Borrower characteristics: 
   
Borrower marital status (1 if married) 
 
0.823*  0.826*  
  
[0.062]  [0.070]  
Borrower age (years) 
 
-0.0138 -0.0156 
  
[0.441]  [0.397]  
Borrower education (years) 
 
-0.0471 -0.0515 
  
[0.371]  [0.354]  
Borrower speaks a local language 
 
0.898 1.02 
  
[0.399]  [0.318]  
Borrower’s time spent living in the same community 
 
-0.0255 -0.0266 
  
[0.117]  [0.108]  
Borrower was client of other microfinance lenders 
 
-0.293 -0.253 
  
[0.320]  [0.410]  
Borrower owns a business 
 
-0.52 -0.548 
  
[0.257]  [0.241]  
Duration of borrower with Pro Mujer (contracts) 
 
-0.0132 -0.0158 
  
[0.818]  [0.809]  
Duration of borrower with loan officer (contracts)  
 
-0.128 -0.112 
  
[0.505]  [0.570]  
Panel D. Additional controls: 
   
Ln (loan size in pesos) 
  
0.0446 
   
[0.903]  
Ln (loan maturity in months) 
  
-0.0457 
   
[0.968]  
Mexico State 
  
-0.423 
   
[0.380]  
Puebla State 
  
-0.634 
   
[0.203]  
Constant -0.115 1.983 2.999 
  [0.939]  [0.245]  [0.349]  
Key statistics: 
   
Log-likelihood -278.4 -271.3 -270.1 
ROC 0.58 0.6 0.55 
AIC 586.8 592.6 602.1 
BIC 654 704.5 740.9 
Rank 15 25 31 
Wald test  19.29 36.24** 42.49* 
Likelihood ratio test  16.15*** 11.4*** 10.65*** 
Number of observations 650 650 650 
Random coefficients: 
   
Borrower level 2 2.399*** 2.036*** 2.037*** 
 
[0.002]  [0.005]  [0.007]  
Loan officer’s characteristics and microfinance repayments rates 
 
 
129 
 
Loan officer level 3 -0.00000389 -7.46E-08 -5.51E-08 
 
[0.712]  [0.890]  [0.960]  
Median odds ratios 9.85 6.97 6.98 
Intra-class correlations 0.64 0.56 0.48 
Notes: p-values are in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. All 
models were estimated by using the maximum likelihood method with 12 quadrature points. Adding more 
quadrature points did not produce any significant change in the coefficients and/or standards errors. The Wald 
test indicates if all explanatory variables in the model are jointly equal to 0 except for the constant. Likelihood 
ratio test indicates the significance of the loan officer level. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion; BIC = 
Bayesian information criterion; the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) indicates the equality of the ROC 
areas for the true value (observed default) versus the predicted default probability. Ln: loan. 
 
The empirical estimations in Table 5.3 have enabled us to derive three important results that 
are linked to the three hypotheses highlighted in section 5.3. First, in line with the first 
hypothesis on the gender of the loan officer, we find that male loan officers are better in 
enforcing credit contracts and in dealing with loan repayments compared to their female 
counterparts. This finding contrasts with the results of Beck et al. (2010) in the context of 
Albania, who found that loans screened and monitored by female loan officers registered 
lower default probabilities than loans handled by male loan officers. In our study, however, 
we find the opposite and we attribute these performance differences to the lesser authoritative 
power of female loan officers in sanctioning loan contracts. This lower level of capacity to 
ensure repayment recovery may emerge from the female loan officer having higher risk 
aversion and lower self-confidence (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; 
Powell and Ansic, 1997) and by their more cooperative behavior and “solidarity” with 
borrowers, which is based on “moral responsibility” (Gilligan, 1977; Hartmann-Wendels et 
al., 2009). 
Another influential factor affecting our results on hypothesis 1 relates to geographical 
location. As we can see from Figure 5.1, Pro Mujer branches are scattered and irregularly 
distributed, particularly in the Puebla-Tlaxcala region, where borrowers live far away from 
their particular branch. In these circumstances, male loan officers may be more able to follow-
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up regular weekly meetings with their borrowing groups in their own communities and to visit 
more defaulting clients for repayment compared to their female colleagues. In such cases, we 
estimate that male loan officers will be better at recovering repayments, as our first hypothesis 
claims. 
Second, with respect to hypothesis 2 on the role of a loan officer’s professional experience on 
loan repayment, we find that the probability of loan default decreases for loans managed by 
loan officers with previous work experience in other MFIs and for those who were former 
clients of Pro Mujer. This result confirms the earlier empirical findings of Andersson (2004) 
and Agarwal and Wang (2008) that senior loan officers make more consistent financial 
decisions than inexperienced loan officers. However, this result contrasts with that of Beck et 
al. (2010), who find no relation between loan default probability and the loan officers’ 
experience in Albania. Surprisingly, loans handled by a loan officer who has worked longer 
for Pro Mujer have higher, not lower, default rates. Perhaps loan officers become demotivated 
over time, as the extremely high rotation of loan officers in Pro Mujer suggests. Alternatively, 
loan officers who worked already for a long period of time in the institution may have more 
possibilities to collude with borrowers; this could also contribute to worsening repayment 
rates. So, with respect to professional experience of the loan officers, our findings are 
inconclusive and partly confirm our hypothesis 2.  
Third, in contrast to Wydick (1999), we find that peer monitoring of group members is not 
significant in improving loan performance, while the characteristics of the delegated 
monitor/loan officer are very important. Although the direction of the change for most of the 
coefficients of the set of explanatory variables that determine peer monitoring (e.g. group size, 
training in group meetings, and group leader) is in line with what we expected, none of them 
are statistically significant in any of the models. An important reason for this is probably that 
transaction costs for the borrowers are very high because they do not live close to each other. 
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Most “peer monitoring” theories simply assume that “peer monitoring” is without costs 
because borrowers know each other very well. However, in reality, this is very often not the 
case, and hence the peer monitoring costs may be very high. In such a setting, the intense 
involvement of the loan officer may make peer monitoring redundant; further, because peer 
monitoring is not costless, the group members may then decide not to monitor each other. 
These findings confirm our third hypothesis. Note that, in contrast to Hermes et al. (2006), 
monitoring by the group leader does not substitute for “peer monitoring.” Apparently, the 
availability of well-functioning loan managers also makes the monitoring role for a group 
leader redundant.  
In addition to the above-mentioned results concerning our three hypotheses, we find that, with 
respect to the loan officer’s characteristics, closeness or similarity of loan officers with their 
borrowers appears beneficial to loan repayment. Loans administered by Catholic loan officers 
who were former clients of Pro Mujer and who had lived longer in the same community were 
less likely to be in default. This result is in line with the idea that close interactions between 
borrowers and loan officers reduce information asymmetry, lead to fewer moral hazards, and 
strengthen contract enforcement, all of which can improve loan repayment rates. Furthermore, 
we do find evidence that loans managed by unmarried loan officers with children were less 
likely to be in default; this suggests that such loan officers are very motivated to keep their 
jobs and obtain substantial bonuses. We do not find a similar effect for loan officers without a 
second job, other than their job at Pro Mujer, nor do we find any effect of education. In the 
following section, we present some conclusions emanating from this empirical study. 
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5.7 Conclusion   
By applying multilevel analyses, the paper studies the role of loan officers on loan repayment. 
We use survey data for a sample of 57 loan officers and 407 borrowers of Pro Mujer Mexico 
— an organization that provides joint-liability, group-based microfinance — and show that 
loan officer characteristics exert significant impact on loan repayment rates, whereas borrower 
characteristics (other than marital status) and peer monitoring have little effect.  
In particular, we have formulated three core hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that default 
probabilities of loan portfolios handled by male loan officers outperform those administrated 
by female loan officers. Our results strongly confirm this hypothesis. Moreover, we formulate 
a second hypothesis concerning the impact of the loan officer’s professional experience on 
loan default probabilities. The empirical estimations are ambiguous on this issue. Loan 
officers who were former employees in other MFIs and those who were former clients of Pro 
Mujer were found to have a higher repayment rates, while those with more experience within 
Pro Mujer were found to have higher loan default probabilities. As a result, our findings partly 
confirm hypothesis 2.  
In addition, we hypothesize that the loan officers’ personal characteristics have a stronger 
positive impact on the repayment performance of borrowers relative to “peer monitoring and 
peer screening.” Our results confirm this hypothesis. Loan officers appear to play a key role in 
reducing monitoring and screening costs in an environment where borrowers live far from 
each other and where the capacity of the group members to enforce contracts is limited and 
peer monitoring costs are high. This result provides new doubts with respect to the relevance 
of the costless peer monitoring model in general, and the importance of joint-liability group 
lending schemes in reducing loan defaults in particular. Most importantly, it draws specific 
attention to the crucial role of loan managers in reducing loan defaults in microfinance, an 
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issue that has almost completely been overlooked in the traditional microfinance literature.  
Appendix 5.1  Model Specification of a Three-level Random-Intercept Model 
 
We estimated a three-level, random-coefficient logistic model, as proposed by Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal (2005), to assess the probability of loan default y for different loans i nested in 
borrowers j clustered in loan officers k: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 The model alternatively can be written as a latent-response model: 
 
 
where 
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The observed dichotomous responses are presumed to be generated from the threshold model: 
  
 
a. Intra-class correlations 
We can consider two types of intra-class correlations for the latent responses of two borrowers 
i and i'. First, for the same branch k but different loan officers j and j’, we obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
Here  
 
 
Xijk  is a vector containing all covariates, 
(3)  is the variance between the loan officer random intercept at level 3, and 
(2)  equals the between-borrower, within-loan officer variance at level 2 (borrower) 
 
Second, for the same borrower j (and the same loan officer k), we get 
 
 
 
Here (2) and (3) are positive (>0), and (borrower, loan officer) > (loan officer). The latter 
relationship indicates that borrowers working with the same loan officer are more likely to 
exhibit correlated performance than if they fell under the supervision of different loan 
officers. 
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b.  Median odds ratios 
In our model of loan default, we quantify unobserved heterogeneity by considering the 
median odds ratio proposed by Larsen et al. (2000) and Larsen and Merlo (2005) for pairs of 
randomly sampled units with the same covariate values. The unit with a larger random 
intercept is compared with the unit of the smaller random intercept. For example, comparing 
loans of different borrowers from the same loan officer gives the following median odds ratio: 
 
 
 
 
 
and comparing loans of different borrowers from different loan officers indicates  
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Appendix 5-2 Descriptive Statistics of Additional Control Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Borrower’s marital status (1 if married) 650 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Borrower speaks a local language  650 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Borrower’s time spent living in the same community 
(years) 
650 20.9 14.08 1 74 
Borrower’s age (years) 650 38.52 11.7 17.78 80.78 
Borrower’s number of years of education  650 9.17 3.99 0 20 
Borrower as group leader  650 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Borrower was client of other microfinance lender 650 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Borrower’s duration with Pro Mujer (contracts) 650 3.7 3.07 1 21 
Borrower’s duration with the loan officer (contracts) 650 1.66 1.11 0 11 
Borrower living in Mexico State 650 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Borrower living in Puebla State 650 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Group size (clients) 650 11.98 4.25 5 30 
Weekly group meetings  650 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Ln (loan size in pesos) 650 8.68 0.69 6.91 9.9 
Ln (loan maturity in months) 650 1.61 0.23 1.1 2.08 
Ln: logarithm 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on survey data. 
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Appendix 5-3 Collinearity Diagnostics 
        
Variable VIF  
SQRT 
VIF 
TOLERANCE 
R-
SQUARE 
Loan default 1.09 1.04 0.92 0.08 
Loan officer’s gender (1 if male) 1.61 1.27 0.62 0.38 
Loan officer’s marital status (1 if married) 2.88 1.7 0.35 0.65 
Loan officer’s prior experience  1.68 1.3 0.6 0.41 
Loan officer as former client of Pro Mujer 2.58 1.61 0.39 0.61 
Loan officer’s religion (1 if Catholic) 1.86 1.37 0.54 0.46 
Loan officer’s experience at Pro Mujer 1.95 1.4 0.51 0.49 
Loan officer’s time living in the community 1.65 1.28 0.61 0.39 
Loan officer offers training in group meetings 1.17 1.08 0.85 0.15 
Loan officer has children 2.71 1.65 0.37 0.63 
Loan officer’s number of years of education  1.71 1.31 0.59 0.41 
Loan officer’s age (years) 1.99 1.41 0.5 0.5 
Loan officer had a previous job 1.88 1.37 0.53 0.47 
Loan officer has job besides Pro Mujer 1.51 1.23 0.66 0.34 
Borrower’s marital status (1 if married) 1.13 1.06 0.88 0.12 
Borrower’s time spent living in the community 1.29 1.13 0.78 0.22 
Borrower’s age (years) 1.44 1.2 0.7 0.3 
Borrower’s number of years of education  1.41 1.19 0.71 0.29 
Borrower speaks a local language 1.29 1.14 0.77 0.23 
Borrower as group leader (1 if leader) 1.05 1.03 0.95 0.05 
Borrower was client of other microfinance lender 1.11 1.06 0.9 0.1 
Borrower owns business 1.06 1.03 0.95 0.05 
Borrower’s duration with Pro Mujer (contracts) 1.57 1.25 0.64 0.36 
Borrower’s duration with loan officer (contracts) 1.31 1.15 0.76 0.24 
Group size (clients) 1.05 1.02 0.95 0.05 
Weekly meetings 2.33 1.53 0.43 0.57 
Ln (loan size in pesos) 1.85 1.36 0.54 0.46 
Ln (loan maturity in months) 2.04 1.43 0.49 0.51 
Borrower living in the Mexico State 3.52 1.88 0.28 0.72 
Borrower living in the Puebla State 3.55 1.88 0.28 0.72 
Notes: VIF = variance inflation factor. Mean VIF = 1.78. 
Ln: logarithm 
C
h
ap
te
r 
5
 
 
1
3
8
 
  A
p
p
en
d
ix
 5
-4
 C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
tr
ix
 
 
  
N
o
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
2
8
2
9
3
0
1
Lo
a
n
 d
e
fa
u
lt
1
.0
0
2
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
ge
n
d
e
r 
(1
 if
 m
a
le
)
-0
.1
0
1
.0
0
3
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
m
a
ri
ta
l s
ta
tu
s 
(1
 if
 m
a
rr
ie
d
)
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
1
.0
0
4
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
e
xp
e
ri
e
n
ce
 
-0
.1
0
0
.2
9
0
.3
1
1
.0
0
5
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r 
a
s 
fo
rm
e
r 
cl
ie
n
t 
in
 P
ro
 M
u
je
r
-0
.1
0
-0
.2
0
0
.1
9
-0
.3
0
1
.0
0
6
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
re
li
gi
o
n
 (1
 if
 C
a
th
o
li
c)
-0
.1
0
0
.0
7
0
.3
8
0
.0
0
0
.2
9
1
.0
0
7
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
e
xp
e
ri
e
n
ce
 w
it
h
 P
ro
 M
u
je
r 
(m
o
n
th
s)
0
.0
3
0
.1
1
0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.4
7
0
.1
7
1
.0
0
8
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r 
h
a
s 
ch
il
d
re
n
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.6
4
0
.0
9
0
.3
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
9
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
ti
m
e
 s
p
e
n
t 
li
vi
n
g 
in
 t
h
e
 s
a
m
e
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.3
9
0
.2
0
0
.3
5
0
.0
5
1
.0
0
1
0
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r 
o
ff
e
rs
 t
ra
in
in
g 
in
 g
ro
u
p
 m
e
e
ti
n
gs
0
.0
0
-0
.2
0
0
.0
2
-0
.2
0
0
.0
6
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
6
0
.0
6
1
.0
0
1
1
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 (y
e
a
rs
)
-0
.1
0
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.0
5
-0
.2
0
0
.3
3
0
.0
5
1
.0
0
1
2
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
a
ge
 (y
e
a
rs
)
0
.0
0
-0
.3
0
0
.2
1
-0
.1
0
0
.5
1
0
.3
1
0
.3
0
0
.1
9
0
.3
6
0
.1
6
0
.1
0
1
.0
0
1
3
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
p
re
vi
o
u
s 
jo
b
-0
.1
0
0
.1
9
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.2
4
0
.1
8
0
.1
1
-0
.2
0
0
.2
3
0
.0
0
0
.5
0
0
.2
3
1
.0
0
1
4
Lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r’
s 
o
th
e
r 
jo
b
 b
e
si
d
e
s 
P
ro
 M
u
je
r
0
.0
0
0
.1
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
8
-0
.2
0
0
.1
2
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.2
8
0
.1
1
0
.2
9
1
.0
0
1
5
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
m
a
ri
ta
l s
ta
tu
s 
(1
 if
 m
a
rr
ie
d
)
0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
5
-0
.1
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
6
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
a
ge
 (y
e
a
rs
)
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.1
6
1
.0
0
1
7
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 (y
e
a
rs
)
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
0
.1
4
0
.0
2
0
.0
5
0
.0
2
-0
.4
0
1
.0
0
1
8
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
lo
ca
l l
a
n
gu
a
ge
0
.0
3
0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.1
1
0
.0
4
0
.3
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
-0
.2
0
1
.0
0
1
9
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r 
a
s 
gr
o
u
p
 le
a
d
e
r 
(1
 if
 le
a
d
e
r)
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
0
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r 
o
w
n
s 
b
u
si
n
e
ss
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
1
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
ti
m
e
 li
vi
n
g 
in
 t
h
e
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.1
8
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.1
4
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.3
3
-0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
2
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r 
h
a
s 
b
e
e
n
 c
li
e
n
t 
o
f o
th
e
r 
le
n
d
e
r
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
0
.0
1
0
.0
6
-0
.1
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
3
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
2
-0
.1
0
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
4
1
.0
0
2
3
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 P
ro
 M
u
je
r 
(c
o
n
tr
a
ct
s)
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
7
0
.0
6
0
.1
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
-0
.1
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.1
6
-0
.1
0
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
0
.0
9
1
.0
0
2
4
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r’
s 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 lo
a
n
 o
ff
ic
e
r 
(c
o
n
tr
a
ct
s)
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.1
5
0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.2
3
0
.0
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
-0
.2
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
6
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.2
7
1
.0
0
2
5
Ln
 (l
o
a
n
 s
iz
e
 in
 p
e
so
s)
0
.0
0
-0
.2
0
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
6
-0
.1
0
0
.0
2
-0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.1
3
0
.1
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
-0
.1
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
1
0
.4
9
0
.2
0
1
.0
0
2
6
Ln
 (l
o
a
n
 m
a
tu
ri
ty
 in
 m
o
n
th
s)
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.1
8
0
.1
3
0
.1
2
0
.0
4
0
.1
1
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.1
2
0
.1
0
0
.0
8
0
.1
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
0
.4
1
0
.1
1
0
.5
1
1
.0
0
2
7
W
e
e
kl
y 
gr
o
u
p
 m
e
e
ti
n
gs
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
9
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
9
-0
.2
0
0
.0
8
-0
.1
0
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
7
0
.0
9
-0
.3
0
0
.0
1
-0
.4
0
-0
.6
0
1
.0
0
2
8
G
ro
u
p
 s
iz
e
 (c
li
e
n
ts
)
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
4
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
2
9
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r 
li
vi
n
g 
in
 M
e
xi
co
 S
ta
te
0
.0
2
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.3
0
0
.0
8
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
0
0
.2
0
0
.0
0
0
.1
8
-0
.2
0
0
.2
5
-0
.1
0
0
.1
8
0
.1
2
0
.0
6
0
.2
4
-0
.2
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
0
.2
9
0
.3
3
-0
.6
0
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
3
0
B
o
rr
o
w
e
r 
li
vi
n
g 
in
 P
u
e
b
la
 S
ta
te
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.0
1
0
.2
2
0
.0
0
0
.1
6
0
.2
5
-0
.2
0
0
.0
8
-0
.2
0
0
.1
1
-0
.3
0
0
.0
6
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
0
0
.0
0
-0
.3
0
0
.2
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
.1
9
0
.0
0
0
.2
0
-0
.2
0
-0
.2
0
0
.4
9
0
.0
4
-0
.8
0
1
.0
0
So
u
rc
e
: A
u
th
o
rs
’ c
o
m
p
il
a
ti
o
n
 b
a
se
d
 o
n
 s
u
rv
e
y 
d
a
ta
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 5
-4
 C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 M
at
ri
x
 139 
 
Chapter 6 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This study provides evidence on how microfinance interventions can improve the well-being 
of financially constrained households in developing economies. It also contributes to a 
broader understanding of how microfinance institutions (MFIs) and programs in Latin 
America can become more financially sustainable in order to have a lasting impact on poverty 
alleviation. As a result, this examination makes at least three major contributions to 
microfinance literature. First of all, it formulates novel research questions that have received 
only limited attention in empirical research such as: (1) the relationship between efficiency 
and the ownership structure of MFIs; (2) the relative importance of different types of 
microfinance services on poverty reduction; (3) the impact of membership in microfinance 
institutions on vulnerability to poverty; and (4) the role that microfinance loan managers have 
on repayment rates in group-lending microfinance. These four issues are important for 
improving public policies and the performance of MFIs operating in contexts characterized by 
market imperfections. Secondly, this study offers four different and innovative 
methodological approaches for the analysis of microfinance performance that can be applied 
in similar contexts where MFIs are operating. Thirdly, it makes use of rich longitudinal 
datasets that enable  the changes in the status of households, MFIs, borrowers, and loans to be 
tracked over time; these datasets can be extended for further investigations in the 
microfinance sector in Mexico in particular and Latin America in general.   
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents key findings 
emanating from the four empirical chapters of this thesis. Section 6.3 offers some overall 
conclusions derived from the empirical studies. Section 6.4 looks at some policy implications, 
and Section 6.5 concludes by presenting the limitations of the study and offering some 
suggestions for further research. 
6.2 Main Findings 
We formulated four specific research objectives in order to assess the economic performance 
and the poverty impact that different types of MFIs have in Latin America and Mexico. Each 
of these objectives generated some empirical results. Below we present the four core 
objectives of this thesis, followed by their corresponding empirical findings. 
6.2.1 Assessing whether the technical efficiency of MFIs in Latin America, both intra-firm 
and inter-firm, can be explained by differences in type of ownership  
The results of this investigation show that non-shareholder MFIs such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and cooperative/credit unions have much lower inter-firm and intra-
firm technical efficiencies than shareholder MFIs such as non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFIs) and banks. In particular, we found that deviations from the optimal production 
possibilities frontier for NGOs and cooperative/credit unions result from the technical 
inefficiency component (ui) — that is, factors over which the MFIs’ management have 
control. In contrast, the inefficiency of banks and NBFIs arises mainly as a result of the 
random noise component (vi); this represents random factors or external shocks which are 
beyond the MFIs’ control and, as a result, have an adverse effect on the total production, such 
as market competition or stringent regulations.  
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Furthermore, from the estimation of the separate production functions, we also found that on 
average, the technology levels of NGOs and cooperative/credit unions tended to be similar 
(0.428 and 0.448, respectively), yet considerably lower than those of the bank and the NBFI. 
The catch-up distribution for banks is mainly concentrated around 0.9 and indicates a 
negatively skewed distribution for NBFIs. However, it is very flat for NGOs and 
cooperative/credit unions. Thus, banks produce just less than the overall optimal production 
technology. Overall, they have an average inter-firm efficiency of 0.928. Specifically, NGOs 
and cooperatives/credit unions have a lower technological level, a more pronounced focus on 
social goals and more severe funding constraints in comparison with banks and NBFIs. 
Unclear objectives associated with the difficulty of developing appropriate incentive 
structures also causes non-shareholder MFIs to suffer from lower levels of efficiency with 
respect to their own frontier. The economic implication of these outcomes is that NGOs and 
cooperatives/credit unions are wasting resources in the production process and, as a result, are 
not as efficient as their peers, i.e. NBFIs and banks. 
Moreover, whereas intra-firm efficiency (IA) is more than 0.99 for all banks and NBFIs, there 
are significant differences in IA among NGOs and cooperatives/credit unions: some institutes 
have an efficiency of more than 0.9, while the efficiency of NGOs and cooperatives/credit 
unions is as low as 0.2 and 0.6, respectively. The bank production function virtually never 
falls below that of any other production function. Thus, the findings of Chapter 2 highlight the 
importance that ownership type has on the technical efficiency of MFIs. 
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6.2.2 Evaluating  the impact of becoming a member of a microfinance program in Mexico 
(i.e. SACP, PATMIR, MFI, BANSEFI, and COOPERA ) on the level of household welfare  
This investigation raises the level of understanding of how different microfinance services can 
alleviate poverty. The main objective is to compare the effects of participation in different 
microfinance programs, each with its own objectives and activities. The results of this study, 
reveal that only savings-oriented microfinance programs (i.e. savings and credit society 
[SACP], the Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program [PATMIR], and the National 
Savings and Financial Services Bank [BANSEFI]) exert a significantly positive impact in 
terms of increasing household expenditures per capita. We did not find such effects for MFIs 
focused mainly on credit or COOPERA, the program that facilitates cash transfers from the 
government. These findings are in line with studies carried out by Roodman (2012) and 
Karlan and Appel (2011), which suggest that savings products have a much greater impact 
than microcredit on the welfare of the poor.  
This result suggests that, on average, membership in MFIs that focus primarily on savings 
improves household welfare. However, the impact differs considerably, depending on which 
MFI program the household is a member of. Thus, in the microfinance programs for which 
savings products are very important (SACP, PATMIR, and BANSEFI), membership seems to 
increase expenditure per capita, and can reduce household  poverty effectively. The most 
significant effects on improving welfare emerged from SACP and PATMIR, whose programs 
have the most diversified financial products. Participation in these programs is associated with 
additional expenditures per capita of more than US$1,374. In contrast, membership in an MFI 
program that mainly offers credit does not seem to alleviate poverty. Although more research 
is needed, the results are in line with several recent randomized controlled trials that indicate 
only a marginal role for microcredit, while other microfinance products, such as savings and 
insurance, play a greater welfare-enhancing role.  
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6.2.3 Measuring  whether membership in an SACP in Mexico reduces the vulnerability of 
households to poverty 
The results of this study yielded two important outcomes: (1) being a member of an SACP 
institution has a positive effect on the mean values of log of per capita income by 0.221, log 
of per capita expenditure by 0.208, and log of per capita education expenses by 0.149; (2) 
banking with an SACP institution in Mexico results in a decrease in the variability of the log 
of per capita income by 0.258, of log of per capita expenditure by 0.0372, and of log of per 
capita education expenditure by 0.0663. These results clearly point out that banking with an 
SACP institution plays a crucial role in reducing household vulnerability to poverty  by 
smoothing out the  income and expenditure per capita. Another important finding, which is in 
line with prior empirical research (Ersado, 2005; Garcia De la Cruz, 2008; Pitt and Khandker, 
1998), is that membership in an SACP institution reduces the variability of investment in 
children’s schooling. This issue has hardly ever been examined in microfinance literature.  
6.2.4 Examining the impact of the loan officer’s characteristics on repayment rates for  
microfinance borrowers in Mexico   
The findings of this study suggest that there are at least three outcomes that are extremely 
relevant in terms of reducing loan default probabilities in microfinance: (1) the loan officer’s 
personal characteristics are much more relevant for reducing loan default probabilities than 
“peer monitoring” and “screening” of the group; (2) male loan officers are better able to 
reduce loan default probabilities than female loan officers; and (3) experienced loan officers 
are better at enforcing loan repayments than relatively inexperienced loan officers. Moreover, 
the results suggest that loan officers appear to play a key role in reducing monitoring and 
screening costs in an environment where borrowers live far from each other, where the 
capacity of the group members to enforce contracts is limited, and where peer monitoring 
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costs are high. This finding draws specific attention to the crucial role of loan managers in 
reducing loan default probabilities in microfinance, an issue that has almost completely been 
overlooked in traditional microfinance literature. 
6.3 Overall Conclusions 
We can draw at least two main conclusions from the afore-mentioned findings. Firstly, from 
Chapters 2 and 5 we have learnt that MFIs in Latin America can improve their institutional 
performance (i.e. technical efficiency and the quality of their portfolio) by choosing an 
appropriate type of ownership and by hiring proficient loan officers with a specific profile. 
Secondly, the results from Chapters 3 and 4 underscore that microfinance institutions that  
focus primarily on facilitating savings have a greater impact on poverty reduction compared 
with microfinance institutions that focus on providing microcredit services only. As a result, 
these two conclusions provide some insight as to how microfinance managers and 
policymakers can improve microfinance policies and the performance of MFIs in the context 
of Mexico and Latin America. 
Moreover, although the results from Chapter 2 show that NGOs and cooperative/credit unions 
perform worse in terms of technical efficiency compared to banks and NBFIs, the results in 
Chapters 3 and 4 also suggest that cooperative/credit unions outperform the banks and NBFIs 
in terms of poverty reduction. Thus, what we conclude from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is that there 
is a potential trade-off between efficiency and poverty reduction of MFIs in Latin America 
and Mexico. This conclusion reinforces the need for MFIs to balance their main goals of 
poverty alleviation and financial sustainability. This can potentially be achieved by means of a 
greater diversification in financial services, particularly savings and insurance products. If that 
happens, the overall sustainability of MFIs can potentially be attained in the long term. 
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However, greater diversification of MFIs also requires an appropriate regulatory framework 
as well as a set of suitable incentives that will enable MFIs to reach this goal.  
6.4 Policy Implications 
Overall, the policy implications derived from Chapters 2 and 5 point to the need for an 
improvement in microfinance management. Firstly, at the micro-level, it would seem 
necessary for microfinance managers to pay more attention to ascertaining whether or not the 
current MFI ownership type fulfills the intended goals of poverty alleviation and financial 
sustainability. If that is not the case, it will be necessary for them to consider a possible 
transformation to a different ownership type, in the hope that this could lead to an 
improvement in the MFI’s overall performance. In addition, at the macro-level, financial 
authorities and policymakers in Latin America are prompted to re-orient their policies towards 
providing support to those MFIs that require a transformation of their ownership type in order 
for them to achieve sustainability in the long term. Overall, this would help to improve their 
efficiency and competitiveness in the microfinance sector. Secondly, it seems fundamental for 
managers of MFIs to pay more attention to the role of the loan officers’ personal 
characteristics as a key determinant in repayment rates and institutional performance. Until 
now, loan managers have generally been ignored, which in turn has led to a worsening of 
institutional performance. Proof of this is the high turnover of loan managers, which was 
identified in Pro Mujer in Mexico in this study. In order to combat this problem, microfinance 
managers should implement an appropriate hiring and incentive policies that permit the 
recruitment of apt loan officers who can also be compensated for their demanding 
responsibilities; this in turn could lead to an improvement in overall institutional performance.  
Furthermore, the results from Chapters 3 and 4 highlight the importance for policymakers, 
donors, and aid organizations in supporting microfinance programs and institutions that 
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primarily offer savings products, because this activity leads to poverty reduction. Notably, 
public policies and microfinance interventions in Mexico are currently pointing towards a 
contrary development. Microfinance policies in Mexico are generally oriented towards 
stimulating the growth of credit-oriented MFIs in order to potentially increase their coverage 
of the poor. However, MFIs primarily offering credit have the following characteristics: (1) 
they target specific groups of people, but not necessarily the poor; and (2) they are highly 
reliant on national and international aid. As a result, a more holistic approach should be 
considered by policymakers in order to provide support to SACP savings institutions in 
improving their portfolio of financial instruments that are suitable for the specific needs of 
their targeted clientele, particularly the rural poor. This is mainly important in rural areas of 
the southern region (e.g. Chiapas, Yucatan, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla), where a huge 
range of SACP savings institutions exists that can potentially play a key role in risk mitigation 
and poverty reduction.  
6.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
Firstly, with respect to the limitations of this study, as in any other impact evaluation of a 
social program, we encountered some methodological drawbacks. In particular, when 
measuring the impact of household membership in one of the five microfinance programs that 
are studied in Chapter 3, we identified three out of five empirical models of household welfare 
which were affected by endogeneity and selection bias problems. We tried to deal with these 
endogeneity and selection bias problems in several ways, for instance by using the Hausman‒
Taylor estimator, which is an instrumental variable approach that generates internal 
instruments; and by using a comparable sample of treatment and control groups. Nevertheless, 
some selection bias may still remain. There are two main options for overcoming these 
problems: (1) the use of randomized control trials (RCTs), and (2) reliance on a set of robust 
instruments to control for such problems. However, for the purpose of this study, we neither 
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had a set of robust instruments nor did we conduct an RCT. Nevertheless, we recommend that 
further impact studies on microfinance participation make use of RCTs.  
Secondly, based on the results and conclusions emanating from this empirical study, we 
identified several important ways in which this research can be extended, which are described 
as follows.  
6.5.1 Concerning the Impact of  Ownership  Type on the Technical Efficiency of MFIs  
Firstly, researchers could enrich our approach by including multiple outputs, such as savings, 
training, insurance, and other financial services, which are provided by an increasing number 
of MFIs, and estimating translog distance functions using a corrected ordinary least squares 
method (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). Secondly, productivity indicators, such as technological 
change, total factor productivity, and input elasticity, derived from the current type-specific 
production functions might help disentangle the main factors that account for differences in 
technologies across MFI types. Thirdly, by determining ownership-specific key factors that 
explain efficiency, further research would provide insight on how to implement better 
practices in order to increase the efficiency of struggling MFIs (NGOs and cooperative/credit 
unions). Battese and Coelli (1995) suggest a stochastic frontier analysis model that 
simultaneously estimates the frontier and the coefficients of the efficiency variables and this 
could also be applied to type-specific production frontiers.   
6.5.2 Concerning the Impact of  Different Microfinance Services on Poverty Reduction 
The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 can be extended in two important ways. Firstly, since the 
savings-oriented microfinance programs such as the SACPs and PATMIR were shown to 
have a positive impact on poverty reduction, it might be interesting to look at the factors that 
contribute to improving the performance of MFIs  operating within  these two  programs. One 
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possibility would be to conduct more research on the SACPs affiliated to these programs, in 
order to disentangle the consequences of regulation policies on the financial sustainability and 
poverty outreach benefits of these financial intermediaries, which have been overlooked so 
far.  
Moreover, another line of research could be developed based on the findings emanating from 
Chapter 4. In this chapter we evaluated the impact of being a client of an SACP institution on 
the mitigation of household exposure to risk and on the reduction of household vulnerability 
to poverty. In particular, the results from Chapter 4 emphasize the need to identify the 
channels by which microfinance services, particularly savings products, can assist households 
in mitigating risk. For instance, perhaps microfinance helps households to reduce the negative 
impact of particular types of shocks, either idiosyncratic or covariate or a combination of 
both. Thus, we recommend that a study should be conducted both for savings-oriented SACP 
institutions and for MFIs focusing primarily on microcredit or on cash transfers services. The 
focus of such a study would be on the impact of banking when confronting shocks and would 
enable the comparison of the impact of different financial services on mitigating ex ante and 
ex post exposure to idiosyncratic and covariate risks. This type of research could help 
microfinance managers and policymakers to design a range of risk-coping instruments to be 
offered by MFIs that are suitable for the specific needs of the targeted clientele, particularly 
the rural poor. 
6.5.3 Concerning  the Impact of Microfinance Loan Managers on Loan Performance 
The results of the investigation on the role of a loan officer’s personal characteristics on loan 
performance in Chapter 5 can be extended in two important ways. The first would be to 
conduct RCTs in order to test for differences in treatment groups of loan officers with the 
personal characteristics and activities (i.e. gender, experience, age, etc.) indicated in Chapter 
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5. This approach could bring new insights as to how MFI performance could be improved 
based on the selection criteria of loan officers by branch or geographical region. Secondly, it 
seems necessary to follow up more credit cycles of the borrowers which, if linked to the loan 
officer’s personal attributes and to the group’s characteristics, could lead to a panel data set of 
loans that could be evaluated. This would allow further insight to be gained on the 
determinants of loan repayment at the individual and at the group level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150 
 
References 
 
Adams, R. B., H. Almeida, and D. Ferreira, 2005. Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on 
Corporate Performance, Review of Financial Studies 18, 1403-1432. 
Agarwal, S., and F. H. Wang, 2008. Motivating Loan Officers: An Analysis of Salaries and 
Piece Rates Compensation. Working Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Agier, I., 2012. The Role of Credit Officers in the Performance of Micro Loans, Economics of 
Transition 20, 271-297. 
Agier, I., and A. Szafarz, 2010. Credit Officers and Loan Granting in Microfinance: Brazilian 
Evidence, Working Papers Series. 15 p. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1729234. 
Aigner, D., C. A. K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt, 1977. Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function Models, Journal of Econometrics 6, 21-37. 
Andersson, P., 2004. Does Experience Matter in Lending? A Process-Tracing Study on 
Experienced Loan Officers' and Novices' Decision Behavior, Journal of Economic 
Psychology 25, 471-492. 
Armendariz, B., and A. Szafarz, 2011. On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions. In The 
Handbook of Micrifinance, pp. 341-366. B. Armendariz and M. Labie, ed. London-
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1918096). 
Armendáriz de Aghion, B., and C. Gollier, 2000. Peer Group Formation in an Adverse 
Selection Model, The Economic Journal 110, 632-643. 
Armendariz de Aghion, B., and J. Morduch, 2010. The Economics of Microfinance.  Second 
Edition. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 468 p. 
Baltagi, B., 2001. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data.  Jhon Wiley and Sons, Chichester. 
New York: Wiley., Fourth edition. 
Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, R. Glennerster, and C. Kinnan, 2010. The Miracle of Microfinance? 
Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation. In Working Papers Series No. 31: mimeo, 
MIT. Centre for Micro Finance IFMR Research. 
BANSEFI, 2007. Las Entidades de Ahorro y Crédito Popular en México (EACP). 
Barro, R. J., 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106, 407-443. 
Bateman, M., 2010. Why Doesn't Microfinance Work? The Destructive Raise of  Local 
Neoliberalism.URL 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=579117. 
References 
 
151 
 
Battese, G. E., and T. J. Coelli, 1995. A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data, Empirical Economics 20, 325-
332. 
Beck, T. H. L., P. Behr, and A. Guttler, 2010. Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan 
Officers? Tilburg University. Center for Economic Research, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/Becketal022409.pdf 
Becker, G., 1993. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. 228 pp. 
Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak, and P. Taubman, 1989. Family Resources, Family Size, and 
Access to Financing for College Education, Journal of Political Economy 97, 398-419. 
Bellucci, A., A. Borisov, and A. Zazzaro, 2010. Does Gender Matter in Bank–Firm 
Relationships? Evidence From Small Business Lending, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 34, 2968-2984. 
Bellucci, A., A. Borisov, A. Zazzaro, G. Calcagnini, and I. Favaretto, 2011. Do Male and 
Female Loan Officers Differ in Small Business Lending? A Review of the Literature. 
In: The Economics of Small Businesses. Physica-Verlag HD. pp.195-219. 
Benhabib, J., and M. M. Spiegel, 1994. The Role of Human Capital in Economic 
Development Evidence From Aggregate Cross-Country Data, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 34, 143-173. 
Berger, A. N., and D. B. Humphrey, 1991. The Dominance of Inefficiencies Over Scale and 
Product Mix Economies in Banking, Journal of Monetary Economics 28, 117-148. 
Berhane Tesfay, G., 2009. Econometric Analyses of Microfinance Credit Group Formation, 
Contractual Risks and Welfare Impacts in Northern Ethiopia. PhD thesis. Wageningen 
University dissertation no.4675.Wageningen UR Library. 
Berumen and Associates, 2006. Diseño Inicial de Muestra. Anexo A. Mexico. 
Besley, T., 1995. Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income 
Countries, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, 115-127. 
Besley, T., 1995. Savings Credit and Insurance, in: H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (Eds.), 
Handbook of Development Economics, 1
st
 Ed., Vol. 3, Ch. 36, pp 2123-2207. Elsvier, 
Amsterdam. 
Besley, T., and S. Coate, 1995. Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral, 
Journal of Development Economics 46, 1-18. 
Bhattacharyya, A., C. A. K. Lovell, and P. Sahay, 1997. The Impact of Liberalization on the 
Productive Efficiency of Indian Commercial Banks, European Journal of Operational 
Research 98, 332-345. 
References 
 
152 
 
Bikker, J. A., and J. W. B. Bos, 2008. Bank Performance: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Framework for the Analysis of Profitability, Competition and Efficiency. International 
Studies in Money and Banking, Routledge, London and New York, 154 p. 
Bryk, A. S., and S. W. Raudenbush, 1992. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and 
Data Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc. 265 p. 
Carroll, C. D., R. E. Hall, and S. P. Zeldes, 1992. The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some 
Macroeconomic Evidence, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1992, 61-156. 
Cassar, A., L. Crowley, and B. Wydick, 2007. The Effect of Social Capital on Group Loan 
Repayment: Evidence From Field Experiments, The Economic Journal 117, F85-
F106. 
Chaia, A., A. Dalal, T. Goland, M. Gonzalez, J. Morduch, and R. Schiff, 2009. Half the World 
is Unbanked. In: Financial Access Initiative Framing Note. 
Chaudhuri, S., J. Jalan, and A. Suryahadi, 2002. Assessing Household Vulnerability to 
Poverty: A Methodology and Estimates for Indonesia. Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 0102-52. New York: Columbia University. 
Cheng, S., 2008. Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance, Journal of 
Financial Economics 87, 157-176. 
Chowdhury, P. R., 2005. Group-Lending: Sequential Financing, Lender Monitoring and Joint 
Liability, Journal of Development Economics 77, 415-439. 
Christiaensen, L. J., and K. Subbarao, 2005. Towards an Understanding of Household 
Vulnerability in Rural Kenya, Journal of African Economies 14, 520-558. 
Coelli, T., Rao  D. S. Prasada., and G. E. Battese, 1998. An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis. Kluwer Academic, Boston. 
Coelli, T. J., and S. Perelman, 2000. Technical Efficiency of European Railways: A Distance 
Function Approach, Applied Economics 32, 1967-1976. 
Norwegian Nobel Committee. 2006. The Novel Peace Prize 2006. In: weblink: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html. Press release O, 
October (Ed.).  
Conning, J., 1999. Outreach, Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-Monitored 
Lending, Journal of Development Economics 60, 51-77. 
Cotler, P., and C. Woodruff, 2008. The Impact of Short-Term Credit on Microenterprises: 
Evidence from the Fincomun-Bimbo Program in Mexico, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 56, 829-849. 
References 
 
153 
 
Crépon, B., F. Devoto, E. Duflo, and W. Parienté, 2011. Impact of Microcredit in Rural Areas 
of Morocco: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation. Mimeo, 
MIT.<http://www.poverty-action.org/work/publications>. 
Croson, R., and U. Gneezy, 2009. Gender Differences in Preferences, Journal of Economic 
Literature 47, 448-474. 
Cull, R., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and J. Morduch, 2009. Microfinance Meets the Market, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 23, 167-192. 
Daley-Harris, S., 2006. State of the Microcredit Summit Campiagn Report 2006. Microcredit 
Summit Campiagn, Washington, DC. 
Daley-Harris, S., 2009. State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2009. In: 
Washington, DC: Microcredit Summit Campaign. 
De Mel, S., D. McKenzie, and C. Woodruff, 2009. Are Women More Credit Constrained? 
Experimental Evidence on Gender and Microenterprise Returns, American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics 1, 1-32. 
Deaton, Angus. 1992. Understanding Consumption. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dercon, S., 2002. Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets. The World Bank Reseach 
Observer Vol 17 no.2, pp.141-166. 
Dilley, M., and T. E. Boudreau, 2001. Coming to Terms with Vulnerability: A Critique of the 
Food Security Definition, Food Policy 26, 229-247. 
Dixon, R., J. Ritchie, and J. Siwale, 2007. Loan Officers and Loan ‘Delinquency’ in 
Microfinance: A Zambian Case, Accounting Forum 31, 47-71. 
Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman, 2008. Forecasting Risk Attitudes: An Experimental Study 
Using Actual and Forecast Gamble Choices, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 68, 1-17. 
Ersado, L., 2005. Child Labor and Schooling Decisions in Urban and Rural Areas: 
Comparative Evidence from Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe, World Development 33, 
455-480. 
Fofana, N. B., 2010. Efficacy of Micro-Financing Women's Activities in Côte d'Ivoire: 
Evidence From Rural Areas and HIV/AIDS-Affected Women. Wageningen Academic 
Publisher, Wageningen. 
Galema, R., R. Lensink, and R. Mersland, 2009. Do Powerful CEOs Have an Impact on 
Microfinance Performance?, Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441985  
Galema, R., R. Lensink, and R. Mersland, 2012. Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance 
Performance?, Journal of Management Studies, 1-25. 
References 
 
154 
 
Gangopadhyay, S., M. Ghatak, and R. Lensink, 2005. Joint Liability Lending and the Peer 
Selection Effect, The Economic Journal 115, 1005-1015. 
Garcia-De la Cruz, M., 2011. Evaluacion del Proyecto de Asistencia Tecnica al 
Microfinanciamiento Rural (PATMIR). 
Garcia De la Cruz, M., 2008. Impact of Access to Formal Deposit Facilities and Loans on 
Schooling: Evidence From Rural Households in Mexico.The Ohio State University.  
Ghatak, M., 2000. Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer 
Selection Effect, The Economic Journal 110, 601-631. 
Ghatak, M., and T. W. Guinnane, 1999. The Economics of Lending With Joint Liability: 
Theory and Practice, Journal of Development Economics 60, 195-228. 
Gilligan, C., 1977. In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality, 
Harvard Educational Review 47, 481-517. 
Glaeser, E. L., 2003. The Governance of Not-for-profit Organizations. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1–43. 
Glejser, H., 1969. A New Test for Heteroskedasticity, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 64, 316-323. 
Gregoire, J. R., and O. R. Tuya, 2006. Cost Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions in Peru: A 
Stochastic Frontier Approach, Latin American Business Review 7, 41-70. 
Günther, I., and K. Harttgen, 2009. Estimating Households Vulnerability to Idiosyncratic and 
Covariate Shocks: A Novel Method Applied in Madagascar, World Development 37, 
1222-1234. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, B., C. Serrano-Cinca, and C. Mar Molinero, 2009. Social Efficiency in 
Microfinance Institutions, Journal of the Operational Research Society 60, 104-119. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, B., C. Serrano-Cinca, and C. Mar Molinero, 2007. Microfinance Institutions 
and Efficiency, Omega 35, 131-142. 
Hartarska, V., 2005. Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, World Development 33, 1627-
1643. 
Hartarska, V., S. B. Caudill, and D. M. Gropper, 2006. The Cost Structure of Microfinance 
Institutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. William Davidson Institute, The 
University of Michigan, Working Paper Number 809. 
Hartmann-Wendels, T., T. Mählmann, and T. Versen, 2009. Determinants of Banks’ Risk 
Exposure to New Account Fraud – Evidence From Germany, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 33, 347-357. 
References 
 
155 
 
Hassan, K. M., and D. R. Tufte, 2001. The X-efficiency of a Group-based Lending Institution: 
The Case of the Grameen Bank, World Development 29, 1071-1082. 
Hausman, J. A., and W. E. Taylor, 1981. Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects, 
Econometrica 49, 1377-1398. 
Haveman, R., and B. Wolfe, 1995. The Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of 
Methods and Findings, Journal of Economic Literature 33, 1829-1878. 
Hermes, N., and R. Lensink, 2007. The Empirics of Microfinance: What Do We Know?, The 
Economic Journal 117, F1-F10. 
Hermes, N., R. Lensink, and A. Meesters, 2011. Outreach and Efficiency of Microfinance 
Institutions, World Development 39, 938-948. 
Hermes, N., R. Lensink, and H. T. Mehrteab, 2006. Does the Group Leader Matter? The 
Impact of Monitoring Activities and Social Ties of Group Leaders on the Repayment 
Performance of Group-Based Lending in Eritrea, African Development Review 18, 72-
97. 
Hoff, H., L.M. Bouwer, G. Berz, W. Kron and T. Loster 2003. Risk Management in Water 
and Climate: The Role of Insurance and Other Financial Services. Dialogue on Water 
and Climate, Delft, and Munich Reinsurance Company, Munich. 
Holtman, M., 2001. Designing Financial Incentives to Increase Loan Officer Productivity: 
Handle With Care. The Microbanking Bulleting. pp 5-10 (ed.). 
Holzmann, R., and S. Jørgensen, 2001. Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual 
Framework for Social Protection, and Beyond, International Tax and Public Finance 
8, 529-556. 
Hox, J. J., 2010. Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 382 p. 
Hulme, D., and P. Mosley, 1996. Finance Against Poverty. Routledge, London. 
INEGI, 2011. XIII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2010. Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, Geografía, e Informática. 
Jacoby, H. G., 1994. Borrowing Constraints and Progress Through School: Evidence from 
Peru, The Review of Economics and Statistics 76, 151-160. 
Jacoby, H. G., and E. Skoufias, 1997. Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a 
Developing Country, The Review of Economic Studies 64, 311-335. 
Karlan, D., and J. Appel, 2011. More Than Good Intentions: How a New Economics is 
Helping to Solve Global Poverty. In Dutton: New York. Penguin Group. 
<http://www.poverty-action.org/work/publications> 
References 
 
156 
 
Karlan, D., and J. Zinman, 2010. Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply 
Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, Review of Financial Studies 23, 433-464. 
Kochar, A., 1999. Smoothing Consumption by Smoothing Income: Hours-of-Work Responses 
to Idioyncratic Agricultural Shocks in Rural India, Review of Economics and Statistics 
81, 50-61. 
Kreft, I., and J. D. De Leeuw, 1998. Introducing Multilevel Modeling. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, London, UK, 149 p. 
Kreimer, A., Arnold, M., Barham, C., Freeman, P., Gilbert, R., Krimgold, F., Lester, R., 
Pollner, J.D., Vogt, T., Eds. 1999. Managing Disaster Risk in Mexico: Market 
Incentives for Mitigation. World Bank. 
Kumar, T. S. A., and J. K. Newport, 2005. Role of Microfinance in Disaster Mitigation, 
Disaster Prevention and Management 14, 176-182. 
Labie, M., P.-G. Meon, R. Mersland, and A. Szafarz, 2010. Discrimination by Microcredit 
Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda, DULBEA Working Paper 
No.11-06.RS. 
Labie, M., Mersland, R., 2011. Corporate Governance Challenges in Microfinance, in: 
Armendariz, B., Labie, M. (Eds.), The Handbook of Microfinance World Scientific 
Publishing, pp. 283–300. 
Laffont, J.-J., 2003. Collusion and Group Lending With Adverse Selection, Journal of 
Development Economics 70, 329-348. 
Laffont, J.-J., and T. N'Guessan, 2000. Group Lending With Adverse Selection, European 
Economic Review 44, 773-784. 
Laffont, J.-J., and P. Rey, 2003. Moral Hazard, Collusion and Group Lending. In: IDEI 
Working Papers 122. Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. 
Lansink, A. O., E. Silva, and S. Stefanou, 2001. Inter-Firm and Intra-Firm Efficiency 
Measures, Journal of Productivity Analysis 15, 185-199. 
Larsen, K., and J. Merlo, 2005. Appropriate Assessment of Neighborhood Effects on 
Individual Health: Integrating Random and Fixed Effects in Multilevel Logistic 
Regression, American Journal of Epidemiology 161, 81-88. 
Larsen, K., J. H. Petersen, E. Budtz-Jørgensen, and L. Endahl, 2000. Interpreting Parameters 
in the Logistic Regression Model with Random Effects, Biometrics 56, 909-914. 
Lee, J.-J., and Y. Sawada, 2010. Precautionary Saving Under Liquidity Constraints: Evidence 
From Rural Pakistan, Journal of Development Economics 91, 77-86. 
Lensink, R., and A. Meesters, 2007. Institutions and Bank Performance: A Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965825. 
References 
 
157 
 
Lensink, R., A. Meesters, and I. Naaborg, 2008. Bank Efficiency and Foreign Ownership: Do 
Good Institutions Matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 834-844. 
Lensink, R., and T. T. T. Pham, 2012. The Impact of Microcredit on Self-employment Profits 
in Vietnam, Economics of Transition 20, 73-111. 
Maldonado, J. H., and C. González-Vega, 2008. Impact of Microfinance on Schooling: 
Evidence from Poor Rural Households in Bolivia, World Development 36, 2440-2455. 
Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer, and D. N. Weil, 1992. A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407-437. 
Meeusen, W., and J. van den Broeck, 1977. Efficiency Estimation From Cobb-douglas 
Production Functions With Composed Error, International Economic Review 18, 435-
444. 
Mersland, R., and R. Ø. Strøm, 2009. Performance and Governance in Microfinance 
Institutions, Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 662-669. 
Mester, L. J., 1993. Efficiency in the Savings and Loan Industry, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 17, 267-286. 
Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005. State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report.  
Middendorf, T., 2006. Human Capital and Economic Growth in OECD Countries, Journal of 
Economics and Statistics 226, 670-686. 
Miller, J., 2003. Benchmarking Latin American Microfinance: A Report From the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) ([online] microfinancegateway.org 
<http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//template.rc/1.9.29458>). 
Morduch, J., 1995. Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 9, 103-114. 
Morduch, J., 1999. The Microfinance Promise, Journal of Economic Literature 37, 1569-
1614. 
Mosley, P., 2001. Microfinance and Poverty in Bolivia, Journal of Development Studies 37, 
101-132. 
Niño-Zarazúa, M. A., 2007. The Impact of Credit on Income Poverty in Urban Mexico. An 
Endogeneity-Corrected Estimation. Sheffield Economic Research Paper (SERP) No. 
2007005. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977759>. 
Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006. The Nobel Peace Prize 2006. In: weblink: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html. Press release O, 
October (Ed.). 
References 
 
158 
 
Palier, J., and B. Prevost, 2007. Vulnerability and Risk Mitigation: Microfinance Experiences 
in South India, Mondes en Developpement 35, 103-118. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong Boards, CEO Power and Bank Risk-Taking, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 33, 1340-1350. 
Paxson, C. H., 1992. Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to 
Transitory Income in Thailand, The American Economic Review 82, 15-33. 
Paxton, J., 2007. Contrasting Methodologies for Expanding Microfinance Outreach to the 
Rural Poor: Trade-offs and Lessons from Mexico's PATMIR Project, Savings and 
Development 31, 283-306. 
Paxton, J., 2007. Technical Efficiency in a Semi-Formal Financial Sector: The Case of 
Mexico. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 69, 57-74. 
Paxton, J., and L. Young, 2011. Liquidity Profiles of Poor Mexican Households, World 
Development 39, 600-610. 
Paxton, J. A., 2006. Technical Efficiency in the Rural Financial Sector: Evidence from 
Mexico, The Journal of Developing Areas 39, 101-119. 
Paxton, J. and. F. Zhuo, 2011. Economic Shocks and Savings Behavior by the Rural Poor, 
Economics Bulletin 31, 3286-3293. 
Pitt, Mark M., and Shahidur R. Khandker, 1998. The Impact of Group‐Based Credit Programs 
on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?, Journal 
of Political Economy 106, 958-996. 
Powell, M., and D. Ansic, 1997. Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour in Financial Decision-
Making: An Experimental Analysis, Journal of Economic Psychology 18, 605-628. 
Rabe-Hesketh, S., and A. Skronda, 2005. Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata. 
Stata Press, College Station, TX. 318 p. 
Roodman, D., 2012. Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance. Center for 
Global Development, Baltimore, MD. 
Roodman, D., and J. Morduch, 2009. The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: 
Revisiting the Evidence. Center for Global Development. Working Paper No. 174.      
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=1472073>. 
Roscam  Abbing, M. I., 2010. Loan Officers of Pro Mujer México: An Explorative Case Study 
on Field Workers’ Issues in a Non-Profit Microfinance Institution in Mexico. Msc 
thesis: Wageningen University. 
Rosenzweig, M. R., 1988. Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-
Income Countries, The Economic Journal 98, 1148-1170. 
References 
 
159 
 
SAGARPA, 2007. El PATMIR: Promoviendo el Desarrollo y la Consolidación de un Sistema 
Financiero para el Sector Rural Marginado en México. Edited by L. Ministry of 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA). 
Schultz, T.P., Hollis, C., Srinivasan, T.N., 1988. Education Investments and Returns. Ch. 13, 
In: Handbook of Development Economics. Elsevier, pp. 543-630. 
Schultz, T. W., 1961. Investment in Human Capital, The American Economic Review 51, 1-
17. 
Shah, S., 1999. Coping With Natural Disasters: The 1998 Floods in Bangladesh. Prepared for 
the 1999 World Bank Summer Research Workshop on Poverty and Development, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Shoji, M., 2009. Does Contingent Repayment in Microfinance Help the Poor During Natural 
Disasters?, Journal of Development Studies 46, 191-210. 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1990. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets, The World Bank Economic Review 
4, 351-366. 
Suryahadi, A., S. Sumarto, and L. Pritchett, 2000. Quantifying Vulnerability to Poverty: A 
Proposed Measure, Applied to Indonesia. SSRN eLibrary.  
Swain, R. B., and M. Floro, 2012. Assessing the Effect of Microfinance on Vulnerability and 
Poverty among Low Income Households, Journal of Development Studies 48, 605-
618. 
Taber, L., Cuevas, C., Navarrete, J. & Zapata, G., 2004. Integrating the Poor into the 
Mainstream Financial System: The BANSEFI and SAGARPA Programs in Mexico. 
Tedeschi, G. A., 2008. Overcoming Selection Bias in Microcredit Impact Assessments: A 
Case Study in Peru, Journal of Development Studies 44, 504-518. 
Towsend, R., and C. Woodruff, 2006. Measuring the Reach of PATMIR: An Examination of 
the Characteristics of PATMIR  Clients Using the BANSEFI/SAGARPA Household 
Panel Survey 
.<http://www.bansefi.gob.mx/sectahorrocredpop/investigacionesSACP>. 
Udry, C., 1994. Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in 
Northern Nigeria. The Review of Economic Studies 61, 495-526. 
Varian, H. R., 1990. Monitoring Agents With Other Agents Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics CXLVI, 153-174. 
Vatsa, K.S., Krimgold, F., 2000. Financing Disaster Mitigation for the Poor, In: Kreimer A., 
Arnold, M., Eds. Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies. World 
Bank,Washington, DC, pp.129-136. 
References 
 
160 
 
Vogelgesang, U., 2003. Microfinance in Times of Crisis: The Effects of Competition, Rising 
Indebtedness, and Economic Crisis on Repayment Behavior, World Development 31, 
2085-2114. 
Weill, L., 2004. Measuring Cost Efficiency in European Banking: A Comparison of Frontier 
Techniques, Journal of Productivity Analysis 21, 133-152. 
Wydick, B., 1999. Can Social Cohesion be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence 
from Group Lending in Guatemala, The Economic Journal 109, 463-475. 
Wydick, W. B., 1999. The Effect of Microenterprise Lending on Child Schooling in 
Guatemala, Economic Development and Cultural Change 47, 853-869. 
Zapata, G., 2007. Enabling Policies for the Development of Integrated Financial Services in 
Mexico’s Marginal Rural Areas: Lessons from the Rural Microfinance Technical 
Assistance Project (PATMIR). In: FAO Conference on Rural Finance. SAGARPA 
(Ed.), Mexico. 
Zeller, M., Meyer, R.L., 2002. The Triangle of Microfinance, in: Food Policy Statements 
IFPRI.(Ed.). 
 
  
 161 
 
Summary 
In the early 1970s there was an overriding interest in poverty alleviation; this brought 
microfinance to the attention of donors, governments, and investors as a promising and cost-
effective innovation tool to reduce poverty and to improve economic development 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005; Morduch, 1999). The 
idea was to put in place an organizational model to provide finance to the poor that would 
mitigate the risks and reduce the transaction costs of administering small unsecure loans to 
poor borrowers living in contexts characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard 
problems. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Banco Sol in Bolivia, and Bank Rakyat in Indonesia 
are three examples of pioneering microfinance institutions (MFIs). These institutions work 
through joint liability; this means that all borrowers within a group are jointly liable for each 
other’s loans repayments (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). This system is accompanied by 
dynamic incentives such as the promise of having access to progressive credit for borrowers 
who repay their loans in time and denying future access to defaulter borrowers (Berhane, 
2009; Besley, 1995; Morduch,1999). This latter feature also helps to reduce the default risk.  
The positive viewpoint that microfinance enables poor people to break out of poverty, thus 
contributing to establishing long lasting peace (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006), has led 
to a euphoric attitude among policy makers, aid organizations, and academics about the 
potential role of microfinance. In contrast with this optimistic view, Bateman (2010) argues 
that microfinance is unsuitable for sustainable development and poverty reduction. Also, 
given the economic crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, some people even 
claim that microcredit has induced suicides. However, the lack of serious scientific support of 
both views, positive and negative, has created a desire for empirical studies to inform 
microfinance policy makers and relief organizations on whether microfinance interventions 
should be implemented, and if so, how. Consequently, a broadening of the research agenda is 
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needed in order to allow for the investigation of a long list of unresolved issues. Mosley 
(2001) indicates that many questions remain to be answered concerning the impact of 
microfinance on the different dimensions of poverty. Most studies deal with the impact of 
microcredit on poverty. However, microfinance is much more than microcredit. The main 
innovation of this thesis is the focus on four topics that have received relatively little attention: 
(1) the relationship between efficiency and the ownership structure of MFIs; (2) the relative 
importance of different types of microfinance services on poverty reduction; (3) the impact of 
microfinance on vulnerability to poverty; and (4) the role of microfinance loan managers on 
repayment rates. 
This thesis is also innovative in terms of the broad range of methodologies and the variety of 
data sets we have used. In each case, we use the most appropriated method for the content of 
the study. In Chapter 2, for instance, we use the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
to measure efficiency. This method allows for the observed production of a particular 
institution to deviate from the efficient frontier, due to either random events or possible 
inefficiencies (Gregoire and Tuya, 2006), and incorporates an error term that captures 
irregularities in the data (Paxton, 2007). In contrast, in Chapter 3 we use the Hausman‒Taylor 
(1981) estimator, a method suitable to control for endogeneity problems in impact studies. 
This method uses the variation between and within strictly exogenous variables in other 
periods as instruments (Baltagi, 2001), a convenient feature when good instruments are absent 
in the data. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 we rely on Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test, 
which permits the quantification of performance variability both across-household and within-
household. Finally, in Chapter 5, we use multilevel analysis, which accounts for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity at three different levels (i.e. loan, borrower, and loan officer level).  
Concerning the data sets, in Chapter 2, to study the relationship between ownership structure 
of MFIs and efficiency, we used the well-known MIX market (see www.mixmarket.org) data 
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set consisting of financial and outreach information from different types of MFI ownership 
(e.g. non-governmental organization [NGO], cooperative/credit union, non-bank financial 
intermediary [NBFI], and bank). This data set is unique in terms of the broad coverage of 
MFIs all around the world. The MIX market data set is probably the best data set with balance 
sheet information at the MFI level that is publicly available. We need data at the MFI level to 
conduct the efficiency analyses. However, we also need household-level data to study the 
impact of microfinance. For this part of our study, we relied on household panel data from a 
representative survey conducted in Mexico by the National Savings and Financial Services 
Bank (BANSEFI) from 2004 to 2007. This data set consists of 18,933 observations; one of its 
major advantages is that it differentiates treatment and control households for each 
microfinance program. The inclusion of reliable, predetermined controls in the data set 
improves our ability to identify the impact of the different microfinance programs. This set 
allows for the investigation of two issues: the relative importance of different types of 
microfinance services on poverty reduction in Chapter 3 and the impact of microfinance on 
vulnerability to poverty in Chapter 4. Both the MFI-level data set and the household-level data 
set were readily available. However, we also collected primary data. Hand-collected data 
regarding both loan officers and borrowers in two adjacent regions of Pro Mujer Mexico 
enabled us to investigate the influence of loan managers on repayment rates. 
The study has been carried out using a sample of Latin American MFIs, with a particular 
emphasis on Mexico. In Latin America, we evaluated data from 318 MFIs operating across 18 
countries, whereas in Mexico the study focuses on 6,976 households living in three 
geographical regions (northern, central, and southern) and on 407 borrowers and 57 loan 
officers living in the central region. The study regions are representative of the country and 
reflect diversity in poverty levels, household demographic characteristics, and market 
accessibility.  
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In Chapter 1, we present background information on microfinance, a detailed description of 
each particular research objective, a brief description of the different data sets, microfinance 
programs and of the methods used for the empirical analysis.  
Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which the ownership type of MFI determines the technical 
efficiency of MFIs in Latin America. This question is relevant because it provides some 
evidence on the necessity to account for heterogeneity of goals and ownership types when 
measuring the economic performance of MFIs. In addition, it can help financial authorities 
and microfinance managers to improve their policies in order to achieve sustainability in the 
operation of MFIs. For instance, if NGOs and cooperative/credit unions are inefficient, 
technological innovations accompanied by an appropriated regulatory framework can reduce 
their inefficiency level and bring them towards their optimal production frontier. In line with 
this, the main focus of Chapter 2 is to estimate the intra-type and inter-type efficiency 
(Lansink et al., 2001) of four different types of microfinance organizations: NGOs, credit 
unions, NBFIs, and banks. To do so, we estimate separate production frontiers by means of a 
parametric method, SFA. The results of this examination suggest that non-shareholder MFIs 
(NGOs and credit unions) are less technically efficient and have an inferior technology 
relative to shareholder MFIs (banks and NBFIs). The differences in performance are attributed 
primarily to the managerial characteristics of the inefficient non-shareholder MFIs rather than 
to external effects confronted by the shareholder MFIs, such as regulation and competition.   
Chapter 3 evaluates the poverty impact of five different microfinance programs in Mexico: 
(1) the public savings and credit societies (SACPs); (2) the Rural Microfinance Technical 
Assistance Program (PATMIR); (3) the BANSEFI bank; (4) the traditional MFIs; and (5) the 
COOPERA cash transfers program. This impact analysis is relevant because it can shed some 
light on the real contribution of different types of MFI, some focusing primarily on savings 
and others on microcredit or cash transfers. In addition, the results of this study can help 
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policy makers in Mexico to reorient their policies towards providing assistance to MFIs that 
contribute greatly in terms of poverty reduction and to prevent the immeasurable delivery of 
subsidies to microcredit organizations that do not. The five programs under study have some 
similarities, they all deal with microfinance, although they do differ considerably: SACP and 
PATMIR offer a wide range of financial services, including credit and savings products, 
technical assistance, and marketing of inputs and outputs to their recipients; BANSEFI 
focuses on savings products; the MFI program offers primarily microcredit; and the 
COOPERA program specializes in channeling public cash transfers. Thus, some programs 
focus on savings while others offer primarily microcredit or cash transfers. We have tested 
which of the five microfinance programs has been most effective in improving the well-being 
of microfinance recipients towards a comparable group of non-participants by means of an 
instrumental variable approach, the Hausman‒Taylor (1981) estimator. The findings show 
that savings-oriented microfinance programs outperformed programs that offer primarily 
microcredit in reducing poverty. In this way, we emphasize the role of each microfinance 
program in terms of the type of financial instruments that they offer to their recipients: 
savings, credit, and cash transfers. Thus, our study provides some new evidence on the 
importance of microfinance in general, as well as on the relative contribution of SACPs in 
Mexico in improving the well-being of people in low-income brackets.  
Chapter 4 examines the impact of membership in a savings and credit society on household 
vulnerability to poverty. This is an important question for microfinance policy because it 
unravels the contribution of microfinance as an exante coping strategy in assisting households 
to cope with risk and in preventing them from falling into extreme poverty. Thereafter, 
microfinance policies can be improved in their scope to provide suitable financial instruments 
to their recipients that enable them to mitigate ex ante risk and to reduce their vulnerability to 
poverty. We use Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test to examine the hypothesis that being 
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banked both increases the size of income/expenditures and reduces the variance of 
income/expenditures. If this would indeed be the case, we argue that the vulnerability to 
poverty will decline. The results of this investigation suggest that being a member of a savings 
and credit society improves per capita income, per capita education, and per capita 
expenditure and reduces the variability of these indicators. These findings allow us to 
conclude that membership in a savings and credit society in Mexico reduces vulnerability to 
poverty.  
Chapter 5 focuses on measuring the impact of the loan officer’s characteristics on 
determining repayment rates in group lending microfinance. This is an important issue, 
because it unveils the real contribution of these executives on reducing default probabilities of 
microfinance borrowers participating in joint-liability group lending in microfinance. In 
addition, the results can inform microfinance managers on the hiring and incentive policies of 
the institution, and how these can be improved if necessary in order to progress the overall 
performance of the institution. To explore this issue, we carry out an empirical investigation 
in 18 branches of Pro Mujer Mexico, an NGO working with the village banking methodology. 
This organization operates in seven Mexican States; however, for the purpose of this study, 
we select only four states: Mexico, Puebla, Distrito Federal, and Tlaxcala. These four states 
correspond to two adjacent regions: (1) the Mexico‒Distrito Federal region with 12 branches, 
and (2) the Puebla‒Tlaxcala region, which features six branches. Ultimately, in our study we 
include information taken from a total sample of 650 loans given to 407 borrowers, arranged 
by 57 loan officers. We use a novel method to measure institutional performance called the 
“multilevel approach”; this controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at three 
different levels: loan, borrower, and loan officer. The main findings suggest that the 
characteristics of the loan officers are very significant in explaining loan default probabilities. 
In particular, we find the gender of the loan officer and his/her professional experience to be 
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important determinants of repayment rates. The results suggest that male loan officers are 
better in improving repayment rates of microfinance borrowers than female loan officers and 
that loan officers with previous professional experience in other microfinance organizations 
and those who have been clients of Pro Mujer are better at improving repayment rates. Further 
findings of interest are that loan officers who work longer in Pro Mujer have higher default 
probabilities in their portfolio and that peer monitoring and peer screening of group members 
are not significant determinants of loan default probabilities. The overall findings suggest that 
the personal characteristics of the loan officer are very important in determining repayment 
rates; therefore, this reinforces the need for microfinance managers to revisit their hiring and 
incentives policies to provide the loan officers with the appropriate means to improve the 
quality of their portfolio and the overall institutional performance.  
Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses major outcomes from the empirical investigations that 
cover this study. This is done by returning to the specific research objectives and by 
discussing key findings based on prior microfinance literature on impact evaluation, 
institutional performance, vulnerability to poverty and, loan performance. Furthermore, this 
chapter presents the policy implications derived from the main findings, recognizes the 
limitations of the study, and draws an outline for future research. 
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Samenvatting 
Aan het begin van de jaren ’70 van de vorige eeuw bestond er veel interesse in 
armoedebestrijding; dit bracht microfinanciering onder de aandacht van donoren, overheden 
en investeerders als een veelbelovend, kosteneffectief en innovatief instrument om armoede te 
bestrijden en economische ontwikkeling te stimuleren (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; 
Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005; Morduch, 1999). Het idee was om een 
organisatiemodel op te zetten dat arme mensen van leningen zou voorzien en dat zou leiden 
tot minder risico’s en transactiekosten geassocieerd met het verstrekken van kleine, onveilige 
leningen aan arme kredietnemers die leven in contexten gekenmerkt door asymmetrische 
informatie en moral hazard-problemen. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Banco Sol in Bolivia 
en Bank Rakyat in Indonesië zijn drie voorbeelden van baanbrekende 
microfinancieringsinstellingen (MFI’s). Deze instellingen opereren met hoofdelijke 
aansprakelijkheid, wat inhoudt dat alle kredietnemers binnen een groep gezamenlijk 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor elkaars afbetalingen (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Dit systeem 
bevat verdere dynamische incentives, zoals toegang tot grotere kredieten voor kredietnemers 
die hun leningen op tijd terug betalen, en het ontzeggen van de toegang tot kredieten voor 
wanbetalers (Berhane, 2009; Besley, 1995; Morduch, 1999). Dit laatste kenmerk verlaagt het 
risico van wanbetaling. 
Het positieve uitgangspunt dat arme mensen dankzij microfinanciering aan de armoede 
kunnen ontsnappen en dat dit concept dus bijdraagt aan het komen tot langdurige vrede 
(Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2006), heeft geleid tot een euforische stemming onder 
beleidsmakers, hulporganisaties en academici over de mogelijke rol van microfinanciering. In 
tegenstelling tot deze optimistische houding stelt Bateman (2010) dat microfinanciering niet 
geschikt is voor duurzame ontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding. Gegeven de economische 
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crisis in de zuidelijke Indiase deelstaat Andhra Pradesh stellen sommige mensen zelfs dat 
microkredieten hebben geleid tot zelfmoorden. Het gebrek aan solide wetenschappelijke 
onderbouwing van deze standpunten, zowel positief als negatief, heeft echter geleid tot een 
vraag naar empirisch onderzoek waarmee hulporganisaties en beleidsmakers op het gebied 
van microfinanciering kunnen bepalen of microfinanciering geïmplementeerd dient te worden, 
en zo ja, hoe. Daarom is een verbreding van de onderzoeksagenda noodzakelijk om een groot 
aantal onopgeloste problemen te onderzoeken. Mosley (2001) geeft aan dat veel vragen 
omtrent de impact van microfinanciering op de verschillende dimensies van armoede 
onbeantwoord blijven. De meeste onderzoeken behandelen de impact van microkredieten op 
armoede. Microfinanciering bestaat echter uit meer dan alleen microkredieten. De 
belangrijkste innovatie in dit proefschrift is de focus op vier onderwerpen die relatief 
onderbelicht zijn gebleven: (1) de relatie tussen efficiëntie en de eigendomsstructuur van 
MFI’s; (2) het relatieve belang van verschillende soorten microfinancieringsdiensten voor 
armoedebestrijding; (3) de impact van microfinanciering op de kwetsbaarheid voor armoede; 
en (4) de invloed van kredietmanagers op aflossingspercentages. 
Dit proefschrift is ook innovatief als het gaat om de grote hoeveelheid methodes en de 
verschillende datasets die we gebruikt hebben. In alle gevallen hebben we de methode 
gebruikt die het best paste bij de inhoud van het onderzoek. In hoofdstuk 2, bijvoorbeeld, 
hebben we de ‘parametric stochastic frontier analysis’ (SFA) toegepast om efficiëntie te 
meten. Bij deze methode kan de waargenomen productie van een bepaalde instelling afwijken 
van de ‘efficient frontier’ door random events of mogelijke inefficiënties (Gregoire and Tuya, 
2006) en bestaat er een foutmarge die onregelmatigheden in de data opvangt (Paxton, 2007). 
In hoofdstuk 3 gebruiken we echter de schatter van Hausman‒Taylor (1981), een methode die 
gebruikt wordt om te corrigeren voor endogeniteitsproblemen bij impactonderzoek. Deze 
methode gebruikt de variaties tussen en binnen strikt exogene variabelen in andere periodes 
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als instrumenten (Baltagi, 2001), een handig kenmerk als de data niet beschikt over goede 
instrumenten. Ook gebruiken we in hoofdstuk 4 de heteroskedasticiteitstest van Glejser 
(1969), waarmee we de prestatievariabiliteit tussen en binnen huishoudens kunnen 
kwantificeren. Tot slot voeren we in hoofdstuk 5 een multilevel analyse uit, die corrigeert 
voor de waargenomen en niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit op drie verschillende niveaus 
(lening, kredietnemer en kredietmanager). 
Wat datasets betreft gebruikten we in hoofdstuk 2 de bekende MIX market dataset (zie 
www.mixmarket.org) om de relatie tussen eigendomsstructuur van MFI’s en efficiency te 
onderzoeken. Deze dataset bestaat uit financiële en outreach-informatie van verschillende 
eigendomsstructuren van MFI’s (bijv. niet-gouvernementele organisatie (NGO), 
coöperatieve/kredietunie, niet-bancaire financiële instelling (NBFI) en bank). Deze dataset is 
uniek wat betreft zijn brede dekking van MFI’s over de hele wereld. De MIX market dataset is 
waarschijnlijk de beste dataset met balansinformatie over MFI’s die openbaar beschikbaar is. 
We hebben gegevens nodig op MFI-niveau om efficiëntieanalyses uit te kunnen voeren. We 
hebben echter ook gegevens over huishoudens nodig om de impact van microfinanciering te 
onderzoeken. Voor dit gedeelte van ons onderzoek hebben we gebruikgemaakt van paneldata 
van een representatief onderzoek dat tussen 2004 en 2007 is uitgevoerd door de National 
Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) in Mexico. Deze dataset bestaat uit 18.933 
observaties. Een van zijn grote voordelen is dat deze dataset voor elk 
microfinancieringsprogramma onderscheid maakt tussen huishoudens die microfinanciering 
hebben ontvangen en een controlegroep bestaande uit huishoudens die geen microfinanciering 
ontvangen hebben. Het feit dat een betrouwbare, vooraf bepaalde controlegroep onderdeel 
uitmaakt van de dataset, maakt het voor ons makkelijker om de impact van de verschillende 
microfinancieringsprogramma’s te identificeren. Dankzij deze dataset kunnen wij de volgende 
twee issues onderzoeken: het relatieve belang van verschillende soorten 
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microfinancieringsdiensten voor armoedebestrijding (hoofdstuk 3) en de impact van 
microfinanciering op de kwetsbaarheid voor armoede (hoofdstuk 4). Zowel de dataset op 
MFI-niveau als de dataset op huishoudniveau waren eenvoudig beschikbaar. We verzamelden 
echter ook primaire gegevens. Dankzij handmatig verzamelde gegevens over zowel 
kredietmanagers als kredietnemers in twee aangrenzende regio’s van Pro Mujer Mexico 
konden wij de invloed van kredietmanagers op aflossingspercentages onderzoeken. 
Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd onder een selectie Latijns-Amerikaanse MFI’s, met nadruk op 
Mexico. In Latijns-Amerika evalueerden wij gegevens van 318 MFI’s, werkzaam in 18 
landen, terwijl het onderzoek in Mexico zich richtte op 6.976 huishoudens in drie 
geografische regio’s (noord, centraal, en zuid) en 407 kredietnemers en 57 kredietmanagers in 
de centrale regio. De onderzochte regio’s zijn representatief voor het hele land en vormen een 
afspiegeling van de diversiteit in armoedeniveaus, demografische kenmerken van huishoudens 
en markttoegang. 
In hoofdstuk 1 geven wij achtergrondinformatie over microfinanciering, een gedetailleerde 
omschrijving van alle onderzoeksdoelstellingen en een korte omschrijving van de 
verschillende datasets en methodes gebruikt voor de empirische analyses. 
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de vraag in hoeverre de technische efficiëntie van MFI’s in Latijns-
Amerika bepaald wordt door de eigendomsstructuur van MFI’s. Deze vraag is relevant omdat 
het enig bewijs levert voor de noodzaak om te corrigeren voor de heterogeniteit van 
doelstellingen en eigendomsstructuren bij het meten van de economische prestaties van 
MFI’s. Bovendien kan het financiële autoriteiten en microfinancieringsmanagers helpen bij 
het verbeteren van hun beleid om zo te komen tot duurzaam functioneren binnen MFI’s. Als 
NGO’s en coöperatieve/kredietunies bijvoorbeeld inefficiënt zijn, dan kunnen technologische 
innovaties in combinatie met aangepaste regelgeving dit tegengaan en ze optimaal laten 
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functioneren. De focus van hoofdstuk 2 ligt dan ook op het schatten van de intra-type en inter-
type efficiëntie (Lansink et al., 2001) van vier verschillende soorten 
microfinancieringsorganisaties: NGO’s, kredietunies, NBFI’s en banken. Hiervoor schatten 
wij afzonderlijke productiegrenzen door middel van een parametrische methode, SFA. De 
resultaten van dit onderzoek suggereren dat MFI’s zonder aandeelhouders (NGO’s en 
kredietunies) technisch inefficiënter zijn en over inferieure technologieën beschikken in 
vergelijking met MFI’s met aandeelhouders (banken en NBFI’s). De verschillen in prestaties 
worden vooral toegekend aan bestuurlijke eigenschappen van de inefficiënte MFI’s zonder 
aandeelhouders in plaats van aan externe effecten die MFI’s met aandeelhouders ondervinden, 
zoals regelgeving en concurrentie. 
Hoofdstuk 3 evalueert de impact op armoede van vijf verschillende 
microfinancieringsprogramma’s in Mexico: (1) de openbare spaar- en kredietverenigingen 
(OSKV’s); (2) het Rural Microfinance Technical Assistance Program (PATMIR); (3) de 
National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI); (4) de traditionele MFI’s; en (5) 
het cashtransferprogramma COOPERA. Deze impactanalyse is relevant omdat het een licht 
kan werpen op de daadwerkelijke bijdrage van verschillende soorten MFI’s; sommige richten 
zich primair op sparen, andere op microkredieten of cash transfers. Ook kunnen de resultaten 
van dit onderzoek beleidsmakers in Mexico helpen om hun beleid opnieuw af te stemmen op 
het bieden van ondersteuning aan MFI’s die in grote mate bijdragen aan de 
armoedebestrijding, en om te voorkomen dat er subsidies worden gegeven aan organisaties die 
daar niet aan bijdragen. De vijf programma’s die onderwerp zijn van dit onderzoek hebben 
enkele onderlinge overeenkomsten omdat zij allemaal onder de noemer microfinanciering 
vallen, maar toch verschillen zij substantieel van elkaar: de OSKV’s en PATMIR leveren een 
groot aantal financiële diensten aan de ontvangers, inclusief krediet- en spaarproducten, 
technische ondersteuning en de marketing van inputs en outputs; BANSEFI richt zich op 
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spaarproducten; het MFI-programma verschaft vooral microkredieten; en het COOPERA-
programma specialiseert zich in de begeleiding van publieke cash transfers. Sommige 
programma’s richten zich dus voornamelijk op sparen, terwijl andere programma’s 
voornamelijk microkredieten of cash transfers aanbieden. Door middel van een instrumentele 
variabele aanpak, de schatter van Hausman‒Taylor (1981), hebben wij onderzocht welke van 
de vijf microfinancieringsprogramma’s het meest hebben bijgedragen aan het welzijn van de 
ontvangers van de microfinancieringen in vergelijking met een vergelijkbare groep niet-
deelnemers. De resultaten tonen aan dat microfinancieringsprogramma’s gericht op sparen 
beter presteerden op het gebied van armoedebestrijding dan programma’s die voornamelijk 
microkredieten leveren. Op deze manier benadrukken wij de rol van alle 
microfinancieringsprogramma’s wat betreft de soorten financiële instrumenten die zij leveren 
aan hun ontvangers: sparen, krediet en cash transfers. Ons onderzoek levert dus nieuw bewijs 
voor het belang van microfinanciering in het algemeen, alsmede voor de relatieve bijdrage 
van OSKV’s in Mexico aan het verbeteren van het welzijn van de mensen met lagere 
inkomens. 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de impact van lidmaatschap van een spaar- en kredietvereniging op 
de kwetsbaarheid van huishoudens voor armoede. Dit is een belangrijk aspect van 
microfinancieringsbeleid, omdat het de bijdrage van microfinanciering ontrafelt als een ex 
ante copingstrategie die huishoudens helpt om te gaan met risico’s en voorkomt dat ze in 
zware armoede belanden. Daarna kan het microfinancieringsbeleid verbeterd worden zodat 
ontvangers kunnen beschikken over geschikte financiële instrumenten waarmee zij ex ante 
risico’s kunnen voorkomen en hun kwetsbaarheid voor armoede kunnen verminderen. Wij 
gebruiken de heteroskedasticiteitstest van Glejser (1969) om de hypothese te testen dat klant 
zijn bij een bank zowel de omvang van inkomsten/uitgaven vergroot als de variantie van 
inkomsten/uitgaven verkleint. Als dit inderdaad het geval is, dan stellen wij dat de 
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kwetsbaarheid voor armoede zal afnemen. De resultaten van dit onderzoek suggereren dat 
lidmaatschap van een spaar- en kredietorganisatie het inkomen, de opleiding en de uitgaven 
per hoofd van de bevolking verhoogt en de variabiliteit van deze indicatoren verlaagt. Op 
basis van deze bevindingen concluderen wij dat lidmaatschap van een spaar- en 
kredietorganisatie in Mexico de kwetsbaarheid voor armoede vermindert. 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op het meten van de impact van de eigenschappen van een 
kredietmanager op het vaststellen van het aflossingspercentage van groepsleningen binnen 
microfinanciering. Dit is een belangrijk issue omdat het inzicht verschaft in de daadwerkelijke 
invloed van deze managers op het verkleinen van de kans op wanbetaling van kredietnemers 
die deelnemen aan groepsleningen met gedeelde aansprakelijkheid. Ook kunnen de resultaten 
microfinancieringsmanagers inzicht verschaffen in het aanname- en beloningsbeleid van de 
instelling en de manier waarop dit beleid, indien nodig, verbeterd kan worden om de 
algemene resultaten van de instelling te verbeteren. Om dit issue te onderzoeken voeren wij 
een empirisch onderzoek uit binnen 18 vestigingen van Pro Mujer Mexico, een NGO die 
opereert volgens de ‘village banking’-methode. Hoewel deze organisatie actief is in zeven 
Mexicaanse staten, richten wij ons voor dit onderzoek op vier staten: Mexico, Puebla, Distrito 
Federal en Tlaxcala. Deze vier staten komen overeen met twee aangrenzende regio’s: (1) de 
Mexico-Distrito Federal region met 12 vestigingen, en (2) de Puebla-Tlaxcala region met zes 
vestigingen. In totaal omvat ons onderzoek informatie over 650 leningen die zijn verstrekt aan 
407 kredietnemers en zijn beheerd door 57 kredietmanagers. We gebruiken een nieuwe 
methode, de multilevel benadering, om de prestaties van de instellingen te meten; deze 
methode corrigeert voor waargenomen en niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit op drie 
verschillende niveaus: lening, kredietnemer, en kredietmanager. De belangrijkste bevindingen 
suggereren dat de eigenschappen van de kredietmanagers vaak van significant belang zijn 
voor het verklaren van de kans op wanbetaling. Vooral het geslacht van de kredietmanager en 
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zijn of haar professionele ervaring bleken bepalende factoren te zijn bij het vaststellen van 
aflossingspercentages. De resultaten suggereren dat mannelijke kredietmanagers beter zijn in 
het verbeteren van aflossingspercentages van ontvangers van microfinanciering dan 
vrouwelijke kredietmanagers. Ook suggereren de resultaten dat kredietmanagers met eerdere 
professionele ervaring bij andere microfinancieringsorganisaties of die cliënt zijn geweest bij 
Pro Mujer, beter zijn in het verbeteren van aflossingspercentages. Verdere interessante 
bevindingen zijn dat kredietmanagers die langer bij Pro Mujer werkzaam zijn, grotere kansen 
op wanbetaling in hun portfolio hebben en dat onderlinge controle of screening van 
groepsleden geen significante bepalende factoren zijn voor de kans op wanbetaling. De 
algemene bevindingen suggereren dat de persoonlijke eigenschappen van de kredietmanager 
van groot belang zijn bij het vaststellen van aflossingspercentages; dit versterkt de noodzaak 
dat microfinancieringsmanagers hun aanname- en beloningsbeleid herzien zodat 
kredietmanagers over de juiste middelen kunnen beschikken om de kwaliteit van hun portfolio 
en de prestaties van de instelling in het algemeen te verbeteren. 
Hoofdstuk 6 vat de belangrijkste uitkomsten van de empirische onderzoeken samen en 
bespreekt deze. Er wordt teruggegrepen op de specifieke onderzoeksdoelstellingen en de 
belangrijkste bevindingen worden besproken tegen de achtergrond van bestaande literatuur 
over microfinanciering: over impactevaluatie, prestaties van instellingen, kwetsbaarheid voor 
armoede en kredietprestaties. Verder bespreekt dit hoofdstuk de gevolgen voor het beleid die 
uit deze bevindingen voortkomen, de beperkingen van dit onderzoek en mogelijkheden voor 
toekomstig onderzoek. 
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Resumen 
Al inicio de los años 1970s se generó un interés preponderante en reducción de la pobreza. 
Este hecho trajo consigo la atención hacia las microfinanzas por parte de donadores, 
gobiernos e inversionistas como una herramienta innovadora, prometedora y eficiente en 
costos que permitía reducir pobreza y mejorar el desarrollo económico (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010; Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2005; Morduch, 1999). La idea fue 
implementar un modelo de organización para proveer financiamiento a los pobres y que 
pudiera reducir los riesgos y los costos de transacción de administrar prestamos pequeños e 
inseguros a prestamistas pobres que viven en contextos caracterizados por asimetrías de 
información y problemas de riesgo moral. El Banco Grameen en Bangladesh, el Banco Sol en 
Bolivia, y el Banco Rakyat in Indonesia son tres ejemplos de  instituciones microfinancieras 
(MFIs) pioneras. Esas instituciones trabajan por medio de responsabilidad mutua; esto implica 
que todos los prestamistas dentro de un grupo son mutuamente responsables por la 
recuperación de préstamos de cada integrante del grupo (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Este 
sistema se acompaña de incentivos dinámicos como la promesa de acceder a crédito 
progresivo para prestamistas que cumplen con sus pagos puntualmente y la negación de dicho 
acceso a los prestamistas morosos (Berhane, 2009; Besley, 1995; Morduch, 1999). Esta última 
característica también ayuda a reducir el riesgo de mora. 
El punto de vista positivo de que las microfinanzas permiten a la gente pobre salir de la 
pobreza, factor que contribuye a establecer paz de largo plazo (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 
2006), ha conducido a una actitud eufórica entre tomadores de decisiones, organizaciones 
filantrópicas, y académicos acerca del role potencial de las microfinanzas. En contraste con 
este punto de vista optimista, Bateman (2010) argumenta que las microfinanzas son 
inapropiadas para un desarrollo sostenible y para la reducción de la pobreza. Asimismo, dada 
la crisis económica en el sur del estado Indio de Andhra Pradesh, alguna gente incluso afirma 
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que el microcrédito ha inducido suicidios. Sin embargo, la falta de un soporte científico serio 
de ambos puntos de vista, el positivo y el negativo, ha creado una necesidad de estudios 
empíricos que sean informativos para los tomadores de decisiones de las microfinanzas y 
organizaciones filantrópicas sobre si las intervenciones microfinancieras  deberían ser 
implementadas, y de ser así, cómo. Consecuentemente, una amplia agenda de investigación es 
necesaria que permita la investigación de una lista amplia de aspectos no resueltos. Mosley 
(2001) indica que muchas preguntas permanecen sin respuesta en relación al impacto de las 
microfinanzas en las diferentes dimensiones de la pobreza. La mayoría de estudios refieren al 
estudio del impacto del microcrédito en la pobreza. Sin embargo, las microfinanzas son 
mucho mas que microcrédito. La principal innovación de esta tesis es el énfasis en cuatro 
temas que han recibido relativamente una atención limitada: (1) la relación entre eficiencia y 
el tipo de estructure de propiedad de las IMFs; (2) la importancia relativa de diferentes tipos 
de servicios financieros en la reducción de pobreza; (3) el impacto de las microfinanzas en la 
vulnerabilidad hacia la pobreza; y (4) el papel de los oficiales de crédito en la microfinanzas 
en tasas de recuperación.  
Esta tesis es también innovadora en términos del amplio rango de metodologías y de la 
variedad de bases de datos que hemos utilizado. En cada caso, hemos utilizado el método más 
apropiado para abordar el tema de estudio. En el Capítulo 2 por ejemplo, hemos utilizado el 
análisis estocástico de fronteras (SFA) para medir la eficiencia. Este método permite que la 
producción observada de una institución particular pueda desviarse de la frontera eficiente 
debido a eventos aleatorios o posibles ineficiencias (Gregoire and Tuya, 2006), e incorporar 
un termino de error que captura irregularidades en los datos (Paxton, 2007). En contraste, en 
el Capítulo 3 hemos utilizado el estimador Hausman‒Taylor (1981), un método conveniente 
para controlar problemas de endogeneidad en estudios de impacto. Este método usa la 
variación entre y dentro de variables estrictamente exógenas en otros periodos como 
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instrumentos (Baltagi, 2001), una propiedad conveniente ante la ausencia de instrumentos 
apropiados en los datos. Adicionalmente, en el Capítulo 4 nos hemos basado en el test de 
heterocedasticidad Glejser’s (1969), el cual permite la cuantificación de variabilidad de 
desempeño de ambos, entre-hogares y dentro-hogares. Finalmente, en el Capítulo 5, hemos 
utilizado un análisis de niveles múltiples de datos, el cual toma en cuenta la heterogeneidad 
observable y no observable a tres niveles diferentes (por ejemplo, a nivel de préstamo, de 
prestamista y de oficial de crédito). 
En lo que respecta a las bases de datos, en el Capítulo 2, para analizar la relación entre la 
estructura de propiedad de las IMFs y su eficiencia, hemos utilizado la renombrada base de  
datos Mix Market (ver  www.mixmarket.org) que consiste de información financiera y 
cobertura de diferentes tipos de estructuras de propiedad de IMFs (por ejemplo organizaciones 
no gubernamentales [ONGs], cooperativa/unión de crédito, intermediario financiero no 
bancario [IFNB], y banco). Esta base de datos es única en términos de la amplia cobertura de 
IMFs a nivel mundial. La base de datos Mix Market es probablemente  la mejor base de datos 
con la información del balance general a nivel de la IMF que esta públicamente disponible. 
Hemos requerido datos a nivel de la IMF para conducir el análisis de eficiencia. Sin embargo, 
también hemos necesitado datos a nivel del hogar para estudiar el impacto de las 
microfinanzas. Para cubrir esta parte de la investigación, nos hemos basado en panel de datos 
de los hogares de una encuesta representativa conducida en México por parte del Banco 
Nacional del Ahorro y Servicios Financieros (BANSEFI) de 2004 a 2007. Esta base de datos 
consiste de 18,933 observaciones; una de sus mayores ventajas es que permite diferenciar 
entre  hogares de  tratamiento y hogares de control para cada programa microfinanciero. La 
inclusión de controles confiables y predeterminados en la base de datos mejora nuestra 
habilidad para identificar el impacto de diferentes programas microfinancieros. Esta base 
permite la investigación de dos aspectos: la importancia relativa de diferentes tipos de 
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servicios financieros en la reducción de pobreza en el Capítulo 3 y el impacto de las 
microfinanzas en la vulnerabilidad hacia la pobreza  en el Capítulo 4. Ambas bases de datos, a 
nivel de MFIs  y a nivel de los hogares, estuvieron fácilmente accesibles. Sin embargo, 
también hemos recolectado información primaria. Recopilación primaria de información 
concerniente a ambos, oficiales de crédito y prestamistas, en dos regiones adyacentes de Pro 
Mujer México nos permitió investigar la influencia de los oficiales de crédito en tasas de 
recuperación. 
El estudio se llevó a cabo usando una muestra de IMFs de América Latina, con un énfasis 
particular en México. En América Latina, hemos evaluado datos de 318 IMFs operando en 18 
países, mientras que en México, el estudio está enfocado a 6,976 hogares ubicados en tres 
regiones geográficas (norte, centro y sur), y a 407 prestamistas y 57 oficiales de crédito 
localizados en la región central. Las regiones de estudio son representativas del país y reflejan 
la diversidad en niveles de pobreza, características demográficas de los hogares, y acceso al 
mercado. 
En el Capítulo 1, presentamos antecedentes sobre las microfinanzas, una descripción 
detallada de cada objetivo específico de investigación, una descripción breve de las  diferentes 
bases de datos, de los programas microfinancieros,  y de los métodos usados para los análisis 
empíricos. 
Capítulo 2 evalúa hasta que punto el tipo de estructura de propiedad de la IMF determina la 
eficiencia técnica de las IMFs in América Latina. Esta pregunta es relevante debido a que 
provee alguna evidencia sobre la necesidad de tomar en cuenta la heterogeneidad en metas y 
tipos de propiedad en la medición del desempeño económico de las IMFs. Adicionalmente, 
esta puede ayudar a las autoridades financieras y a los administradores de microfinancieras a 
mejorar sus políticas a fin de lograr la sostenibilidad en la operación de las IMFs. Por 
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ejemplo, si las ONGs y cooperativas/uniones de crédito son ineficientes, innovaciones 
tecnológicas acompañadas de un marco regulatorio apropiado pueden reducir su nivel de 
ineficiencia y un mayor acercamiento hacia su frontera óptima de producción. De acuerdo con 
esto, el énfasis principal del Capítulo 2 es estimar la eficiencia intra-tipo y entre-tipo 
(Lansink, et al., 2001) de cuatro tipos diferentes de organizaciones microfinancieras: ONGs, 
uniones de crédito, IFNB, y bancos. Para esto, hemos estimado fronteras separadas de 
producción por medio de un método paramétrico, Análisis Estocástico de Fronteras (ASF). 
Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que IMF no-accionistas (ONGs and uniones de 
crédito) son técnicamente menos eficientes y tienen una tecnología inferior en comparación 
con IMF accionistas (bancos y IFNB). Las diferencias en desempeño se atribuyen 
primordialmente a las características gerenciales de las IMFs ineficientes no-accionistas más 
que a factores externos confrontados por las IMFs accionistas tales como regulación y 
competencia. 
Capítulo 3 evalúa el impacto de pobreza de cinco programas microfinancieros diferentes en 
México: (1) las sociedades públicas de ahorro y crédito (SACPs); (2) el Programa de 
Asistencia Técnica al Microfinanciamiento Rural (PATMIR); (3) el banco BANSEFI; (4) las 
IMFs tradicionales; y (5) el programa de transferencias públicas COOPERA. Este análisis de  
impacto es relevante debido a que puede proveer alguna evidencia sobre la contribución real 
de diferentes tipos de IMFs, algunas con un enfoque primordial en el ahorro y otras en el 
microcrédito o en las trasferencia públicas. Adicionalmente, los resultados de este estudio 
pueden servir de base a los tomadores de decisiones en México a reorientar sus políticas hacia 
proveer asistencia a IMFs que contribuya ampliamente en términos de reducción de la pobreza 
y a prevenir la trasferencia desmesurada de subsidios a organizaciones de microcrédito que no 
contribuyen. Los cinco programas de microfinanciamiento objeto de éste estudio tienen 
algunas similitudes, todos ellos abordan microfinanzas, aunque difieren considerablemente: 
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SACP y PATMIR ofrecen un amplio rango de servicios financieros, incluyendo crédito y 
productos de ahorro, asistencia técnica, y comercialización de insumos y productos a sus 
socios; BANSEFI se enfoca en productos de ahorro; el programa de IMFs ofrece 
predominantemente microcrédito; y el programa COOPERA se especializa en canalizar 
transferencias públicas de recursos.  De esta forma, algunos programas se enfocan al ahorro 
mientras que otros ofrecen primordialmente microcrédito o transferencias en efectivo. 
Nosotros hemos probado cual de los cinco programas microfinanceros ha sido más efectivo en 
mejorar el nivel de bienestar  de los beneficiarios de microfinanzas en relación a un grupo 
comparativo de no beneficiarios por medio de un método de variables instrumentales, el 
estimador Hausman‒Taylor (1981). Los resultados muestran que los programas 
microfinancieros enfocados al ahorro superan los programas que ofrecen principalmente 
microcrédito en reducción de la pobreza. De esta manera, enfatizamos el papel de cada 
programa microfinanciero en términos del tipo de instrumentos financieros que ofrecen a sus 
beneficiarios: ahorros, crédito, y transferencia de recursos públicos. Así, nuestro estudio 
provee nueva evidencia empírica sobre la importancia de las microfinanzas en general, así 
como también sobre la contribución relativa de las SACPs en México en mejorar el nivel de 
bienestar de los grupos de bajos ingresos. 
Capítulo 4 analiza el impacto de ser socio de una sociedad de ahorro y crédito en la 
vulnerabilidad de los hogares hacia la pobreza. Esta es una pregunta importante para la 
política microfinanciera debido a que permite dilucidar la contribución de las microfinanzas 
como una estrategia ex ante en asistir los hogares para hacer frente al riesgo y para prevenir su 
caída en pobreza extrema. Posteriosr a esto, las políticas microfinancieras se pueden mejorar 
en su alcance para proveer instrumentos financieros apropiados a sus beneficiarios que les 
permitan mitigar el riesgo ex ante y reducir su vulnerabilidad hacia la pobreza. Nosotros 
usamos el test de heterocedasticidad Glejser’s (1969) a fin de examinar la hipótesis de que el 
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ser bancarizado de forma silmultánea, incrementa el volumen de ingreso/gasto y reduce la 
varianza de nivel de ingresos/gastos. Si este fuera el caso, nosotros argumentamos que la 
vulnerabilidad hacia la pobreza podría reducirse. Los resultados de esta investigación sugieren 
que el ser miembro de una sociedad de ahorro y crédito mejora el nivel de ingreso per capita, 
de educación per capita, y de gasto per capita y reduce la variabilidad de dichos indicadores. 
Esos resultados nos permiten concluir que la membresía en una sociedad de ahorro y crédito 
en México reduce la vulnerabilidad hacia la pobreza.    
Capítulo 5 se enfoca en medir el impacto de las características de los oficiales de crédito en la 
determinación de las tasas de recuperación en préstamo grupal en microfinanzas. Este es un 
aspecto importante debido a que éste esclarece la contribución real de esos ejecutivos en 
reducir la probabilidad de mora de prestamistas microfinnacieros que participan en préstamos 
grupales de responsabilidad mutua en microfinanzas. Además, los resultados pueden ser 
informativos para los administradores de microfinancieras sobre como mejorar las políticas de 
contratación y de incentivos institucionales y sobre como éstas pueden contribuir al mejorar el 
desempeño general de la institucion. A fin de explorar este aspecto, hemos conducido una 
investigación empírica en 18 oficinas de Pro Mujer México, una organización microfinanceira 
que trabaja con la metodología de banca comunal. Esta organización opera en 7 estados 
mexicanos; sin embargo, para fines de este estudio, hemos seleccionado solo cuatro estados: 
México, Puebla, Distrito Federal, y Tlaxcala. Esos cuatro estados corresponden a dos regiones 
adyacentes: (1) la región México-Distrito Federal con 12 oficinas, y (2) la región Puebla-
Talaxcala con seis oficinas.  Al final, hemos incluido en nuestro estudio información sobre 
una muestra total de 650 préstamos ofrecidos a 407 prestamistas administrados por 57 
oficiales de crédito. Hemos usado un método novedoso para medir el desempeño institucional 
conocido como “análisis de niveles múltiples” el cual toma en cuenta la heterogeneidad 
observable y no observable a tres niveles diferentes: préstamo, prestamista y oficial de crédito. 
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Los hallazgos principales siguieren que las características de los oficiales de crédito son muy 
significativas en explicar la probabilidad de mora. 
En específico, hemos encontrado que el género de los oficiales de crédito así como su 
experiencia profesional son factores importantes que determinan las tasas de recuperación. 
Los resultados siguieren que los oficiales de crédito masculinos son mejores en mejorar las 
tasas de recuperación de créditos que los oficiales de crédito femeninos y que los oficiales de 
crédito con experiencia profesional previa en otras organizaciones microfinancieras y  
aquellos que han sido clientes de Pro  Mujer son mejores en mejorar las tasas de recuperación. 
Resultados adicionales de interés se refieren a que los oficiales de crédito que han trabajado  
por más tiempo en Pro Mujer tienen una alta probabilidad de mora en su cartera  y que la 
supervisión y seguimiento de integrantes del grupo no determinan de una manera significativa 
las probabilidades de mora. Los resultados generales siguieren que las características 
personales de los oficiales de crédito son importantes  determinantes de las tasas de 
recuperacion; consecuentemente, esto refuerza la necesidad de que los administradores de 
microfinancieras revisen sus políticas de contratación y de incentivos a fin de proveer a los 
oficiales de crédito los medios apropiados para mejorar la calidad de su cartera  y con esto el 
desempeño general de la institucion. 
Capítulo 6 sintetiza y discute los resultados principales de las investigaciones empíricas que 
comprende este estudio. Esto se lleva a cabo mediante una recapitulación de los objetivos  
específicos de investigación y por medio de una discusión de los resultados principales que se 
basa en literatura microfinanciera previa sobre evaluación de impacto, desempeño 
institucional, vulnerabilidad hacia pobreza, y desempeño de crédito. Adicionalmente, este 
capítulo presenta las implicaciones de política que se derivan de los resultados principales, 
reconoce las limitaciones del estudio,  señala y  determina futuras líneas de  investigación. 
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